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r : , . IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
THE CHESAPEAICE .AND OHIO RAIL WAY COMPANY 
v. 
HELEN MAY 1iEYER, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE. 
ESTAT-E OF GEO~GE E:OGAR MEYER, 
DECEASED. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR AND 
SUPERSEDEAS. 
To the Hon.ofable J'ltages of tl~e Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia: 
The petition of The dhesap~ake .and Ohio Ra.Uway Com:-
pany re~pectfully represents that it is aggrieved by a :final 
judgment of. the Law .& Eq11ity Cqurt of th~ City of Rich-
~ond, Part I.I, entered ,on the 23rd day of Deeeni.ber, 1926, 
~n favor of the plai.ntiff against your petitioner, for Eight 
Thousand Six ;Hun<jred Dollars ($8,600.00), the amount of 
damages by ~ jury in their verdict ascertained in an action 
at law, wherein the 1\ilaryland Casualty Co~pany, suing hi 
the name of Ifelen May Meyer, Administratrix of the estate 
of George Edgar Meyer, deceased, was plaintiff iand your 
petitioner was defendant. The parties will be hereinafter re.;. 
~ ferred to as the plaintiff and defendant, respectively. 
THE FACTS. 
Herewith presented is a. transcript of the record from 
~vhich it will appear that this action. was an action of deatP, 
by wrongful act, based upon the death of _pla.intiff's decedent, 
George Edgar Meyer ... He w~s shoWn to have been killed 
as the result of a collision between an automobile in which 
--- ---~- . ----- -- -
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·he was riding, and a train of the defendant company, which 
occurred within the corporate limits of the Town of Mineral, 
'Virginia, at a point where the public street known as First 
Street crosses the defendant's main line track at grade. 
On the evening of April15, 1925, shortly after eight o'clock, 
-1\{eyer, who was a traveling salesman, riding in an open tour-
ing car, left . a garage Ioca ted several miles west of Mineral, 
with the intention of going to the Iviineral Hotel. In proceed-
ing to this destination by way of the J e:fferson Highway, which 
extends from Charlottesville to Richmond, in a general 
easterly and 'vesterly directio~, the car was being driven by 
a Mrs. Mapes, wife of the garage proprietor, who was there-
fore seated on the left front seat. Linwood Baker, a boy four-
teen years old, was riding on the front seat with l\{rs. Mapes, 
. while Meyer was loooted on the rear seat alone. 
In entering Mineral from the west, the Jefferson High-
way, which within the town limjts is also known as Main 
Street or Mineral A venue, is practically parallel with the 
right of way of the defendant company which is on its 
northerly side. On this right of way are three tracks, two 
of· which are side or passing tracks, with a main line track 
in between therri. 
First Street extends out in a northerly direction at right 
an$!les to the J e:fferson Highway, and crosses the defendant's 
right .of way at a distance of approximately 150 feet froin 
·the highwa.y. The defendant's station and station grounds 
are immediately north of the right of 'vay and west of First 
Street, while the Mineral Hotel is on the same side of the 
ril!ht of way and east .of First Street. 
The Mapes car with its occupants had turned into Firs.t 
Street and was proceeding northwardly across the defen-
dant's right of way when it was struck by a westbound pas-
senger train on the main line track. .As a result of the col-
lision all of the occupants of the automobile were throwrl 
out on the north side of the track. Mrs. Mapes and Lin-
'vood Baker were rendered unconscious and Meyer was killed 
almost instantly. ·. 
The uncontradicted testimony of a number of witnesses 
showed that the automobile had almost completely cleared t.he 
track when the train locomotive collided with its rig-ht rear 
wheel and fender. A singular feature of the accident was 
that the automobile was not turned over or pushed forward 
any distance but was merely sle,ved around, in such manner 
as to indicate it 'vas struck a glancing blow. The train 
which consisted of the engine and six cars, was stopped in 
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practically its own length. It was shown to be a through 
train not scheduled to stop at Mineral. 
Linwood Baker, the only occupant of the car who was 
living a.t the time of the trial, testified as follows regarding 
the occurrence of the accident (Rec., pp. 45-46): 
"Q. Which way did you go when you left Mr. Mapes' 
~~' ~ 
A. We came right straight down the road toward Mineral. 
Q. When you reached the first street in the City of Mineral 
which way did you go then? 
A. We turned short to the left. 
Q. And First Street, does that cross the railroad tracks 
there? · 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. No,v, Mr. Baker, I want you to tell the jury as best 
you can what happened after you turned into First Street 
there at Mineral and started. across the track! 
A. After we turned into the First Street to cross the 
tracks, we went on up to the track; I d. on 't know whether she 
stopped or not, but I know she cut the car in second gear, 
changed gears in the car (I don't know 'vhether in se.cond 
or first), and she started across the track, and when we got 
mighty near up on top the ·track, say, up on top the track, 
I saw a big light right beside me just about as far as from 
here to that thing over.there (indicating), and I didn't know 
'vhether it was an automobile or train; and that is all I re-
member." 
On cross examination of this witness regarding a state-
ment to Mr. Dunn, the defendant's claim agent, the follow-
ing oc_curred ( Rec., pp. 53-54) : 
'' Q. I am going to ask you if you did not make this state-
ment to him on April 18th, 1925, at the Martha Jefferson 
Hospital at Charlottesville: 
''I am fourteen years old, birthday May 8th, residence 
Louisa, Va., and I live with Mr. C. A. Mapes. On April 
15th, 1925, I was in Oakland auto being driven by Mrs. Mapes. 
I was on the front seat with her and we were taking Mr. 
Meyers to the hotel at ~Iiueral, he was on back -seat. . We 
left our garage a few minutes past eight. It is about four 
and three-quarter miles from garage to Mineral. Headlight 
on auto burning, and as we approached railway crossing, 
speed between five and ten miles an hour, I do not remem-
ber whether or not auto stopped before going on crossing, 
4- Iri the Supr~me Court of Appeais of Virginia~ 
but ·auto had slowed down after we turned off cement TOad 
towards crossing. Before that we had been running betwe~l~ 
ten and fifteen miles an 'hour. I did not look to see if· the 
train was coming, did not hear the train and did ·not see it 
until auto got on trl:lck and engine then 'vas fifteen feet 
from auto. I could have seen the train coming for som~ 
distance down the. tr.ack before . auto got on track if I had 
looked, and could have seen train coming for at least three 
hundred yards. Engine on auto ran about medium and we 
~ould ha~e .seen and heard the train if 've had stopped and 
looked. I do hot know whether or not train blew for cross~ 
h~[ o:~; ~.ngine hell ringing. I did not hear them. 
tJ. D1d you make that ~tatement to Mr. Dunn? 
A. I don't remember whether I made that statement or not~ 
It seems like I remember something· about it, but I can't re-
meinber. · 
_Q. Do you deny that statement as being correct now, a cor~ 
rect statement T 
A. No, sir, I don;~- de11y it because I can't remember it. 
_ Q. Do yoil deny that as being a correct statement of the 
facts~ 
A. No, sir, I do not." 
Roberts; the P.reman on the ciefendailt~s 9ngine, who was 
seated op the side of the engine fr'oni which the Mapes car 
approacJied -~11e track, testified as follows (Rec., pp. 91, 92, 93,: 
94, 951 9S, 100) : 
'~Q._ Will you state just what yon kno'\v about the ~ccidentY 
A. I was sitting on the left side looking out. I noticed 
this car GOmiilg up to the crossing when we were approaching 
close to it and the car 'vas appr"oaching close to it. I fo~nd 
he wasn't going to make any effort t9 stop and I holloed to 
the engineer to hold her. He immediately threw the brakes 
into emergency. 
Q. How far away 'vas the car? 
A_. l would judge about twenty-five feet from the crossing.,_ 
a~ the time I saw him---=aborit twenty-five or thirty feet, some;.; . 
thing _like that. _ · 
Q. I-I ow far was th~ engine, would you say? 
A. We '\vere about the same distance. 
Q. .About the same distance? 
A. Yes, sir. 
. Q. Do you remeinber any signals being bio~ in apprdacii.:. 
1ng there? 
-~·-····-·;·:, .. 
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A. Yes, sir, station signal was blown. 
Q. How far off was that blo·wn ~ 
A. :Half a mile from the station. 
Q. Is that where the whistle post is 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Any other signal blown' 
A. Two road crossings between the whistle post and this 
crossing at the station. 
Q. What signal was blown for that? 
A. Two long and two short for each crossing. 
Q. Was there a separate signal blown for this crossing? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Two long and two shorts ? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. 1\{r. Roberts, can you say about how far you were away 
from this crossing at the time the crossing whistle was blown 
for the second crossing? 
A. I would say about hvo hundred and twenty-five or fifty 
yards when the whistle started blowing. 
Q. Do you know how far you 'vere at the time it stopped 
blowing the last time Y 
A. When it stopped blowing I don't think it was over fifty 
or seventy-five feet from the crossing. 
* * * * • 
Q. Do you remember anything about the bell on the engine? 
A. The bell was ringing, yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know when it started to ring and when it 
stopped ringing? 
A. We have automatic bell ringer'S, or air bell ringers, 
operated by air. It is right many crossings. It commenced 
at Pendleton and continued until we passed Mineral until we 
stopped. 
Q. Do you know of your own knowledge it did thatt 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you remember when it stopped ringing? 
A. The engineer shut it off after he stopped the engine. 
Q. After passing the crossing~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
* 
Q. Mr. Roberts, ''rhat was your position~ ·You say you 
were sitting on the seat box towards the station, which way 
were you facing? 
A. I was facing the way the engine was going. 
Q. Facing- ahead, the way· the engine was going? 
A. Yes, sir. 
~ r;,= 
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Q. Could you have seen this automobile any sooner than 
you did by taking any other position Y · 
A. No, sir. · 
Q. What did you do when you realized that the car was 
coming and wasn't going to stop? · · 
· A. Holloed to the engineer to hold it, and, if I remember 
I said, 'An automobile!' That is the words that passed be. 
tween me and the engineer at the time. He put the brake's 
right in emergency. 
Q. Was that done right instantly Y 
A. Instantly. 
Q .. Do you know what kind of a stop he madeY 
A. We considered it a good stop that he made~ He only 
ran an engine. length and about five or six cars I think. The 
rear car stopped on the crossing. 
Q. Do you know at what rate of speed the engine was going 
through Mineral? 
A. He was running between twelve and fifteen miles an 
hour. 
Q. You didn't think he was running over fifteen T 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Had you slowed up any in coming into Mineral Y 
A. Yes, sir, we had slowed up considerably. We were a 
little ahead of the time when we approached Mineral. We 
were killing tfme through Mineral. We were due there at 
8 :31 ; 've were right on the second. We were a little ahead 
of time if we hadn't. 
* ~ * * • 
Q. Now, did you see Mr. 1\{eyer on the car anywhere? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What position was he on in the car? 
A. He was sta~ding on the running board facing the 
engine. 
Q. When did he first get out on the running board Y 
A. I didn't see him when he got out on the running board, 
but he was in a kind of inclined position, leaning back like · 
against the back part of the automobile on the fender, or on\. 
the running board I should say. · 
• * * • • 
Q. After you saw the car come upon the track, was there 
any opportunity on the part of the engineer to stQp the 
engine in time to avoid the collision Y 
A. No, sir." 
On being asked regarding the speed of the· automobile 
the witness stated (Rec., p. 101): 
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''A. He didn ~t seem to be running so fast. I would say 
he was running not over fifteen miles an hour; twelve or 
fifteen miles an hour; I wouldn't say for sure; it is mighty 
hard to judge speed. 
Q. Could you tell from the way that car was running 
whether the gears· were changed while you saw it 7 
A. No, sir, I couldn't tell that. 
Q. It never slacked until it got to the crossing? 
A. No, sir." 
The testimony of Giesendorffer, the engineer, corroborated 
that of Roberts in every material particular except tliat on 
account of being seated on the opposite side of the engine 
cab he was unable to see the automobile until the moment 
of impact, which was immediately after the fireman had 
made an outcry. Although looking ahead continuously the 
opposite side of the track was obscured from view by the 
engine on coming within an engine length of the crossing. 
He stated that ''as soon as he (the firem~n) holloed I slammed 
the brakes on in emergency". (Rec., p. 75). He further 
testified that the train stopped practically in its own length, 
that on account of having used his air pressure in reducing 
·Speed in coming into l\fineral he could not stop as quickly 
as he otherwise could, that the stop he made 'vas "a good 
stop considering the circumstances'', and he couldn't make 
a better one in a similar situation (Rec., pp. 75, 80). 
Perkins. the town postmaster, who, aside fr0m the occu-
pants of the automobile and the engineer and fireman, was 
apparently the only eye-witness to the accident, was on a 
store porch a short distance north of the crossing. He had 
just walked away from the station and became aware of 
the a.pproach of the train by reason of the glare of the head-
light, and by hearing the whistle blow and by the ''rumble'' 
of the train itself. 
In describing the situation immediately before the acci-
dent, he testified as follows (Rec., pp. 1'29-130, 131, 133): 
"'A. * * • I turned facing the railroad to see the train 
pass. That is the time I saw the car, the first time I sa,v. 
the car. 
Q. Where was the ear in respect to the train when you 
saw it? 
A. ·The automobile was pulling up on the ·side track. There 
are three tracks there. On the south side track when I saw 
~t. . 
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Q. Ho·w far off was the automobile from the trainf 
A. I should say the train was possibly twenty-five or thirty 
yards, not that far hardly. I am not .much of an estimator 
of distance. 
Q. Hardly that distance~ 
A. No, sir, I don't think so. 
Q. Did yon see whether or not the antomobil~ stopped f 
A. The automobile didn't stop. 
Q. Which way was it coming? 
A. It was coming north. 
Q. Did it come straight north f 
A. No, sir, it cut nearly across the track, then it seemed 
to lean a little east, the front end seemed to be pulling 
cast. 
Q. The direction in which the train was coming from? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. They were heading to,vard the train? 
A. ·Yes, sir, just a slight turn to the east." 
• * * • * 
'' Q. You say when you first looked back there and saw 
the car it was then pulling up on the side track to the south. 
A. Yes, sir.· 
Q. You know that the car did not stop from the side track 
to the main track Y 
A. No, sir, didn't stop. 
Q. That is only a very short distance, isn't it f 
A. Yes, sir, a very short distance. 
Q. Probably a couple of feet or soY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How far would you say it is from the southermost rail 
of the side track to the southerm.ost rail of the main track Y 
A. Well, not over ten or twelve feet I should think. 
Q. How fast would you estimate that that train was run-
ning through there Y 
A. Well, the train didn't appear to me to be running at 
very fast speed, I didn't think. 
Q. What is your estimate of the mileage that it was run-'·, · 
ning? 
A. Well, I shouldn't think it was running over :fifteen 
miles, I don't think. 
• * * * ~ 
Q. * * * Was the automobile running fast or slow? 
A. It struck me as running as slow as any I ever saw to 
be moving; it was hardly moving. I took particular notice Qf 
that, realizing the fact that it was likely to be struck by tlle 
train.'' 
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Schwartz, the proprietor of the 1\Hneral Hotel, testified 
that when the train came into Mineral he was on the back 
porch of the hotel. He heard it blow for the station as 
well as for both crossings, and also heard the engine bell ring-
ing. He could not actually see the train but saw the glare 
of the engine headlight which he said was quite bright. He 
also stated that from the noise the train was making "it was 
not running quite as fast as usual'' (Rec., pp. 115, 116). 
The witness, Payne, testified that on, the occasion of the 
accident he had driven to Mineral from Pendleton via the 
Jefferson Highway, having come from a direction opposite 
to that from which the l\1:apes car had come. In turning into 
First Street for the purpose of crossing over to the other 
side of the railroad he sa'v the 1\iapes car some distance 
ahead of him. As to the location and movements of that 
car, he testified as follows (Rec., pp. 148-149; 152): 
''Q. When did you notice that car? 
A. After I turned the corner going towards the railroad. 
Q. Did the car stop before it got to the track? 
A. The ca;r ~as moving when I saw it, and didn't stop any 
after I saw it. 
Q. Here is a map that has been introduced (indicating). 
This is the south side of the railroad and this is the north 
side. This is the highway along here, and this is First 
Street going up to the depot. You 'vere coming along here. 
Wlwn you turned in this street you saw this lady. About 
where was she 'vhen you saw her? 
A. About twenty-five or thirty feet of the crossing when 
I saw the car. It might have been a little further. 
Q. Where were you? 
A. I turned tl1is corner here and got straight and my 
lights were shining across the track 
Q. Yon turned to go up First Street, too? 
A. To cross the railroad to go home. 
Q. Where was your home? 
A. I lived on the road right straight across the railroad 
track. 
Q. You stopped ? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where did you stop? 
• A. I stopped between the north corner of the hardware 
store and the railroad.'' 
. . ~ ~ . 
''Q. Do you know how fast J\1:rs. Mapes was going1 
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A. No, sir. The car was moving slow. 
Q. Po you kno'v what was the speed of the train Y 
A. No, I do not. The train 'vas moving along slow, 
seemed to be well under control. 
Q. Was there a headlight on the engine 1 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Did the train stop quickly or not, after the accident? 
A. The train stopped quickly as I call it, about a train 
length.'' 
This witness further testified to having heard the whistle 
blow for the station and for both crossings; that the engineer 
beg-a~ blo,ving for the last crossing about the time he w~s 
making the turn into First Street (Rec., pp. 149, 150). 
Lacy, the train conductor, and Coffey, the baggagemaster, 
testified that the station and ~rossing whistles were heard by 
them, that the train was running at a speed of from twelve 
to fifteen miles an hour, and that their attention was first 
called to the accident by the sudden application of the emer-
gency brakes (Rec., pp: 103, 107, 108, 109). · 
D. R. Luck, who was in a store on the north side of the 
right of way, testified to having- heard the engine whistle 
blow several times before reaching First Street (Rec., p. 
145). 
While some witnesses for the plaintiff stated that they did 
not hear the whistle, or did not remember hearing it, none 
of them purported to say as a fact that it was not blown. 
Oharles Johnson. a ·witness for the plaintiff, testified as 
follows regarding the speed of the train (Rec., p. 40): 
'' Q. Where were you at the time the collision occurred f 
A. I was standing on the street at Mineral. · 
Q. Were you in a position to observe the speed of that 
train when it came within a few feet of the railroad· cross-
ing? 
A. Well, the only position that I can say I saw it was_ . 
about fifty yards before it got to the station. I was standing 
on the str~et on the opposite side of the railroad. 
0. What would you estimate as its minimum speed? 
· A. Well, I should say that it was running at least twentv 
or twenty-five miles an hour." '"' 
This witness further stated that a three story brick build-
ing· prevented him from seeing both points at which the 
collision occurred and the railway station. 
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The plaintiff introduced the following ordinance of the 
Town of Mineral (Rec., pp. 20, 21): 
''No engine or other vehicle shall be drawn or propelled 
in or across any street at a greater rate of speed than fif-
teen miles an hour. While· any locomotive or train shall 
be passing along or across any street, the bell on sucli loco-
motive shall be kept constantly ringing. Any person, or 
corporation, violating any provision of this section" or 
causing it to be done, shall be fineQ,_ not less than five nor 
more than ten dollars for every such offence. In case such 
fine be not paid by the person incurring the same, the com-
pany by which he is employed shall be liable for such fine." 
To show the physical layout of the scene of the accident, 
the plaintiff introduced in evidence a map (Exhibit Ambler 
# 1) drawn. to scale, while the defendant introduced three 
photographs (Exhibits Dementi #1, 2 and 3) for the same 
purpose. By stipulation of counsel it was agreed that these 
exhibits need not be copied in the record, but might them-
selves be certified to this court. A reduced size photostat. 
copy of the map is, however, attached to this petition. 
It appears from these exhibits that First Street, where it 
crosses the defendant's tracks, has a width of about sixty 
feet. The crossing has a smooth sand gravel surface for 
vehicles, with conc~et.e sidewalks on either side. 
It further appears that on the south side of the right of 
way and beginning some distance east of First Street there 
are several small structures, consisting of a section house, 
pump house and sand house, as well as a water tank base. 
The front lirie of these structures is about ten feet from the 
south rail of the south side track. While it is stated that 
these buildings would in some degree interfere with the view· 
eastward of persons approaching the crossing from the tTef-
ferson Highway, it is· undisputed that at a distance of ten 
feet from the south side track .or twenty-one feet from the 
main line track, there was a clear view for four hundred 
feet or more. At the near rail of the side track there was 
an unobstructed view for about a mile. (Rec., pp. 64, 65, 
124, 125.) There were no cars on the side track at the time 
of the accident. There were no obstructions to the view 
'vestward from the. crossing. · 
It was shown that all of the occupants of the :hfapes auto-
mobile were aware of the location of the crossing and familiar 
with the surrounding physical conditions. Both :hfeyer and 
Mrs. 1\tia pes had had occasion to use the crossing regularly, 
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the former being accustomed to spend two nights out of every 
two weeks at the Mineral Hotel. It also appeared that he 
had been to this hotel earlier in the day on which the accident 
occurred (Rec., pp. 116, 117, 146). 
The 'vitness, F. ],. Johnson, who did not see the accident 
but arrived a short while after it occurred, testified that at 
a distance of about ten feet from where Meyer's body was 
located, he found a broken coca-cola bottle· which contained 
'vhiskey (Rec., pp. 135-136). Several other witnesses for the 
defendant stated that they smelled· the odor of whiskey 
around the decedent's body and the automobile (Rec., pp. 96, 
105, 130). One witness for the plaintiff testified that he did 
not smell any liquor upon Meyer, while another witness testi-
fied to the same effect as to 1\frs. l\1apes (Rec., pp. 165, 164). 
It was stipulated between counsel that each of the six ·cars 
in the train had a length of seventy-one feet, and the engine 
and tender a combined length of sixty feet (Rec., p. 157). 
Solely for the purpose of impeachment and negation of the 
testimony of the. engineer, Giesenclorffer, that he stopped 
the train as quickly as possible, the Court allowed the plain-
tiff to introduce the alleged expert testimony of the witness, 
Copley. This testimony was to the effect that under some-
what similar circumstances the train ''should stop in about 
a car and a half length". The witness was shown to have 
been a railroad engineer, but "mostly in yard service", and 
had only operated a passenger train on a single trip of eight 
miles. The defendant objected to this testimony and moved 
to exclude it, but the objection and motion were overruled 
by the Court, to which action the defendant excepted. (Bill 
of Exceptions No. 3, Rec., pp. 192-196.) 
PLEADINGS .AND TRIAL PROCEEDINGS. 
The plaintiff, in the Notice of Motion, alleged the follow-
ing grounds of negligence on the defendant's part: (1) 
Operation of its train at a ·negligent rate of speed and at 
a speed in excess of that authorized under an ordinance of. 
the Town of 1\-Iineral; (2) failure of the enginemen to give 
a warning signal in approaching the crossing; (3) failure 
to give such warning signal as was in accordance with the 
requirements of la-w; ( 4) failure to provide ~ stationary 
warning signal at the crossing as provided by an ordinance 
of the Town of Mineral; ( 5) failure of the ·enginemen to 
keep a proper lookout; ( 6) maintenance of certain buildings 
along the right of way which made it impossible for the 
C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Helen iVIay Meyer, Adm 'x, etc. 13 
occupants of the automobile to see the train until nearly on· 
top of the main line track. 
In addition to a plea of not guilty, the defendant filed a 
special plea which set out that the pl~intiff's decedent. was 
an "employee" within the meaning of the ""'\Vorkmen 's Com-
pensation Act'', and that a compensation award, for the 
identical injuries complained of in the suit, had been made 
by the Industrial Commission of Virginia, and had been 
accepted by both the plaintiff and the decedent's employer, 
theW. H. !la:rris_~Grocery .Company. . j The plaintiff then :filed a replication to this special plea, 
/ .asserting that the 1faryland Casualty Company had insured 
~ the W. H. Harris Grocery Company against liability for 
'',; compensation for the injuries received by the decedent, had 
assumed liability for the payment of the award of the Indus-
trial Commission of Virginia, and had itself brought this 
·,,, action in the name of Helen May 1\ieyer, Administratrix of 
\ George Edgar 1\ieyer, deceased, for the benefit of itself and 
l the es.tate of George Edgar Meyer. 
The defendant then filed a rejoinder, in which it denied 
the suit had been brought as alleged in the replication. 
At the conclusion of the evidence it was apparent that the 
· plaintiff had abandoned all of the charges of negligence 
enumerated above except the charge relating to the speed .of 
the train. 
The plaintiff offered six instructions. The defendant ob-
jected to the giving of any instructions. whatever authorizing 
a recovery by the plaintiff, upon grounds set forth in writing, 
and further objected specifically to each instruction offered, 
upon grounds set forth in writing, but the Court overruled 
all of said objections and gave all of the plaintiff's instruc-
tions, to which action exceptions were duly taken by the de-
fendant. 
The defendant offered seven instructions, and the Court 
gave four of said instructions, but refused to give the other 
three, or any of them, to which action exceptions were also 
duly taken by the defendant. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ER.RORS. 
In its rulings, actions and final judgment, it is respectfully 
submitted the Court erred in the following particulars: 
1. The Court erred in giving any instructions whatever 
'vhich authorized a recovery by the plaintiff, as set out in 
Bill of Exceptions No. 2 (Rec., pp. 185, 188). 
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2. The Court erred in giving Instructions 1, 2, 2-A, 3, 4 and 
7, asked for by the plaintiff, or either or any of said Instruc-
tions, as set out in Bill of Exceptions No. 2 (Rec., pp. 185-
188). 
3. The Court erred in refusing to give Instructions E, F 
and G, asked for by the defendant, or either or any one of 
said Instructions, as set out in _Bill of Exceptions No. 2 
(Rec., pp. 190-191). 
4. The Court erred in overruling the motion of the defen-
dant to set aside the verdict of the jury and to enter up .. 
judgment for the defendant, as set out in Bill of Exceptions 
No. 1 (Rec., p. 181). 
5. The Court erred in overruling the motion of the defen-
dant to set aside the verd!ct of the jury and to award it a ne'v 
trial, as set out in Bill of Exceptions No. 1 (Rec., p. 181). 
6. The Court erred in receiving in evidence the testimony 
of the witness, Paul Copley, and in overruling the motion of 
the defendant to exclude said testimony, as set out in Bill 
of Exceptions No. 3 (Rec., pp. 191~196). 
ARGUIVIENT. 
For convenience and to save repetition the questions raised 
by the assignment of errors will be discussed under the fql-. 
lowing divisions: ·i -
I. DEFENDANT WAS NOT· NEGLIGENT. 
II. EVEN IF DEFENDANT WERE NEGLIGENT, 
SUCH NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE 
OF THE'ACCIDENT, BUT THE INTERVENING, INDE~ 
PENDENT ACT OF THE DRIVER OF THE AUTO~­
MOBILE WAS .. THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE 0}, 
THE ACCIDENT. 
Ill. PLAINTIFF'S DECEDENT WAS GUILTY OF 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ·AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
IV. ERRORS AS TO INSTRUCTIONS. 
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V. ERROR IN ADMISSION AND REFUSAL TO 
STRIKE OUT TESTIMONY: OF WITNESS PAUL COP-
LEY. 
The first three divis_,ions of the argument relate to assign-
ments Nos. 1 and ;k-- The next division relates to assign-
ments 2, 3 and 5/ The last division relates to assignments 
5 and 6. 
I. 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT. 
While, as already stated, a number of grounds of negligence 
were alleged in the Notice of Motion, it was manifest at the 
conclusion of the evidence that counsel for the plaintiff relied 
solely upon the charge based on the speed of the train. As 
to the other allegations the evidence was as follows: -
It was undisputed that in approaching the First Street 
crossing the engine whistle was blown nine times, including 
the station blast, at a distance of half a mile, four blasts at 
a private road crossing between the station whistle post and 
the First Street crossing, and four blasts for the First Street 
crossing· itself. . 
It was also undisputed that in approaching the crossing 
the engine bell 'vas ringing continuously, the automatic ringer 
having- been started at the last station passed before reach-:-
ing lVIineral and being cut off after the accident. 
The Court very properly excluded from the evidence the 
ordinance relied upon by the plaintiff as requiring a sta-
tionary warning sigrial at the First Street c-rossing. 
The testimony of the engineer and fireman showed conelu-
sively that both of them 'vere on their seat bmms, alert and 
looking ahead, and saw the Mapes (~ar as soon as it can1e 
into view, that there was no opportunity to avert the acci-
dent 'vhen it appeared the CclX ·would J,roceed across the track. 
The existence of the buildings alleged to ob::truet the vie\v 
of the occupants of the automobile of conrsP did not estab-
lish a ground of recovery, but at most could only increase the 
amount of care to be observed by both decedent and the driver, 
as well as the defendant. 
To return to the question of speed, it was alleged that the 
train was operated ''at a negligent rate of speed and at a 
speed in excess of that authorized under an ordinance of the 
16 In the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
Town of ~Iineral' '. The ordinance in question prohibited an 
''engine or other vehicle'' from being ''drawn or propelled 
in or across any street at a greater rate of speed than fifteen 
miles an hour". (Italics ours. Rec., pp. 20, 21.) 
All of the witnesses in the case who either saw the· train 
engine as it reached First Street crossing, or lly reason of 
being on the train could give an estimate of its speed at 
that point, testified that the speed was from 12 to 15 1niles 
an hour. This applies to Perkins, 'vho stood n short distance 
north of the track and faced the crossing for the express 
purpose of watching the train pass. It applies to Payne, who 
was facing the crossing from the south, nnd who further 
stated, "The train was moving along slo,v, seemed to be well 
under control". It applies to the engineer and fireman in 
the cab, who also testified that the speed bad been slackened 
in entering Mineral, in order to a:void passing the station 
ahead of schedule time. This testin1on v 'vas further sub-
stantiated by like e~timates of the coucluctor and baggage-
man who were back in the train. The waness, Sclnvart~, \vho 
was in the rear of the hotel propert~r adjoining the crossiug, 
although naturally unable to name its speed, testified that 
from the noise made by the train it was not running quite as 
fast as usual. 
In support of its charge the plaintiff relies solely upon the 
statemerrl of the witness, Charles .J obHson,. that tl1e train, 
at the point he saw it (which wHs not at the 0rossing), was 
running "at lca~t twenty or tWC?uty-11vn n1ilc~ an hour". 
It is earnestly submitted that the testil.no11y of tll is w~tness 
has no probatiYe Yalue to establish n~gligence in this case. 
This witness "ras standing on 1\Iain Street (Jefferson High-
way), on the south or opposite side to that on which the . 
railroad was located. vVhile he said that the highway at 
''the closest point'' was around twenty yards from the rail-
road, the map introduced in evidence (Exhipit Ambler #l) 
plainly shows that the distance from the south sidewalk of 
Main Street to the north building line is 80 feet, and fro~ 
this building line to the main line track the distance is 172-
feet 9 inches. Hence he was at least 250 feet or more than 
80 yards a'vay from the track. 
He stated that he could not see either the accident itself 
or the station, on account of the ''three story brick building-
" Mineral Hardware". It is a fair inference that he referred 
·to the building designated on the map as "Graves l-Iard-
ware''. He also stated that he did not see the train either 
at or within a few feet of the crossing, but only saw it for a 
space of "something like fifty ya1~ds", when it was then no 
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neare1· th.an ahout fifty yards front the station. From these 
statements it is apparent that the witness must have been op-
posite the building designated on the map as ''Turner''. 
If the estimate given by Johnson could have been accepted 
by the jury as an accurate measure of the speed of the train 
it is submitted that it still fails to establish negligence on the 
part of the defendant. The ordinance relied upon did "not 
purport to limit the speed to :fifteen miles an l1our except 
"in or across any street''. It did not restrlct the speed 
of the train at any other point on the defendant's right of 
way, and the record shows that First Street was the only 
street intersecting the right of way east of the station, and 
that there was no street running lengthwise within the right 
of way lines. 
Even though Johnson's estimate of the speed of the train 
be taken as correct as to the portion of the track under ob-
servation by him, it is quite evident that his testimony would 
be entirely consistent with that of the other witnesses, all 
of whom testified that the speed at the crossing was not in 
excess· of :fifteen miles an hour. Certainly this is true in 
view of the testimony of the enginemen that they had been 
slowing down in coming into and through Mineral, in order 
to avoid passing the station ahead of time. That even a de-
murrant to the evidence is fully entitled to the benefit of 
his own proof which does not conflict with the demurree 's 
evidence, but merely brings out omitted consistent facts, is 
of course well settled. As was said in Fwnner's A~m'x. v. 
C. d!; 0. Ry. Co., 144 Va. 65: '' I-Ie may supply gaps and 
fill in de:fic~encics in the evidence of the demurree, and sho'v 
other independei1t affirmative facts, provided only_ they do not 
conflict, directly or indirectly, with the evidence demurred 
to.'' 
In view of the authorization which the defendant had under 
the ordinance of the Town of 1\fineral, to operate its train 
across First Street at a rate of :fifteen miles an hour, the 
affirmative proor that tl1is limit was observed, and the entire 
~bsence of proof that the ordinance was violated, it is 
~·arnestly submitted that the record contains no· evidence of 
negligence on the part of the defendant, upon which a ver-
dict could be predicated. There was, in fact, no issue of 
negligence for the jury to pass upon, and the Court, as re-
quested by the defendant, should have refused to grant any 
instructions which authorized a recovery by the plaintiff. , 
Davis v. Rodgers, 139 Va. 618. 
,), ... ,;:; ... , 
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W. & 0. D. R. Co. v. Weakley, 140 Va. 796 .. 
81naJl v. Va. R. & P. Co., 125 Va. 416 .. 
Realty Co. v. Burcun~, 129 Va. 466. 
Norfolk v. Anthony, 117 Va. 777 .. 
It is obvious that as to those portions of the defendant's 
right ·of way not included within a public street of the Town 
of Mineral, a train speed of from twenty to twenty-five miles 
an hour not only could not furnish a ground of recovery, but 
. per se would not even be evidence of negligence on the part 
of the defendant. At most it 'vould be but an attendant 
condition to be considered with other factors, such as the 
warnings which were given, the lookout maintained and the 
negligence bf the driver of the vehicle. 
This was expressly held in the case of C. & 0. Ry. Co. v .. 
Gayle, 132 Va. 433, 436, 437, a crossing accident ease where-
in the evidence showed a train -speed of fifty miles an hour. 
And in the ease of N.Y. P. & N. Ry. Co. v. Kellam's Adm'r., 
83 Va. 851, the following instruction was approved as cor-
rectly stating the law: 
''The Court instructs the jury that the train's mere speed 
of motion is not per se evidence of negligence, nor is the 
fact that the train is behind time.'' 
A case involving facts very sffi?.ilar to those in the instant 
case, and believed to be controlling of the result here, is 
the recent case of N. & W. R. Co. v. Wilkes' Adm'r., 137 Va. 
302. This case involved a crossing accident in the Town of 
Vinton, Virginia, in which the plaintiff's intestate, a pas-
senger in an automobile driven by a. hunting companion, was 
instantly killed. It appeared that the town ·nad no ordi-
·nance regulating the speed of trains passing through the 
town, nor as to gates, watchmen or gongs, but the defen-
dant railway had. provided an automatic gong at the crossing 
in question, and also gave the usual crossing whistle sig-
nals. 
The opinion of this Court sets forth the following perti-' 
nent facts at page 305: 
''The train was going west on the westbound tracks, and 
was running on time at the usual rate of speed of from thirty-
five to forty-five miles an hour. It '\Vas not scheduled to 
stop at Vinton. The street and the railroad are on prac-
tically the same level, and the occupants of the car lived 
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close by and were familiar with the crossing. At a point 
nine feet south of the eastbound tracks, and twenty-three 
feet south of the westbound tracks, upon which the train 
was running, the track to the east could be seen for nearly a 
.mile without any obstruction to the view. The automobil~ 
was running from ten to fifteen miles an hour before reach-
ing the railroad, and there is no evidence that it slowed down 
or stopped before going upon the track.'' · 
Among other charges of negligence were a failure to warn, 
by bell, whistle or crossing gong; failure to provide a watch-
man ; and reckless speed. 
After sta-ting the common law duty of the defendant "to 
use due· care to so operate its trains as not to injure others 
passing over the tracks at grade crossings", which duty it at-
tempted to fulfil by providing a crossing gong and by giving 
the customary whistl~ signals, the opinion further stated 
at page 307: 
''In order to establish negligence on the part of the defen-
dant it was necessary for the plaintiff to prove either that 
the precautions adopted by the defendant were inadequate, 
under ordina·ry circumstances, to provide protection for per-
sons crossing its tracks at that point,. or that the precautions 
adopted were not observed. Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Ives, 
supra. But the plaintiff introduced no evidence to show the 
inadequacy of the precautions adopted by the defendant, nor 
was that position taken in the argument.'' 
While there were some statements made by the witnesses 
in the Wilkes Case tending to show that the engine wliistle 
was not blown and the gong did not ring, upon close analysis 
it was found that in view of other circumstances clearly 
esta blisl1ed by the evidence this evidence was contrary to 
fact. After making this finding, and without further mention 
of the charge of excessive speed, in spite of an admitted rate 
·of thirty-five to forty .miles an hour, this Court said at 
page 311: 
''We are of opinion that the plaintiff failed to establish 
the primary negligence of the defendant, and that the ver-
dict of the jury so finding is plainly contrary to the evi-
dence. This renders it unnecessary to pass upon contribu-
tory negligence of the plaintiff's intestate.'' 
.As a result of this conclusion the judgment of the trial 
20 In the Supreme Court of .A.ppeals of Virginia. 
court was reversed, and pursuant to section 6365 of the Code, 
final judgment ·was entered for the defendant. 
But it is further submitted that the ,vituess, Joi1nson, 
was not in such a position as to enable him to form an ac-
curate estimate of the speed of the train, and his testimony 
on this feature of the case is without any probative value. 
Being opposite the ''Turner'' building, his observation of 
the train would be confined to a vie'v between that building 
and the building designated '' Slachter' '. 
The view between these two buildings it will be seen from 
the map, is partially obstructed by the two piles of iron 
junk indicated thereon and described by the surveyor as being 
"about as high as your head". The vie\v is alsG obstructed· 
by the saud house 'vhose comb is 15 feet above the rails 
of the track, and towards the west by ·the \Vater tank. The 
map further sl1o\VS that the cross-section ·view of the train 
which the -witness could get would be at a distance of 50 
or more yards from the crossing, and considerably more 
than that distance from the depot building. Such a fleeting 
chance glimpse of the train as could be obtained under these 
physical circumstances, in the night time, it is submitted 
does not furnish. a sufficient opportunity for the making of 
any intelligent calculation of its speed, and the estimates of 
the witness is not entitled to either weight or consideration, 
but is to be regarded . as wholly within the realm of guess 
and speculation. 
In the case of Davis v. C7z4cago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 159 Fed. 
10, 16 L. R. A. {N. S.) 424, a crossing case in which one of 
the charges of negligence against the defendant railroad was 
excessive speed, the following statement \Vas made: 
''The allegation respecting the dangerous rate of speed 
of the train is not supported by any evidence that would 
have \varranted the jury in finding the existence of such 
fact. The only witness to this issue was one Cooper, who, 
according to his statement, \Vas about 150 yards northea~t 
of the crossing, following on the same road in the rear of 
the plaintiff. Remarkably enough, in view of the plaintiff's. 
evidence that they could not see the crossing until they ·were 
within about 30 feet of it, this \Yitness ~laimed that he saw 
the train 150 yards to the northeast, when it was about 50 
feet from the crossing, although he did not see the accident. 
Indisputably, he had but a mere glimpse, for one or two 
seconds, of the train. From which it is manifest that any 
expression of opinion by him as to its rate of speed was the 
merest speculation ahd guess work. He said he thought it 
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was running from 40 to 45 miles an hour. There was nothing 
whatever· at the instant to fix his n1ind upon the matter of 
the speed, and his cross examination developed that he had 
never experimented from a side view to determine the rate of 
speed of a passing train. As said in lJicGra·in· v. McGrain, 
48 N. J. Eq. 532-536, 22 Atl. 582, 584: 'Nothing is more 
uncertain and unreliable than the testimony of. witnesses as 
to the time occupied in a transaction. ' 
"Recognition of such mere guess work as sufficient to 
carry the question to the jury of the rate of speed of a train 
l1as a long column of injustice to its account. This testi-
mony, doubtless; and properly so, was treated as utterly 
worthless by the experienced judge who presided at the trial.'.' 
The case of Springs v. Va. Ry. & P. Co., 117 Va. 826, was 
an action for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff 
in being struck by an electric car, which according to his 
,testimony was proceeding "at a terrific rate of speed". 
Upon a demurrer to the evidence it was said ( pp. 830, 831) : 
"Running its car which struck the plaintiff in error, 'at 
a dangerous rate of speed' is the sole ground of actionable 
negligence alleged against defendant in error. As to the 
speed of the car, plaintiff in error in testifying in the case 
gave no estimate as to its speed, 'vhile other witnesses for 
him who undertook to speak in comprehensible language vary 
in their estimates of the speed of the car at from 25 to 35 
miles an hour; while others use such expressions as 'going 
a considerable rate of speed', 'pretty rapid', 'running like 
lightning'. None of these witnesses, however, gave any evi-
dence capable of conveying to the ordinary mind a definite 
conception of the physical fact, viz., the actual speed of the 
car. 
As said by the ·court in the case of Foley v. Boston, &c., R .. 
Co., 193 Mass. 332, 79 N. E. 765, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1076: 
. '~1ere e~.pl.etive or declamatory words or phrases as de-
. scriptive of speed or acts unacc-ompanied by any evidence 
capable of conveying to the ordinary mind some definite 
conception of a specific physical fact, and depending gen-
erally upon the degree of nervous emotion, exuberance of 
diction and volatility of imagination of the witness, and 
not upon her capacity to reproduce by language a true pic~ 
ture of a past event, ·are of slight, if indeed they are of any~ 
assistance in determining the real character of the fact re· 
specting which they are used.' '' 
22 In the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
See also 
Washington-Va. R. Co. v. St1··uder, 132 ·va. 368, 373. 
, 
To recapitulate: (1) There 'vas no evidence in the case 
that the defendant's train, when it reached the First Street 
crossing, was. running at a speed in excess of fifteen miles an 
hour, whereas there was affirmative proof -to the contrary; 
(2) this rate of speed was authorized under the ordinance 
of the Town of Mineral and · was reasonable ; ( 3) a speed 
of twenty to twenty-five miles an hour as to portions of the 
right of way not included within a street weuld not of itself 
even be evidence of negligence; ( 4) the COJ?.ditious under which 
this estimate of the speed of the train at a given point was 
found, show that it was a mere guess, which is without any 
probative value whatever. 
II. 
EVEN IF DEFENDANT WERE NEGLIGENT, s·ucH 
NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT A PROXIIvfATE CAUSE OF 
THE ACCIDENT, BUT THE INTERVE~TJNG. INDE-
PENDENT ACT OF THE DRIVER OF THE AUTO-
MOBILE WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE Oli' 
THE ACCIDENT. 
But if it be conceded for the purposes of argument that 
the train, as it passed over the First Street crossing, was 
running at a rate of speed in excess of fifteen miles an hour, 
it is earnestly submitted that this speed was not a proximate 
cause of the~ accident, but that the intervening, independent 
act of J\~Irs. Mapes, the operator of the automobile, in driving 
upon the track immediately in front of the train, was the 
sole proximate cause of the accident. 
The case involves travelers upon a highway, driving over 
a crossing with which they were thoroughly familiar, and 
under conditions which required them to look and listen effec~ 
tively before assuming a position of danger. The evidence_ 
shows that this could have been done at any point within a 
distance of twenty-one feet from the main track, where there 
was a clear unobstructed view for three hundred yards· or 
more. 
AA was stated in Wash. & 0. D. R. Co. v. Zell, 118 Va. 7·55, 
759-760: . 
''Travelers approaching a public. crossing must bear in 
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mind that, while their rights and those of the railroad com-
pany at that point are 'mutual, reciprocal and co-extensive' 
in general, the law has always accorded, and in the nature 
of the case must accord, to a moving train the right of way. 
So~tthern .Ry. Co. v. Torwin, 95 Va. 454, 28 S. E. 569; Elliott 
on Roads and Streets (3d Ed.); sec. 1021, and cases cited 
in note 77; ·CQntinental Irnp. Co. v. Stead, 95 U. S. 161, 24 L. 
Ed. 403. A failure on the part of the railroad company to 
jrlve proper 'varninp: or other lack of ordinary care will ren-
der the company liable if its negligence is the proximate 
cause of an injury at a crossing and the injured party is 
without fault, 'but the track itself is a warning of danger 
and a traveler must always exercise care proportionate to 
the known danger, and this care must be such as one who 
knows the danger and is aware of the prior right of passage 
would be expected to exercise'. 3 Elliott on Railroads (1897), 
and cases cited in notes 1 and 3. '' 
In Southern R. Co. v. Stockdon, 106 Va., it was said at page 
697: 
''It has been freauently held by this court that the mere 
running of a. train fn violation of law or an ordinance is not 
per se negligence, for which a recovery can be had, yet it is 
always a circumstance to be considered along with the other 
facts and circumstances of the case in determining the ques-
tion of negligence. ' ' 
In Washington, etc., R .. Co. v. Lacey, 94 Va. 460~ there was 
evidence which justified a finding that a train colliding with 
a vehicle ·at a street crossing was being operated at a speed 
of from four to six times the rate permitted by a city ordi-
nance, but a recovery was denied the driver of the truck 
when it appeaerd that though well acquainted 'vith the loca-
tion of the crossing, in approaching it, he failed to look 
and listen for trains within a distance of 246 feet from the 
track. 
The case ·lf lVilm .. outh v. Southern R. Oo., 125 Va. 511, was 
an action for the death of plaintiff's intestate, who was struck 
. by a train while walking on the defendant's tracks upon a 
much-used street crossing in the City of Danville. Upon a 
demurrer to the evidence, it was held that the defendant 
was guilty of "culpable negligence" in running its train, 
without warning, over the crossing, at a speed of twenty-five 
to thirty miles an hour, in violation of an ordinance which 
limited the speed to fifteen miles an hour. 
· 24 In the Supreme Court of ·Appeals of Virginia. 
In sustaining the demurrer, however, on the ground that the 
negligent speed was not the proximate cause of the accident, 
this Court said at pages 522, 523, 524: 
''Neither the speed of the train as it appeared to. the plain-
tiff's intestate nor the expectation by him that it 'vould be 
within the lawful speed in fact induced him to attempt the 
crossing in front of it. lie attempted the crossing in cul-
pable ignorance of the proximity of the train. A supposed 
speed of the train was not a ca,ztsa causans-it was not a 
'causing cause '-in the instant case; ·which character of 
cause alone is a proximate cause as known to the law. It 
can no more be regarded as the proximate cause of the failure 
of the plaintiff's intestate to clear the track in advance of 
the train than was the time and the speed of his own move-
ment. If he had started across immediately behind the pass-
ing freight train and had run rapidly instead of walking, he 
·'vould have crossed the northbound track ahead of the pas-
senger train. That conduct of omission may be as well 
said to have been the proximate cause of the accident as the 
speed of the passenger train. Neither can be said to have 
been sncli proximate cause in contemplation of law. The 
order of sequence of events does not furnish a reliable test 
of a proximate cause. The act 'vhich is nearest in point 
of time may not be the nearest in the line of causation. 
There was in truth, in contemplation of law, an intervening 
cause in the instant case behveen the negligent speed of 
the passenger train and the accident, and that was the con-
tributory negligence of the plaintiff's intestate aforesaid .. 
And the law regards such an intervening act as the proxi-
mate cause of an injury suffered by the actor. 1 Thompson 
on Neg., sec. 64. If the act which constituted such negligence 
had been such that under the circumstances it was such as a 
reasonably prudent person would l1ave committed, and h~nce 
ought not to have been imputed to· the plaintiff's intestate as 
a fault, then indeed such act would not be regarded as an 
intervening proxim~te cause, because it would have been sucl} 
an act as the railroad company might reasonably have fore.:.. 
seen as likely to have occurred or as reasonably possible of· 
occurrence under the circumstances, without fault of the 
actor, and hence the injurious result, or some injurious re-
sult such as did happen, might have been reasonably fore-
seen by the railroad company as. likely to occur, or as reason-
ably possible of occurrence, without fault of- any other per-
son, from its own wrongful act in running its train in an 
unlawf~l speed. And such foreseeable nature of the re-
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suit, when regarded in such a light as that just mentioned, 
is, after all, the most reliable and perhaps the only prac-
tical test which the finite mind can apply to the solution of 
that most difficult of legal questions-what is the proximate 
cause of a given result. 1 Thompson on Neg., sections 48-
49." 
In the insfant case, if the speed of the train be conceded to 
have been in excess of fifteen miles an hour, there is no addi-
tional circumstance or factor in the case which the plaintiff 
can link with it for the purpose of establishing liability. The 
record is replete with undisputed proof of ample warnings 
in the form of blasts of the wl1istle, ringing of engine bell 
and a bright headlight, while both enginemen were on the 
lookout. No argument was even advanced by the plaintiff 
that any theory of last clear· chance could under the evidence 
have been applied against the defendant. 
The case of Ba.g~vell v. SouJhe'rn R. Co., 167 N. C. 611, 83 
S. E. 814, was an action to recover damages for personal . 
injury suffered by the plaintiff in a crossing collision be-
tween the defendant's train and an automobile driven by a 
Mr. Jamison and in which the plaintiff was a guest. In conl-
menting with approval upon instructions given covering the 
respective duties of the defendant and the driver of the auto-
mobile, the Court said: 
''His Honor also instructed the jury that there was nu 
evidence that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory neg-
. ligence, and that if Mr. Jamison was negligent his negligence 
could not be imputed to her and the only view in which the 
jury was permitted to consider the negligenc·e of Mr. Jamison 
'vas that, if it was 'the sole, only, proximate cause of the 
injury, the plaintiff could not recover', and this, not upon the 
ground that it showed contributory negligence of the plain-
tiff, but if the negligence of 1\tir. Jamison was the sole, proxi-
mate cause, then the negligence of the defendant would not 
be proximate. In other words, there was evidence upon the 
. part of the defendant tending to prove that it gave timely 
and reasonable notice of the approach of the train to the 
crossing, and that the automobile went upon the.track so short 
a distance in front of the approaching train that it could not 
have been stopped by the exercise of ordinary care in time 
to avert the injury, and, if so, the negligent act of driving-
the car upon the track would be the cause of the injury, and 
there would be no negligence on the part of the defendant.'' 
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That the speed of the train was not a "causa causans" 
becomes all the more apparent when it is considered what 
could have been done by the enginemen if the engine had 
been running at exactly fifteen miles an hour. The train, 
it was shown, stopped practically in its own length, which 
was 486 feet, and the engineer and :fireman testified that this 
was a reasonable stop under the circumstances wl1ich existed. 
But if the testimony of witness Copley; that a stop under 
similar circumstances could be made within a car length and 
a half, which was shown to be 105 feet, be accepted, the engine-
men still could not have avoided the collision. It ·was stated 
by the fireman that when he discovered the car was going 
across the track the engine was about twenty-five or thirty 
feet from the crossing, so that the stop prescribed by Cop-
ley would in no event have been effective until the engine was 
well past the crossing intersection. 
As to this feature of the case the evidence of the witness 
Baker who sat on the front seat of the automobile with 
Mrs. Mapes is significant. He said that when the automobile 
went on the main line track he saw a big light (obviously 
the engine headlight) right beside him. He did not deny 
that the train could have been seen approaching for at least 
300 yards. It is quite plain that the driver of the car com-
nletelv disregarded tl1e duties incumbent upon her, and neither 
looked. listened nor stopped, but attemnted to cross ''in cul-
nable ig'norance of the train". Certainly an act of this reck-
less character would not be within the reasonable anticipation 
of the defendant, and under the reasonin~ adopted in the case 
of Wilntou.th v. Southern. R. Co. (supra), it would be totally· 
unfair to charge it 'vith the consequences which followed. 
III. 
PLAINTIFF'S DECEDENT WAS GUILTY OF CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER 
. OFLAW. 
If for the purpose of argument it be conceded that the 
train in passing over the crossing 'vas operated.at ·a negli-
g-ent rate of speed, and if the further concession be made 
tl1at the negligence of the driver which has just been re·-
ferred to, was not the sole proximate cause of tl1e accident, 
it is earnestly submitted that ·the decedent himself was guilty 
of contributory negligence· as a matter of law, and the plain-
tiff is therefore barred from any recovery. 
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It is a well settled principle of law that a person riding 
in an automobile driven by another, even though not charge .. 
able with the driver's negligence, is not absolved from all 
personal care for his own safety, but is under the duty of 
exercising ordinary care to avoid injury. This duty especially 
applies to a railroad crossing, and it has been repeatedly 
held that a failure to exercise such care is contributory neg-
ligence as a Jl!atter of law. 
See note in 41 A. L. R. 767 et seq. 
In 2 Blash:field 's Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, pp. 1110-
1112, it is said: 
"The law will not excuse, on the ground that he is not 
the driver, a total absence of care on the part of a guest or 
passenger in a motor vehicle in the avoidance of danger from 
crossing railroad tracks, whether steam railroad or a street 
car track. He cannot close his eyes to the dangers of the 
crossing in blind reliance upon the care and vigilance of the 
driver, without assuming the consequences of a disregard of 
his own safety. 
While a gratuitous passenger in an automobile is not ex-
pected ordinarily to give advice or direction, as to its con.: 
trol or management, as to do so might well be harmful rather 
than helpful, and under all circumstances is. not bound to 
use his senses o~ to look or listen in order to discover ap-
proaching railroad or street cars; or other dangers, he is 
nevertheless subject to the same standard of duty as the 
driver, to-wit, the use of reasonable care for h~s own safety. 
· In other words, the test of due care on the part of a guesf 
in an automobile approaching a railroad crossing is whether, 
in the particular circumstances confronting him, he failed 
to exercise ordinary care to discover the approach of a train, 
or car, or failed to act as a person of ordinary prudence 
would have acted under the same cirsumstances, or, as the 
rule is sometimes expressed, he is bound to look out for his 
own safety as far. as practicable.'' · 
The de~edent was located on the rear seat of an open car. 
He was entirely familiar with the surrounding physical con-
ditions, having often driven his own car across the same 
crossing. Having also stayed at the Mineral Hotel regularly, 
he must have been aware of the fact that the very train· 
which struck the car was scheduled to reach Mineral at that 
particular time .. His opportunities for observation were as 
good as those of the other occupants of the car. He could 
have seen the bright headlight, could have heard the noise 
;.. 
:.il;.:;.-;:.:~!.?l:i"(A\"YiN 
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of the train, its whistle and its engine bell. It would· have 
taken but an instant for him to have made an outcry such 
as 'vould have aroused the driver's attention to the danger 
of going on the track. The car was not running at a high 
rate of speed and could have been stopped within a very 
short distance. That no warning cry was uttered by the de-
cedent is apparent, for Baker who was sitting next to Mrs. 
Mapes would have heard it, and his testimony shows that 
both of them remained totally unaware of the presence of 
the train until the headlight was right beside the car. 
The language of the opinion of the Court in the case of 
Southern R. Co. v. Jones' Ad,m'r., 118 Va. 685, is peculiarly 
appropriate to the facts of the instant case. In that case the 
plaintiff's intestate was seated in a wagon which was being 
driven by the plaintiff along a street in the City of Richmond. 
On reaching a railroad crossing, supposedly protected by 
crossing gates, they observed that the gates were raised, and 
proceeded on the crossing without looking or listening for 
a train, whereby a collision with a train occurred. The de-
fendant was admittedly negligent but maintained that the 
contributory negligence of the plaintiff's intestate precluded 
-any recovery. In upholding this defense, Judge Keith, speak-
ing for the Court, said at pages 687, 689, 691: 
"The negligence of the driver is not to be imputed to a 
passenger, but it is the duty of the traveler to use ordinary 
care for his own safety. The railroad track is to him, as to 
others, a signal of danger, and his failure to exercise reason-
able precaution for his own protection is contributory negli-
gence and bars a recovery. The evidence in this case shows 
that if the driver or the traveler, either or both, had exer-
cised the most ordinary caution, the . accident could never 
have l1appened, for, 'vithout undertaking to reduce the dis-
tance at which the train could have been seen to feet, there 
is no room to doubt that it could have- been seen in time to 
have prevented a collision. If they had looked they could 
have seen; if they had. listened they could have heard; for 
it appears by the evidence of a witness-introduced it is true 
by the defendant, but as to whose statement there is no con-· 
tradiction-that seeing the train approach from under the 
bridge, and they seeming not to have seen it, the witness 
'hollered' to the driver, who paid no heed to the warning. 
* * * * * 
The plaintiff in the court below, defendant in error here, 
who was the driver of the vehicle, by his own testimony 
shows that he approached the point of collision without pay-
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ing the least heed that he was about to cross a railroad track, 
in and of itself a warning of danger; that he neither looked 
nor listened, though the evidence plainly shows that had he 
looked or listened he would have been warned of the danger 
and must have seen the approaching train; and his evidence 
conclusively shows that he was relying upon the fact that 
the gates were up as giving him the unquestioned rig-ht of 
way and as fully justifying him in driving across the track 
without any precaution whatever for his own safety. 
By the side of the driver sat the plaintiff's intestate. All 
that was visible to the one was equally so to the other, aild 
there is no proof nor even a suggestion that he, more than 
the driver, by word or act, took any precaution for his own 
safety. Upon this record they were both equally guilty of the 
negligence which caused the accident. 
* * * * * 
The ordinary test applying to the duty of a traveler ap-
proaching the crossing of a railroad track is that he shall 
use ordinary care for his own protection, and if there be 
doubt upon the evidence whether or not such care 'vas used, 
it is a case for the jury; but here it appears beyond ques-
tion that no care whatever was used, reasonable or· other-
wise, on the p~rt of either the driver or his companion, and 
under such circumstances there can be no recovery.'' 
In the above case not only were the gates open, but in 
addition no warning sig;nal whatever was given by the ap-
proaching train, whereas in the instant case these conditions 
did nqt exist, which of course considerably strengthens the 
authority _of the case from the standpoint of the defendant. 
In Va. & S. W. R. Co. v. Skinm,er, 119 Va. 843, the plaintiff 
'vas a passenger in an automobile owned and driven by one 
Harris. At the crossing where a collision with the defen-
dant's engine occurred the track 'vas straight and the view 
unobstructed for a distance of nine hundred feet. It was 
shown that the car was stopped. within five or six feet of the 
track. In sustaining a demurrer to the evidence the Court 
said at pages 846, 84 7 : 
''If Harris, when standing within five or six feet of the 
rail, had looked, as he says he did, he could not have avoided 
seeing the approaching engine, which was upon him almost 
instantly thereafter, and could have escaped the accident by 
remaining where he was in a place of safety unfil the engine 
had passed over the crossing. It is manifest that Harris 
either did not look, or after seeing the engine attempted 
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to cross the track immediately in front of it, thinking, no 
doubt, that he could clear the track before it. reached him. 
In either event he was guilty of contributory negligence and 
cannot recover. The plaintiff, Skinner, says that when the 
automobile was one hundred yards from the crossing, he 
looked for a train and did not see any, and that he did not 
look any more either way. This failure to look again, and 
to continue to look until he was over the crossing, was in-
excusable negligence. 
In Chesapeake & Ohio.Ry. Co. v. Hall, 103 Va. 296, 63 S. E. 
1007, it is said: 'The duty to look and listen imposed upon 
a traveler on a highway approaching a railroad crossing 
is a continuing duty, and if there is any point at which, by 
looking and listening, a person injured could have avoided 
the accident and failed to do so, then he has neglected to dis-
charge a duty whic.h the law imposes, and his contributory 
negligence defeats a recovery for the injury.' 
It is sugge.sted that as Skinner was a passenger he had 
the right to rely on Harris, the driver, for protection, and 
was excused from looking out for himself. It was the duty 
of Skinner to look out for himself. No one can be allowed to 
shut his eyes to danger in blind reliance upon the unaided 
care of another without assuming the consequences of the 
omission of such care. .A. ct D. R. Co. v. Ironmm~ger, 95 Va .. 
625, 29 S. E. 319; S~ear. Red. on Neg. (6th Ed.), sec. 66." 
In the case of Branuner's Ad1n'r. v. N. & W. R. Co., 104 Va. 
50, the decedent was driving a two horse wagon across the 
defendant's track when a collision with a locomotive occurred. 
In sustaining a demurrer to the evidence, the court said at 
pages 53 and 57 : 
"It is clearly shown by the evidence that if Brammer had 
been looking he could have seen the engine at a distance of 
280 or -300 yards when he was within 20 or 25 feet of the 
track. There is positive evidence that the engineer blew the 
'vhistle for the crossing. There is much negative evidencib 
that it was not blown. We will not undertake to determine_ 
this question, but will for the purpose of this case assume 
that it was not blown, and that in the failure to blow it the 
railroad company was guilty of negligence. 
There is evidence to show that the engine to which cars 
were attached was running down grade by force of gravity, 
at a rapid rate of speed. There is no evidence to show that 
its speed was such as to constitute negligence. per se. The 
only negligence o~ which the railroad company may be said 
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to have been guilty consists in its failure .to sound the whistle, 
as 've have assumed to be the case. 
But this _negligence was not the pr-oximate cause of the: 
injury, because it .was none the less the duty of Brammer, 
upon approaching the railroad, to look and listen-to take 
precautions, in order words, for his own safety-and if he had 
done so, there is no doubt that he would both have seen 
and heard. the engine in time to stop and thereby have avoided 
the accident. 
• • • • 
To sum up the case briefly, it appears that the railroad com-
pany was guilty of negligence in failing to sound its whistle, 
but that this omission was not the proximate cause of the 
accident, since the plaintiff in error's intestate, had he taken 
the precautions 'vhich the law imposed upon him, could have 
heard· and seen the approaching train. In other words, the 
evidence established beyond doubt that Brammer was guilty 
of contributory negligence.'' 
The language of the Court shows that in the above case 
also, under the demurrer, it was c.onceded that the defen-· 
dant had failed . to give any warning signal, which is con- . 
trary to the situation in the instant case. 
The recent case of Norfolk-So~~thern R. Co. v. Ba.nks, 141 
Va. 715, involved a crossing accident, wherein the plaintiff 
was riding in an automobile being driven by his son. The 
evidence showed that the driver did not look in the direction 
f:rom which the engine approached, until alr.nost on the track, 
and that the plaintiff did not look until just before the im-
pact of the collision. 
In criticizing a finding instruction which told the jury that 
if the plaintiff and his son looked and listened wheu it would 
have been reasonably effective, and the defendant failed to 
give the statutory crossing signals, they should find for the 
plaintiff, the Special Court of Appeals said at pages 720-
.721: 
"Another fatal objection to the instruction is that it au-
thorizes the jury to find for the plaintiff even though he ma.y 
l1ave gone upon the track in full view of the oncoming train, 
and at a time when to do so was courting disaster and flirt-
ing with death. · 
The facts of this case strongly indicate contributory neg-
ligence on the part of the plaintiff, and it might be gravely 
questioned whether a recovery could be sanctioned unless 
the facts justified the jury in believing the bell was not 
32 In the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
rung on approaching the crossing as required by section 3959, 
Code of Virginia.'' 
It is 'apparent from this language that under the evidence 
·the Court found the plaintiff passenger guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law, and except for the provisions 
of the Code·section cited, which is not involved in the instant 
case, he would necessarily have been barred from any re- · 
covery. 
The case of Canody v. N. & W. R. Co., 129 Va. 56, was a 
crossing accident case which was before the Court on a de-
murrer to the evidence. There 'vas evidence requiring th(} 
Court to hold that the train was running very rapidly, sounded 
no crossing signal and rang no bell. T11e plaintiff, who was 
driving a heavily loaded truck, stopped, looked and listened 
at a point some distance from the crossing, but his view 
was then obstructed. There were four tracks at the crossing, 
and it appeared that if he had looked when within ten feet 
of the first track reached, he could have seen at least one 
thousand yards in the direction from which the train was 
coming. flis helper, Mayberry, who ·was. on the rear end 
of the truck, seeing the train appearing on the third track, 
as the truck was about on the first track, shouted a warning 
to him and jumped off. The plaintiff testified that he did 
not become conscious of the approach of the train until he 
was on the second track and the train was one hundred 
yards away. 
In affirming the judgment of the trial court which sustained 
the demurrer, the Court said at page 59: 
"It seems to us very clear indeed from the plaintiff's own 
testimony that the proximate cause of the accident ·was his 
failure to look and listen for approaching trains just be-
fore he started to cross the tracks. Every one of his own 
witnessea introduced to testify as to the circumstances of 
the accident, none of whom were under any duty to obseriVe 
the approaching train, testify that they both saw and heard 
it before the accident occurred, and when it was a consider-
able distance away from the point of collision. It is con-
tended that he was excused from looking for danger after 
he approached the track close enough to see, so as to make 
such Io'oking effective, because it was necessary for him to 
guide the automobile tnlCk across the tracks. The crossing, 
however, 'vas smooth, fifteen feet wide, made of cinders, 
perfectly straight, at right angles with the tracks, and there 
was no danger of obstruction in front of the machine to be 
I 
,I 
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evaded. It would have required only an instant to observe 
the tracks looking east and west while the machine was 
moving slowly at two miles per hour, from the point ten 
feet south of the first track until he reached the second track,· . 
and had he been paying even as much attention as his helper, 
Mayberry, who was not in as· good position to see or to 
appreciate the danger, he 'vould certainly have seen the train 
sooner than ~lay berry saw it.'' 
See also 
Washington, etc., R. Co. v. Thmnpson, 136 Va. 597. ·, 
A leading authority upon the subject under discuss~on is 
e case of B1·adley v. Misso?.tr'i Pacific R. Co., 288 Fed. 484 
J (C. C. A. 8th Cir.), which was an action for damages for 
the death of one Bradley, killed while riding in an auto-
mobile driven by one Brown, which was struck by a pas-
senger train at a street crossing in the to'vn of Prescott, 
Arkansas. B.rown was likewise killed. It was shown that the 
train 'vas not scheduled to stop at Prescott and was running 
at a high rate of speed. After setting forth certain physical 
facts, the opini9n of the Court states at pages 486-487: 
"It is undisputed that from a point 40 feet east of the 
track on Garland Street a train down to the wheels of the 
engine would be visible to a distance of 800 feet north of 
the crossing. Before reaching that point on Garland Street 
the embankment of earth along the right of 'vay made the 
sight of an approaching train difficult, if not impossible. 
There 'vas no s,moke to obscure the view. There were no 
other moving trains in the vicinity to distract attention; 
no unusual noises from the industries; nothing to ~onfuse 
or perplex. The eyesight and hearing of the men \Vere un-
affected. Both kne'v of this crossing and had passed over 
it for years. Bradley had worked in that immediate vicinity 
for over ten years. Brown had crossed at this place with 
his Ford car practically every day for three years in going 
back and forth to business. They knew it was the usual 
time for the fast mail to pass through Prescott. This par-
ticular day it was nearly on time-about four minutes late. 
None knew the crossing better than did these men. Under 
these circumstances, the car was driven at a speed estimated 
at 10 miles per hour from where the road parallel to the 
track on th'e east turns into Garland Street, across the in-
dustrial track, and on along the 7 4 feet to the main track, 
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apparently without either Brown or Bradley looking or listen-
ing, and so far onto the track ahead of the approaching 
train that the car, when struck, was thrown tothe west of the 
crossing. The only reasonable inference that can be drawn 
from their conduct is that t~ey did not look, or, if they did 
and saw the train, deliberately took the chance of beating 
it over the crossing. If the former, they were guilty of 
gross negligence-if the latter, g.ross recklessness. If parties 
driving automobiles persist in gambling with death at rail-
road crossings, their estates should not be augmented by 
damages if death win. Care, not cha:.ce, is the re,uisite at 
railroad crossings~'' 
After quoting from a large number of opinions in cases 
where it wa~ held that a person riding in a vehicle driven 
by another was guilty of contributory negligence, the Court 
further said at _page 493: 
''These cases are sufficient authority for the common sense 
doctrine that parties cannot sit quietly in an automobile 
'vhen the driver thereof is taking them into a place of dan-
ger, well known by them to be such, and fail to warn him or 
to. protest, and be in the exercise of such care as the law 
demands. 
And at page 495: ... 
· "In the face of all the physical surroundings and the ever-
present fact that, had Bradley looked about 40 feet from the 
track, or nearer, .he must have seen the approaching train 
and could have warned Brown, that he knew the e.rossing, 
and everything about it, as well as did Brown, and knew 
that the train went throuJrh at that particular time of day 
at a high rate of speed without stopping the presumption 
of due care on his part is unavailing. It cannot offset such 
positive evidence of negligence as the physical surroundings 
present. The duty was upon him in approaching this cross-
ing to ascertain the approach of a train by exercising his 
faculties of sight and hearing at such a place and wit]\in 
such distance from the crossing as would be effective. Re 
could not rely upon Brown to protect him. The duty to 
look was as much upon him as upon Brown. 
• * • * * 
This is not a situation of wliere a party is thrown into 
a sudden hazard by the negligence of another as in Warth 
v. Jackson Cownty Court, 71 vV. Va. 184, 76 S. E. 420. Under 
such circumstances the doctrine of sitting tight and keeping 
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still might be applicable, as suggestion to the driver at that 
time might make the hazard even greater. Here the hazard 
was brought about as much by Bradley's negligence as by 
Brown's. We think the question of contributory negligence 
here· was one of law for the court, as the evidence relating 
thereto was undisputed, and but one conclusion can be drawn 
therefrom by reasonable minds, ·and that is that Bradley was 
guilty of contributory negligence.', . 
In the case of Chicago db I. R. Co. v. Sellars, 5 F. (2d) 31, 
it was said: 
"A passenger who sits quietly in an automobile and allows 
the driver thereof to take him into a place of danger, without 
effectively exercising his senses for his own protection, or 
without warning the driver or maJ.ring a protest is guilty of 
contributory negligence and. cannot recover." 
In Hoyle v. Northern Pacific R. Co.; 105 Wash. 652, 178 
Pac. 810, the plaintiff's decedent, seated in a motor truck-
driven by his employer over a crossing, was killed in a col-
lision with a train. The decedent was showri to have been 
familiar with the surroundings and had previously driven 
over the crossing himself. In holding, that although the 
negligence of his employer, :!\filler, could not be imputed to 
the decedent, the lower court should have held as a matter 
of la"r that the decedent was guilty of contributory negli-
gence, the Court said: 
'' ~iding be!Side the driver, on the side from which the 
train was approaching, the slightest degree of care for his 
ow11 safety would have caused him to look for the regular 
train then due which always passed that crossing at a high 
rate of speed. l-Ie did not occupy a position in the truck or a 
relationship to,vards ~filler which would permit him to close 
his eyes to that which would have been apparent had he 
looked, and rely absolutely upon either 1\filler or the rail-
road operatives to protect him from the danger." 
In Sadler v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 118 Wash. L21, 203 
Pac. 10, it was said that as a guest in an automobile ap-
proaching a crossing did not warn the driver, where he could 
have seen 1,000 feet along the track from a distance of seventy 
feet therefrom, his contributory negligence was conclusively 
established as a matter of law. 
In_ the case of Jameson v. N. & W. R. Co., 97 We_st Va. 119, 
36 In the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
124 S. E. 491, which· involved a crossing collision, it was 
shown that the driver of an automobile and the passenger· 
for whose death the action was brought, approached the track 
at a speed of four or five miles an hour, 'vhile the train speed 
'vas about thirty miles an hour. At a point twenty feet from 
the track the driver shifted gears and alm.ost brought the car 
to a standstill. They then had a view in the direction fron1 
which the train approached of nearly 800 feet. In affirm4lg 
a judgment of the trial court which directed a verdict for 
the defendant the Court said: 
"For aught we kno,v, decedent, who 'vas in an even better 
position to see, being on the right side· of the automobile, may 
not have looked at all .. ~And 'virile we pointed out in Yout~tg 
v. Railway Co., 96 W.Va. 534, 123 S. E. 433, that a passenger 
in an automobile is not always negligent because he does 
nothing, that it is often his best course to remain silent rather 
than disturb the driver, and that the driver's negligence is 
not imputed to him, we also showed that he is not excused 
from the duty of acting for his own safety a~ a reasonably 
prudent person should do. As stated in a case there cited. 
he must not be 'mere fright'. But on this point of the case, 
as on the other issues, plaintiff claims that decedent's con-
duct was for the jury to consider. We think not. How can 
we excuse either him or the driver for failing to observe the 
train which must have been in plain vie,v, and in failing to 
make provision for their safety? They had no right to rely 
wholly and implicitly upon the defendant's failure to sound 
the warning. Blackwood v. T'ractim·-, Co., 96 W. Va. 1, 122 
S. E. 359. 
In none of our cases 'vhich hold that the contributory,neg-
ligence of the traveler is a matter for the jury do we find 
the palpable carelessne·ss on his part shown by this record. 
~fore aidn to it is our decision in Cavendish v. Rwilw(JjlJ Corn-
pany, 95 W.Va. 490, 121 S. E. 498, where we set aside aver-
dict in plaintiff's favor. 
Other persons, 'vitnesses for plaintiff, who were in posi-
tions of perfect safety, and, therefore, under no duty to look 
out for the danger, saw the train's approach. 'That one is 
injured at a railway crossing does not of itself prove that 
he is guilty of contdbutory negligence.' Casdorph v. Hin,es, 
89 W. Va., 448, 109 8. E. 77 4. But where, as here, there 
has been a gross disregard for one's personal safety, 've could· 
not sustain a recovery. We therefore affirm the judgment.'' 
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See also 
Parramqre v. De11tver, (c., R. Co., 5 F. (2d) 912. 
Trenholm v. Sou. P . Co., 4 F. (2d) 562. 
M:orris v. C. B. db . R. Co., 101 Neb. 479, 163 N. W. 799. 
Jo-int Enterprise. 
The evidence in the instant case showed that on the day 
of the accident and on the preceding day the decedent had 
had some trouble with his car. For this reason he did not 
reach the ~lineral Hotel on the night before the accident as 
expected, but arrived there at noon the next day, and stated: 
''I will be here tonight.'' (Rec., pp. 116-117.) It further 
appeared that later in the day he ... managed to get his car to 
the garage operated by Mr. ~!apes. In order for· him to leave 
the car at the garage for repairs it would of course be neces-
sary to make some arrangement for getting back to the hotel 
that night. Hence Mrs. ~!apes agreed to drive him there. 
(Rec., p. 45.) 
From these facts it is apparent that Mrs. Mapes and 
Meyer had a mutual interest in the ride to :Mineral, by means 
of which the car could be fixed a.t the :1\{a pes garage, whereas 
Meyer could still get back to the hotel that night. 
It is submitted that these facts are sufficient to bring the 
instant case well within the "joint enterprise" rule which 
was first enunciated in Virginia in the case of Wash. db 0. D. 
R. Co. v. Zell, 118 Va. 755, and that hence the negligence o~ 
the driver of the car, Mrs. ~Iapes, is imputed to the de-
cedent. This of course furnishes an additional bar to any 
recovery 'vhatever by the plaintiff. 
In that case, 'vhich involved a crossing accident just out-
. side the City of Alexandria, it 'vas said at pages 758-759: 
''This was a dangerous crossing for travelers coming, 
as these two men were, from the south, because on that side 
of the track and west of the highway there was a natural 
embahkment or hill which obstructed the view from the 
highway of the track and V'ice versa. Various estimates, not 
purporting to be based upon actual measurements qr to be 
absolutely accurate, app~ar in the record as to the extent 
and effect of this obstruction, but the question is set at rest 
by the results of undisputed tests and measurements made 
by a photographer assisted by an engineer. These tests 
and measurements, construed most strongly against the de-
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fendant, demonstrate that the driver of an automobile, coming 
north on the highway, could in a perfectly safe and ample 
stopping distance of the track see a train .approaching from 
the west at a distance of at least seventy-five feet from the 
crossing. As he drew nearer the track he could see the train 
still further west, the track in that direction being straight 
for several hundred feet. The maximum rate at which any 
witness plac~d the speed of the train was 'between 25 and 
30 miles an hour', This same witness, the only eye-witness 
who testified, and who ~as in a position to see both the train 
and the automobile and 'just stopped and waited to see 
which would cross first', said that the automobile approached 
the crossing at about fifteen miles an hour, and slo\ved down 
just before reaching it to a spee.d of from ten to twelve miles, 
the impression made on hipl being that the machine slowed 
·down to avoid the jar which would result from running at a 
faster rate of speed over the crossing. 
* * • * .• 
The negligence of the driver of the car is perfectly mani-
f t. He had no right to proceed across the track without 
king and listening for a train. The greater the danger 
.. the greater the measure of his dutr:. "*If lie did not see orllear 
a train when he first reached the point at which the obstruc-
tion began to pass from his westward vision along the track, 
then it was his duty to continue to look and listen until he 
reached the track. The very contention made here that he 
had to be close to the track before he could see any dis-
Jance to the west emphasized the importance of caution on 
his part. If the running of his machine interfered with his 
hearing or looking, it was his duty to stop and look and 
listen so as to make looking and listening effective.'' 
And at pages 764-765: 
"But it is claimed that the negligence of the driYer, Peck, 
cannot be imputed to Zell. Inasmuch as they left Alexandria 
fifteen minutes before the accident. with Peck at the wheel, 
it is a fair inference that he was still driving the car, but in 
our view of the case that fact. is immaterial, because Zell '~ 
situation ·did not bring him \vithin the rule applicable to in-
vited guestR or passengers as applied in .A. & D. R. Co. v. 
"11·onmon.ger, 95 Va. 625, 632, 29 S. E. 319, but upon the con-
trary, brought him within the reason and the terms of the 
rule that where two persons are engaged in a joint enter-
prise or adventure in the use of an automobile, even though 
the ~nterprise or adventure be only a pleasure trip, the con-
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tributory negligence of either, within the scope of the enter-
prise, will bar a r~eovery of the other. In this case Zell 
had taken the lead that morning in the joint project in which· 
they were engaged, and can by no reasonable intendment be 
classed as an invited guest or passenger in the sense in which 
those terms are used in the Iromnon.ger Case and the many 
other cases of that type, the authority of which in eases where 
they apply we recognize, but which are distinguishable in 
principle from this one. 
In the second volume of Ruling Case Law, sec. 43, p. 1208, 
.after adverting to the -variety and contrariety of opinion 
upon the question of imputing to a passenger the negligence 
of a driver, the text sa.ys: 'In spite of these different rules 
as to whether negligence may be imputed to a guest or pa.s-
·senger in an automobile, there seems to be no difference of 
opinion as to the rule that where two persons are engaged 
in a joint enterprise in the use of an automobile, the con-
tributory negligence of one will bar a recovery by either, 
if it is a matter 'vithin the scope of the joint undertaking. 
See also Beaucage v. Mercer, 206 Mass. 492,92 N. E. 774, 138 
Am. St. Rep. 401 ; 33 Cyc .. 1015, and cases cited in note 64; 
White's Supplement (1907 and 1914) to Thompson on Neg., 
sees. 506.'' 
See ~lso 
B'rom1ner v. Pen:n. R. Co., 179 Fed. 577, 29 L. R .. A. (N. S.) 
924. 
Davis v. Oh·icago, R.I. & P. Co., 159 Fed. 10, 16 L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 424. 
In concluding this treatment of assignments of error Nos. 
1 and 4, the defendant contends that each of the propositions 
asserted, namely: (1) That the defendant was not negligent; 
(2) that the intervening, independent act of the driver of the 
automobile. was the sole proximate cause of the accident; 
and (3) that the decedent was guilty of contributory negli-
gence ·as a matter of law, are fully substantiated by the evi-
dence in the ca~e, and demanded that the trial court grant the 
respective motions of the defendant, (1) to refuse to give any 
instructions authorizing a recovery by the plaintiff, and (2) 
to set aside the verdict of the jury and enter up judgment 
for the defendant. These contentions 'vere of course season-
ably presented to the trial cour·t and properly preserved 
(Bill of Exceptions No. 2, Rec., pp. 185, 188, Bill of Excep-
tions No. 1, p. 181). The facts of the case were fullY:_ de-
/ 
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veloped at the trial, and this Court is requested to reverse 
the judgment of the trial court and enter final judgment for 
the defendan~ .. 
~RRORS AS :·INSTRUCTIONS . 
. \A) Plai·ntiff' s Instructio1z.s. 
Instruction 1 given by the Court at the instance of the 
plaintiff was as follows (R.ec., p. 183): 
"The Court instructs the jury that if. you believe from a 
preponderance of the evidence tl1at the defendant was guilty 
of negligence gharged in the Notice of 1vlotion for Judgment, 
and such negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries 
an~ d~ath of George E~ar !!e~er, you shall fi~d for the 
platnbff, unless you further beheve that the sa1d George 
Edgar Meyer was guilty of contributory negligence." 
This instruction ailows the jury to find a verdict for the 
plaintiff upon any ''negligence charged in the ·Notice of 
Motion' 1• As already noted, six charges of negligence ai'e 
therein set out, whereas at the conclusion of the evidence it 
was apparent that the plaintiff had necessarily abandoned 
every charge except the one relating to the speed of the 
train. There was no evidence which even purported to sub-
stantiate any other cha~ge. There was no conflict in the 
· evidence to the effect that an adequate lookout was main-
tained and appropriate warnwg signals were given, yet the 
jury may have found their verdict upon these charges under 
this instruction. 
While the Court excluded from the evidence the ordinance 
which the plaintiff offered as requiring a stationary gong 
or signal at the crossing, the failure to provide suGh a . 
signal was alleged as ·a distinct ground of recovery and,_ re-
mained in the Notice of Motion when it was taken to the 
jury room. It is impossible to say that the verdict was 
not based solely upon this charge. 
Although Instruction B, given on motion of the defen-
dant, correctly told the jury that the obstruction to the view, 
whose existence is alleged as the sixth cl1arge of negligence, 
did not constitute negligence upon which a recovery could 
be based, Instn1ction 1 is in direct conflict with this state-
ment. 
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a That finding instructions must be limited to grounds of 1ability supported by evidence is of course too plain for rgnment. ---·· _ ........ ~---------------- _______ ...----
Sou.thern R. Co. v. Forgey, 105 Va. 599. 
Furthermore, on account of the important bearing in the 
case of the conduct of the driver of the automobile, under 
any view of the evidence, it is submitted that in a finding 
instruction, which purported to cover the entire case, this 
feature should have been referred to in such manner as to 
exonerate the defenda11t, if the jury believed it was the sole 
proximate cause of the accident. 
The objections to this instruction were not remedied by 
any other instructions which were given. 
Instruction 4 given on motion of the plaintiff was as fol-
l~ws ( Rec., p. 184) : 
"The Court instructs the jury that if you believe from the 
evidence tliat the defendant appr«?ached and operated its train 
·over the crossing ''There ~£eyer was killed at a greater rate 
of speed than 15 miles an hour, that such fact alone is evi-
dence of the negligen~e of the defendant.'' 
This instruction is presumably based upon the speed ordi-
nance of the 'Town of 1\tiineral to which reference has been 
made. But, as already noted, this ordinance does not pur-
port to regulate the f3peed of an engine or train except wh~n 
running in or across a street, and being penal in nature js 
to be strictly construed. There is no warranty. for saying 
-that a speed greater than fifteen miles au hour as the train 
"approached the First Street crossing would be evidence of 
negligence. As has been previously shown, a particular rate 
of speed, where no regulatory ordinance or statute is in-
volved is not evidence of negligence. This Court will no 
doubt take· judicial notice of the faet that passenger trains 
necessarily have to run at a. greater rate of· speed than 
fifteen miles an hour, except where limited by ordinance or 
statute, in order to maintain the schedules the defendant is 
required to establish. Furthermore it could not be said under 
the evidence, that the speed of the train as it "approached" 
the_ crossing was the proximate cause of the accident: 
The instruction is further objectionable in that there was 
no evidence in the ·case to the effect that the defendant 
operated its train "over the· crossing" at a greater rate of 
speed tha!l fifteen miles an hour. Doubtless it was the ab-
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sence of evidence of this fact which suggested to counsel 
the use of the term "approached". 
(B) Defendant's Instructions. 
The . following instructions 'vere offered by the defendant 
and refused by the Court : 
Jnst1·uction E. 
''The Court instructs the jury that a passenger who sits 
quietly in an automobile while approaching a railroad crossing 
and allows the driver to take him into a place of danger with- -
out effectively exercising his senses for his own protection, 
or ·without warning the driver, or making a protest is guilty 
of contributory negligence as a. matter of law." 
Instruction F. 
''The Court instructs the jury that a railroad track is of 
itself. a notice of danger to a traveler and that a person ap-
proaching a railroad crossing must not only use his eyes and 
cars, looking and listening in. both directions, but must, when 
about to cross the track, look and listen s.o as to make these 
acts reasonably effective. If such looking or listening did 
or would warn him of the near approach of the train, then 
it is the duty of such person aRProachhig a crossing to keep 
off a track until the train has passed. And if the jury be-
lieve from the evidence that the -plaintiff's decedent in this 
case did not ·Iook and listen in both directions as . he ap-
proached the crossing of the defendant, or that he did not 
continue to look and listen using reasonable care to make 
such looking and listening effective in both directions until 
he reached the main track of the defendant, the plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory negligence and the jury should find for 
the defendant.'' 
I nstr·uct-ion G. 
''The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from 
the egidence that the plaintiff's decedent was himself guilty 
of negligence when the automobile in which he 'vas riding 
crossed or attempted_ to cross the railway tracks, upon the 
occasion of his injury, and such negligence efficiently con-
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cannot ~ecover in this action even though the jury ~ay be-
lieve from the evidence that the defendant was negligent." 
Each of these instructions directed the attention of the 
jury to the question of the contributory negligence of the de-
cedent. In refusing to give any of these instructions, or any 
other instruction which told the jury that there was a duty 
resting upon the decedent to exerc1~- ordinary care for his 
own safety, the Court in effe~esolved the. issue of con-
.):fibutory neglfgence in favor oi_!!Ie _p_!a.!!l.tiff_as-a-matte:J;..-of-~ 
}/'law. 
In its action in this respect, the Court, as already pointed 
out, disregarded both physical facts and testimonial proof 
which were sufficient to establish contributory negligence on 
the part of the decedent as a matter of law. It further dis-
regarded the testimony of the witness, F. F. Johnson, that 
shortly after the accident he found a broken bottle contain-
ing whiskey about ten feet from the decedent's body. (Rec., 
pp. 135-136.) It also disregarded the statement of several 
other witnesse·s that they smelled whiskey around the de-
eedent's body and the automobile. (Rec., pp. 96, 105, 130.) 
Certainly the jury· should have been given the option under 
this evidence, coupled with the fact of the accident itself, to 
find that the decedent was intoxicated, and failed to exercise 
due care for his own safety. Under the instructions given, 
however, this privilege was denied them. The authorities 
which have been previously cited, in the discussion of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law, apply of course 
with added f~rce to the contention that the question was at 
least one for the jury to pass upon. 
A r~cent Virginia case wherein upon facts much more 
favorable to the plaintiff it was held that the contributory 
negligence of a passenger in ·an automobile was a question 
for the jury, is Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. James, 136 S. E. 660, 
664 (decided Jan. 20, 1927). 
It is significant that even the plaintiff in asking the Court 
to give Instruction 1, quoted above, conceded that there was 
evidence justifying the submission of the question to the 
jury, .since this instruction concluded 'vith the qualifying 
clause ''unless you further believe that the said George 
Edgar Meyer was guilty of contributory negligence". Fur-
thermore, Instruction 2 offered by the plaintiff and giveu 
by the Court covered the question of burden of proof on the 
question of contributory negligence. It is inconceivable that 
the plaintiff would have asked for instructions in this form 
if there had been no evidence to support them. But in no 
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instruction given was the jury told what nature or measure 
of duty rested upon the decedent as regards his own sa~ety. 
It is respectfully submitted that the errors of the Court, 
'vith respect to the instructions given and refused, which 
have just been discussed, required the Court to set aside 
the verdict of the jury and award to the defendant a new 
trial. 
v. 
ERROR IN ADl\IISSION AND REFUSAL TO STRil(E 
OUT TESTIMONY OF WITNESS 
PAUL COPLEY. 
The defendant's engineer, Giesendorffer, testified that after 
receiving the emergency signal from the fireman, he im-
mediately applied the brakes, and stopped the train in prac-. 
tically its own length. The train was shown to have con-
sisted of the engine and tender and six coaches, 'vith an aggre-
gate length of four hundred and eighty-six feet, and was 
running at a rate of speed not in excess of fifteen miles an 
hour when the application of brakes was made. Giesen-
dorffer stated that this ·was as good a stop as he could 
have made under the circumstances. He explained that in 
lowering the speed of the train in coming into Mineral he 
had reduced his available air brake pressure from 110 pounds 
to 95 pounds, that 'vith the full amount of pressure to call 
upon he could hav:e stopped witl1in the length of the engine 
pd three cars. (Rec., pp. 75, 79.) 
~ Solely for the purpose of Jmpeachment and negation of 
the testimony of Gieseudorffer, 1I1at a reasonable stop ;vas 
made by him, the plaintiff was allowed in rebuttal to intro-
duce expert testimony to the effect that the train could have 
been stopped within a shorter distance. The witness, Paul 
Copley, whose testimony was tendered to the Court for this 
purpose, stated that under conditions similar to those shown 
to exist in instant case, a train "should stop in about a car 
and a half length". (Bill of Exceptions No. 3, Rec~', p. 
195.) . -. 
Objection was duly made by the defendant that the ,\iit-
ness was not shown to have possessed the qualifications of a1i 
expert as to the subject under investigation (Bill of Excep---
tions No. 3, Rec., pp. 193-195), but the Court allowed the 
testimony to go to the jury. 
It was shown that though the witness had been rated as a 
locomotive engineer for nine years, he had been engag·ed 
chiefly in yard and freight service. He had spent some time 
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as a fireman in passenger service. As to his experience ·as 
an engh1eer in passenger service, he testified as follows (Bill 
of Exceptions No. 3, pp. 194, 195) : 
"Q. How many passenger runs have you made? 
A. I never made only emergency runs on passenger trains .. 
The only passenger train I ever ran was from Potomac Yards 
to Washington. I caught that on an emergency trip. 
Q. How far is that~ 
A. About eight miles. 
Q. That is the only time you have run a passenger train 7 
A. Yes, sir. I have handled a passenger train around the 
stations in making up passenger trains around Broad Street 
station up here." 
• 
"Q. You say yon operated a passenger train once? 
A. From Potomac Yard to Washington. 
Q. Eight miles? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You base your opinion upon the results of that trip? 
A. Yes, sir." 
These excerpts from the testilnony demonstrate quite 
plainly that the witness was not shown to have had the re-
quisite amount of personal knowledge and experience to give 
any opinion as to the distance within which the train could 
have been stopped, and his testimony therefore should have 
been excluded. Expert testimony being admissible only under 
an exception to the hearsay rule, it is of course incumbent 
upon a party tendering such evidence to establish the com-
petency and special qualifications of a witness through whom. 
lf is offered. 
V For the error in admitting and refusing to exclude the 
testimony of the witness, Copley, it is submitted the Courf 
should have set aside the verdict and awarded a new trial 
to the defendant. 
Wherefore, for the foregoing and other errors apparent on 
-the face of the record, your petitioner prays that a writ of 
error and supersedeas may be awarded your petitioner to 
the said judgment of the Law & Equity Court of the City of 
Ricltmond, Part II, and that the proceedings may be reviewed, 
the judgment reversed ancl final judgment entered for the de-
fendant. 
Respectfully su hmi t ted, 
THE CHESAPEAKE & OHIO RAIL\VAY CO~IPANY. 
By LEAICE & SPICER, Counsel. 
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. We; the undersigned counsel, practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, are respectfully of the opinion 
that the judgment complained of in the foregoing petition 
is erroneous, and that the same should he reviewed and re- · 
versed. 
Received 1\IIay 9, 1927. 
WALTER. LEAI{E, 
MEADE T. SPICER, Jn. 
R.li. L. C. 
Writ of error allowed and supersedeas awarded. Bond, 
$9,000.00. 
R. H. L. CHICHESTER. 
To the Clerk at R.ichmond. 
• 
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VIRGINIA: 
PLEAS before the Honorable Frank T. S'utton, Jr., Judge 
of the La'v and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part Two, held for the said City at tlJe Court room 
thereof, in the City Hall, on the 12th day of January, 
1927. . 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit: In the Clerk's 
Office of the said Law and Equity Court of the City of Rich-
mond, Part Two, the 19th day of .January, 1926: Came Helen , 
May Meyer, Administrator of George Edgar Meyer, deceased, 
and filed her Notice of lvfotion for ,Judgment against the 
Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, 'vl1ich Notice of 
Motion for Judg·ment is in the words and figures following,' 
to-wit: 
NOTICE OF ~LOTION FOR .JUDG~fENT. 
Virginia: 
In the La'v and Equity Court of the·City of Richmond, Part 
Two. 
Helen May 1\f eyer, Administratrix of George Edgar 1\feyer, 
deceased, 
v. 
The Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., a corporation, etc. 
NOTICE OF ~lOTION FOR. JUDGM~ENT. 
To the Chesapeake and Ohio R.ailway Company, a corpora-
tion, chartered and doing business under the. laws 'of the 
State of Virginia: 
Take Notice that I shall, on the 8th day of Fe_b-
page 2 ~ rnary, ] 926, at 10 o'clock A. 1\I., or as soon there-
after as I shall he heard, in the La"; and Equity 
Court, Part II, of the City of Richmond, Virginia, make 
motion for a. judgment. against you in the sum of Ten Thous-
and Dollars ($10,000.00), which amount is due me from you 
as damages for certain injuries resulting in. the instant, or 
almost instant death of my intestate, George Edgar M.ey~r, 
ea used by your negligence in the manner following: . 
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hour of 8:30 P. l\I., my intestate was riding as a g'nard in an 
automobile driven by lvirs. C. A. Mapes, and going in a north-
erly direction along First Street in the town of :Mineral, 
Louisa County; Virginia; that my said intestate was riding 
in the rear seat of the automobile and had no control what-
ever over either the operation of the car or its driver; that 
the said ~f rs. C. A. l\fapes was driving along First Street 
at a legal rate of speed and otherwise exercising due caution; 
that whm1 the said Mrs. l\fapes approached within a short 
distance of your railway tracks at a point somewhat op-
posite your station in the town of l\fineral, Virginia, she 
stopped the car and looked and listened for the approach 
of trains upon your traeks; that she did not see or hear any 
train, and proceeded to c.ross said traeks; that she was driving 
at a low rate of speed when she crossed your main tracks; that 
when she was in t.he act of crossing said tracks, one of the 
trains yon own, operate andjor control, approached from 
the east and crashed into the said automobile, hurling out 
my said intestate and instantly, or almost instantly killing 
him; that the collision was due in no manner to any neg-
ligence on tl1e part of my said intestate, but was a proximate 
result of your negligence in one or more . of the following 
particulars : 
page 3 ~. (1) That you operated the train which killed my 
said intestate, at a negligent, careless, reckless and 
unlawful rate of speed, and in excess of the rate of speed 
permitted by an ordinance of the Town of Mineral, Virginia, 
in such cases made and provided. 
(2) That your train failed to give any kind of signal when 
it approached the crossing at which my said fntestate was 
killed. 
(3) That if your train gave· any signal of its approach 
at the crossing upon which my said intestate was killed, that 
said signal was not in accordance with requirements of law. 
(4) That. you failed to keep a proper lookout from the 
ehgine of the train that killed my said intestate. 
. (5) Tlwt yon failed to provide any kind of signal at your 
crossing at. First. Street, in the Town of Mineral, Virginia, 
whereby to give notire of the approach of your train to per-
sons traveli.ng said street, against the Ordinance of the Town 
of J\IIineral in snrh ca~e made and provided. 
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(6) That yon construeted and negligently maintained a 
certain tool house, water tank, pump house, sand house, eoal 
bin, and other obstructions along your right of way to the 
south of your tracks and to the east of First Street, so that 
it was impossible for ~irs. l\iapes or my intestate who were 
traveling north on said First Street, to either see or hear a . 
train approaching your said crossing in the Town of 1\tiineral, 
from the east, until they had gotten nearly on top of your 
main line track. · 
\Vherefore, on account of said injury and death, received 
as aforesaid, I have been damaged as administrator for 
George Edgar J\1:eyer, in the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars 
($10,000.00), for which amount I will ask judgment 
page 4 ~ as above set out. · 
1926. 
Given under my hand this 15th day of January, 
HELEN l\iAY l\iEYER, 
Administratrix of the estate of George 
Edgar Meyer, deceased. 
By .JOHN G. l\iAY, JR., 
S. L. SINNOTT, Counsel. 
And at another day, to-wit: In said Court on the 8th day 
of February, 1926. 
This day came the Plaintiff and the Defendant, by Counsel, 
and on motion of the Plaintiff, by Counsel, it is ordered that 
this case be docketed. The defendant, by counsel, then filed 
herein Notice of its intention to rely upon the contributory 
negligence of the plaintiff's intestate as a defense to this 
action and the partienlars thereof, nnd its plea of "not 
g:uilty" and put itself npon the Country, and the plailhiff 
likewise. 
PLEA OP CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGEKCE. 
I 
Virginia: 
In the Law HJ)(l Equity Court, Part IT, of the City of Rieh-
mond. . 
Ifelen ~fay il.f eyer, Administratrix of George Edgar ilf eyer, 
deceased, 
v. 
The CJwsapeake & Ohio Railway Company. 
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Notice of intention of defendant to rely upon contributory 
negligence of fhe plaintiff's inteRtate aS a defence to this 
action, and particulars tl1ereof. 
"\Vithout admitting, but expressly denying tlwt the defen-
dant 'vas guilty of any negligence, p_roximately 
page 5 ~ rausing or efficiently c-ontributing to the injury of 
the plaintiff's intestate, the defendant will rely 
upon the contributory nagligenee of the plaintiff's intestate 
as a defense to this action, the particulars of which are set 
forth as follows: 
(1) In not stopping, looking and/or listening for the ap-
pr_oach of the train. 
(2) In not looking and/or listening in both directions for 
the approach of the train at a point or points 'vhere, under 
the circumstances and surroundings existing, such looking 
and/or listening would be effective. 
(3) In not looking· and/or listening for the approach of the 
train as he ·was about to cross the railway tracks. 
( 4) In disregarding: tl1e signals g-iven by tl1e locomotive 
tnid otl1er warning·s of the approarh of the train. 
(5) The automobile was heing- clriven in a dm1gerous and 
improper manner and at a clang·erous, impl'oper and exreR-
Bive rate of sneed, with the know-Iedg·e of the plaintiff's i 11-
testate, and without olJjertion on his part. 
(6) The automobile \vas driven on the traef in front of tlw 
oncoming train without any propm· precautions hcing; tak~1i 
for the safety of the automobile and ih; occupants, after tlH! 
driver and the or~upants thereof ought to have known, hy 
the exereise of ordinary rare, of the a1Tr~·o~wl1 of the train 
and of the dang·er of crossing the tracks of tl1e defendant 
at the time and under the eircnmstances existing. 
(7) Neither the driver of the automobile nor the occupants 
thereof used ordinary, reasonable and proper means to de-
termine whether the train was approaching the crossing, or 
about to cross the raih\'"ay tracks. 
(8) Generally, in not using surh care and rantion a.s a 
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reasonably prudent person would have done under 
page 6 } the circumstances. 
(9) In not himself using ordinary care to prevent the in-
jury 'vhen he kne,,r, or ought to have known, of :..the dan-
gerous proximity of the trah1 to the crossing. 
(10) The driver of the automobile was negligent in the 
particulars alleged and such neg·ligence was imputed to the 
plaintiff's intestate. 
In other particulars w·hieh will be disclosed py the evidence 
for tl~e plaintiff. 
LEAI<E, LE .. A.KE & SPICER, p. <i 
page 7} PLEA. OF NOT GillLTY. 
Virginia: 
. In the Law and Equity Court, Part II, of the City of Rich-
nlond. 
lielen l\fay :Meyer, .Administratrix of George Edgar ·l\:feyer, 
~cc>eased, 
v. 
'The Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, a corporation, 
etc. 
PLEA OF NOT GUILT.Y. 
rrhe said defendant. says that it is not guilty of the premises 
laid to its charge in manner and form as complained of in the 
Notice of l\fotion, or any part thereof, m1d of this puts itself 
upon the Country. . 
W11erefore, &c. 
LEAKE, LEAI<E & SPICER, p. d. 
page 8 } And at another day, to-wit: Tn said Court on 
the 13th day of September, 1926. 
Tl1is day came tlu~ dcfc1ldant, by counsel, and by leave of 
Court, filed.herein its "Special Plea.". 
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"SPECIAL PLEA.'' 
·virginia: 
In the. Law and Equity Court of tl1e City of Richmond~ 
Pa1·t II. 
I-Ielen l\'lay 1\feyer, Administratrix of George Edgar :Meyer,. 
deceased, 
v . 
. The Chesapeake & Ol1io Railway Company, a corporation. 
SPECIAL PLEA. 
The said defendant says that. thi~ 0onrf. ougl1t not to 
Iwve or take any furtl1er rognizanee ot the alleged cause of 
action in the Notice of l\Iotio11 meptioned, because it says: 
That lJeforc and at f:l10 time it is allep;ed that the grievances 
in the Notice of ~fotion mentioned were committed, the plain-
tiff's intestate, George Edgar 1\ieyer, ".,.as an employee of 
W. H. Harris Grocery Company, a corporation organized 
under the laws of the State of Virginia and doing busi-
ness in said State, and an "employer" in said State, 'vithin 
the meaning of a certain Aet of the General Assembly of 
Virginia, kno·wu as ''The \Vorl{men's Compensation Act", 
and the plaintiff's said intestate was an ''employee" of the 
said W. H. Harris Grocery Company, 'vithin the meaning~ 
of said Act; that before tl1at time both the plaintiff's in-
testate and the said W. H. Harris Grocery Company had. ac-
cepted the provisions of tl1is Act, to aceept and pay com-
l)ensation for personal injury or death by acci-
page 9 ~ dent, as provided therein, and were hound by its 
terms and conditions. · 
And the said defendant says tl1at l1eretofore, to-wit, 01_1 
the 22ncl day of ~lay, 1925, after the commission of the alleged 
grievances in the Notice of Motion mentioned, the Industrial 
Commission of Virginia, under the provisions of the .Act 
of Assembly aforesaid, made au award approving an agree-
ment "rhich had been theretofore made and entered into he-
tween W. H. Harris Grorery Company and the plail1tiff, 
for compensation to the said plaintiff, for the death of the 
plaintiff's said intestate, of which complaint is made in the 
plaintiff's Notice of l\fotion; and botl1 the said W. H. I:Iarris 
Groeery Company and the plaintiff, then and there, accepted 
said aw·ard, which award now remains in full force and un-
'-
C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Hel_en May Meyer, Adm 'x, etc. 55 
reversed, and a certified copy thereof is now to the Court 
here shown. 
And the said defendant further says that the said plain-
tiff is, by virtue of the terms of the Act of Assembly afore-
said, barred from prosecuting any snit for the alleged cause 
o~ action in the Notice of ~1:otion mentioned. 
And this said defendant is ready to verify. Wherefore, 
&c. 
LEAI{E & SPICER, p. d. 
page 10 r COPY OF AWA.RD. 
INDUSTRIAL CO~·[~fiSSlON OF VIRGINIA. 
Bolling- Handy, Chairman, 
C. G. J(izer, 
Parke P. Deans. 
Richmond 
NOTICE OF A WAR.D. 
,V. ],. Bursey, Secretary, 
Clnim No. 56790. 
Ca~e of George Edgar Meyer. 
rro \\T. fT. Harris Grocery Company, 
Rirhmond, Virg-1nin, 
and ~frs. :Helen J\tf ay 1\:f eyer, et als., 
2405 Carolina Avenue, 
R.ichmond, Va., 
mu11vfaryland Ca~unlty Company, 
Richmond, Virginin. · 




Take notice that the Industrial Commission of Virgjnia 
has examined the memorandum of agreement entered into 
on the 15th day of 1\:fay, 1925, in the above styled case for 
the payment of eompensntion under the Vil·ginia Workmen's 
Compensation Act, and has found the same in accordance with 
the nrovisions of tlw said Act. 
\Vlwrefore, tlw Tndnstrial Commission of Virginia directs 
the payment of compcnsfl:tion as follows: 
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'ro Mrs. :Helen ~Iay 1\Icyer, $12.00 per week, payable 
·weekly, beginning Apri115, 1925, for the use of herself and 
all children under the age of eighteen years in equal propor-
tion, for a period of tl1ree hundred (300) weeks, unless sub-
sequent conditions require a modification. 
To the proper parties, costs of medical, surgical and hos-
pital expenses incident to the injury which caused 
page 11 ~ the deat~ of the decedent (if any) and burial ex-
Iars. 
Seal. 
penses not to exceed One Flundred ($100.00) Dol-
INDlJSTRIAL CO~I:MISSION OF VIRGINIA, 
BOLLING H. H ... t\..NDY, Chairman. 
Attest: \V. F. BURSEY, 
Secretary. 
I, W. F. Bursey, Secretarv of the Industrial Con1mission 
of Virginia, herehy certify that the foregoing is a true and . 
correct copy of the Award in Claim No. 56790, 1\.frs. Helen 
~fay Meyer. et als., Claimants, versus W. H. Harris Grocery 
Con1pany, Employer, and 1\:far~Tland Casualty Company, In-
surance Carrier, as the .same appears on file in this office. 
Given under my ltand and the seal of the Industrial Corn-
mission of Virginia, this the lst day of September, 1926. 
W. F. BURSEY, 
Secretary Industrial Commission of Virginia. 
page 12 ~ And at another day, to-wit: In the said Court 
on the 23rcl day of September, 1926. 
This day came again the parties by eonnsel, and the plain-
tiff, by C'Ounsel, filed a special replication to the special plea 
heretofore filed by the defendant, stating that this suit wa~ 
instituted hy the ~Iar~Tland Casualty Company in the naml~ 
of llelen ~fay ~feyer, Administratrix of the estate of Georg·e 
Edgar Meyer, deceased, for the benefit of the said ~faryland 
Casualty Company and the said Helen May :Nieyer, Adnlinis-
tratrix of the estate of the said George Edgar Meyer, de-
ceased, to which s11id special replication the defendant, by 
counsel, :filed in writing its Rejoinder. 
And thereunon came a Jury, to-wit: B. F. Wallace, vV. S .. 
Jolley, ,J oln1 I-I. Randolph, H. T. Jones, L. C. Cardona, ,V. r.r .. 
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Clary and Raymond W. Clark, wl1o were sworn to well and 
truly try the issues joined, and having partly heard the evi-
dence, were adjourned until to-morro'v morning at ten 
o'clock. 
page 13} REPLICATION TO SPECIAL PLEA. 
Virginia: . 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Ricl1mond, 
Part II. 
Helen ~fay ~Ieyer, Administratrix of George Edgar ~feyer, 
deceased, 
v . 
. The Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, a corporation. 
REPLICATION. 
Now comes the plaintiff and fqr replication to the special 
plea filed br the defendant, says that the facts alleged in 
said special plea down to the _last two paragraphs thereof; 
ure true. 
The plaintiff further shows, ho,vever, that the Maryland 
Casualty Con1pany earried a policy of compensation insur-
ance on· theW. H. H~arris Grocery Company and that under 
tlte terms of said policy, the said \V. H. Harris Grocery 
Company were insured lly the said 1faryland Casualty Com-
pany a~ainst lial)ility of compensation and that on account 
of said policy the 1farylaud Casualty Company has paid 
whatever compensation due to the dependents of the said 
George Edgar 1\feyer to date, and has assumed the liability 
of said W. H. Harris Grocery Company for all compensation 
which may be due said dependents, of and on account of the 
injury that said Georg·e Edgar :Meyer received, as set forth 
in the Notice of Motion and in the Special Plea filed by the 
defendant. 
And the plaintiff further says that this suit is brought 
by tl1e 1\:Jaryland Casualty Company in the name of Helen 
May Meyer, Administratrix of George Edgar Meyer, de-
ceased, for the benefit of itself and the E8ta.te of the said 
George Edgar Meyer. 
fiE LEN lVfA Y ~I EYER, 
Admrx. of Geo. Edgar I\feyer, dec. 
By S. L. SINNOTT, Counsel. 
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page 14 ~ REJOINDER.-
Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond,. 
Part Two. 
Helen May 1\{eyer, Administratrix of George Edgar Ivleyer, 
deceased, 
v. 
The Chesapeake· & Ohio Railway Company. 
Rejoinder. 
· And for Rejoinder to Special Replication filed to Special 
Plea, tlw said defendant, by its Attorneys, comes and says: 
'rhat this suit is not brought by the :Maryland Casualty Com-
pany in the name of Ifolen May Meyer, Administratrix of 
George Edgar 1\ieyer, deceased, for tlw benefit of itself and. 
the estate of George Edgar ~Ieyer, deceased. 
And of this the ·defendant puts itself upon tlie Country. 
LEAI{E & SPICER, p. d. 
page 15 ~ And at anotlwr 'day, to_,,Tit: In the said Court 
on the 24th day of Septen1ber, 1926. 
This day came again the parties, by counsel, and the ~Tliry 
sworn to try this case appeared in Court pursuant to their 
adjournment and having fully heard the evidence and argu-
ments of Counsel, \Vere sent ont of Court to consult of a 
verdict, and after s01ne time returned into Court with a 
verdict in the "rords and figures following, to-\vit: ''We, 
the Jury on the issue joined, find for the Plaintiff and asRess 
damages at $8,600.00." Thereupon the Defendant, by Coun-
sel, moved the Court to set aside the verdict of the Jury and 
to grant it a new trial and to enter up juclgment.for the de-
fendant, upon the gronndR tlutt the Raid verdict is eontrary 
to the law and tlw evidence, being without evidence to sup-
port it and for misdirection of the Jury by the Court, and 
other grounds stated in writing and filed with ·the reC'ord 
herein, the further hearing of which motion is continued. 
page 16 ~ GROUNDS OF ~~lOTION FOR· NEW TRIAL. 
Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part Two. 
C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Helen ~Iay 1\ieyer, A<lm 'x, etc. 59 
Helen ilfay Meyer, Adm"inistratrix, 
v. 
The Chesapeake & Ohio Hailway Company. 
Grounds of l\Iotion to Set .. A.side Verdict .of .Jury and Enter 
· Up Judgment for tlw Defendant or in the Alternative 
to Award the Defendant a Ne'v Trial. 
1. Verdict contrarv to the law and the evidence and with-
out evidence to supp.ort it. 
2. Errors of the Court in the admission and rejeet~on of 
evidence as heretofore pointed out. 
:3. ~rrors of the Court in the giving rertain instructions 
for the plaintiff and in refusing- cert-ain instructions offered 
by the defendant, as heretofore pointed out. 
4. Error~ of the Conrt in amending on its own motion and 
giYing eertain instructions offered by the plaintiff. 
5. Errors of the Court in giving any instructions authoriz-
inp; a recovery by the plaintiff. 
6. Plaintiff in any event is limited in its recovery to the 
amount for which it hecame liable to pay under the a.ward 
of the Industrial Cmnmission of Virginia. 
7. The damages awarded by the ,Jury are excessive. 
LEAJ{E & SPICER, p. d. 
page 17 ~ An<l at another day·, to-wit: In the said Court. 
on the 23rd day of December, 1926. 
~rhis day eame again the parties hy eounsel, and the motion 
Jwretofore made hv the defendant to set aside the verdict 
of the .Jury and to grant it a new trial, having been fully 
heard is overruled hy the Court, to whirh ruling· of the Court 
the defendant, hy rounsel, excepted. It is, therefore, con-
sidered by the Court that the plaintiff. ~fa ryland Casualty 
Company, :.;ning in the name of I-Ielen 1\fay 1\'fcyer, ... t\.dminis-
tratrix of the Pstate of Georg-e Edgar ~feyer, deceased, re-
(•oveJ· again~t the defendant the sum of Fjigltt Thonsand, Six 
}Iunclrccl Ut:S.HOO.OO) nona rs, with interest thereon to be com-
rntc<l after tl10 rate of six per centum per annum from the 
60 In the Supreme Court of .A .. ppeals of Virginia. 
24th day of September, 1926, until paid, and its costs by it 
about its suit in this behalf expended. 
And it is further ordered that any amount of this judgment 
collected by the ~faryland Casualty Company in excess of the 
amount paid by it under its policy covering the employer. of 
the decedent, or for which it is liable, less such amounts 
paid by it for reasonable expenses and attorney's fees, be 
held hy the said n~faryland Casualty Company for the benefit 
of the Administratrix of the estate of George Edgar ~Ieyer, 
deceased, and to he paid over to her as such. And it appear-
ing that the Jury av{arding damages failed to specify in 'vhat 
proportions such funds should he distributed, the Court after 
hearing evidence touching this issue, is of the opinion, and 
doth order tl1at the Administratrix of the estate of George 
I~dgar Meyer, deceased, do pay such excess directly to Helen 
1\fay lVIeyer, the widow of George Edgar 1\ieyer, free of 
all debts and liabilities of the decedent, Georg~ Edgar l\{eyer . 
.. ME~IQR.ANDU1Vf: lJ pon the trial of this case the defen-
dant, by counsel, excepted to sundry rulings and opinions of 
the Court, given against it, and on its motion leave 
page 18 ~ is given it to :file its bills of exceptions or certifi-
cates of exeeptions at any time within E?ixty days 
frmn this date as prescribed by la,v. 
Upon the further n1otion of the defendant, by counsel, it. 
is ordered that the judgment this day rendered in this pro-
ceeding· be suspended for t1Ie period of ninety days from 
this date in order to enable the defendant to apply for a writ .. 
of error and supenwdeas, upon the condition tltat the said 
defendant or som.e one for it, enter into a hond before the 
Clerk of this Court, within fifteen days from this day, in 
the penalty of $10,000.00, with surety to be approved by the 
said Clerk, and conditioned according to law. 
And now at this day, to-wit: In the said Court on the 12th 
day of tT an nary, 1927. 
This day came the plaintiffs and the defendants, by Coun-
sel, and the defendant, hy Counsel, tendered to the Court 
its Bills of Exceptions N0s. 1, 2, 3 and 4, which were re-
ceived by the Court, signed, sealed and made a part of the 
record, whieh is a('cording]y done. 
page 19 ~ Virginia: 
_ In the l.JaW & Equity Court of the City of Richmond,. 
Part n. 
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Helen ~fay 1\:Ieyer, Administratrix of George Edgar Meyer, 
deceased, 
v. 
':rho Chesapeake and Ohio R.ailway Company. 
DEFENDANT'S BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO.1. 
BE IT RE~IEl\fBER.ED that on the trial of tl1is case and 
after the jury had been selerten and sworn, the following evi-
dence was introduced before the jury: 
page 20} I..~EvVJS. I<:ELLER, .JR., 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows: 
EXAl\IINATION IN CHIEF. 
Bv 1\fr. 1\Iav: 
·Q. lv[r. Keiler, will you state your name and age to the 
jury? 
A. Lewis Keller, Jr.; ag·e, twenty-eight. 
Q. What is your residence and occupation? 
A. Mineral, Va.; my occupation is Assistant Cashier of 
the Bank of Louisa. 
Q. 'Viii you state if you hold any position with the Town 
Counril of the Town of lvfineral? 
A. Clerk of the Council. 
Q. On the 15th of April, 1925, was there in force an ordi-
llance of your town regulating the rate of speed that trains 
could operate through that town? 
A. Yes, sir, it was. 
Q. Will you read that ordinance to the jnry? 
A. It is found in Chapter 2, Section 10 of the Ordinances 
of the To,nl of ~Iineral, Va.: 
"No engine or other Yehiele shall he draw·n or propelled 
in or across any street at a greater rate of speed than fifteen 
miles an hour. While anv locomotive or train 
page 21. }, shall he passing along or 'across any street, the 
hell on snch locomotive shall be kept constantly 
ring·ing. Any person, or corporation, violating any provision 
of this section, or causing it to be done, shall be fined not less 
than five nor more than ten dollars for every such offence. 
In case such fine he not paid by the person incurring the 
same, the company by whieh he is employed shall he liable 
for such fin~.'~ 
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Q. \Vas there also in force in your city an ordinance re-
quiring the railroad company to establish signals to give evi-
dence of the approad1 of their trains? 
l\fr. Spicer: We object and ask tlwt tl1e jury be excluclect 
Note: The jury were sent from the court room, and tl1e 
witness read the ordinance referred to as follows: 
''Whereas tl1e dangers of the crossings of the Chesapeake 
& Ohio Railway have been made evident to the Town Coun-
cil of the Towi1 of 1\iineral, Virginia, and 
"\Vhercas the said railw·ay company has made no pro-
vision to lessen such dangers nor to provide any adequate 
proteetion to peclestrians or vehicles using said crossings, 
"Now·, therefore, Be it Resolved by the Town 
pag·e 22 ~ Council of the To,vn of l\Iineral, in meetin.~ as-
sembled, that it shall be unlawful for any steam 
railway eOinpany to operate its trains, motor or hand car& 
across the streets of the Tow·n of 1\fineral without providing 
suitable signals at all such crossings. 
"Violation of this ordinance shall be punishable by a fine 
of fi\re dollars for the first day and ten dollars for each and 
every day thereafter that this ordinance is violated. 
''This ordinanee shall go into effect four months from the 
date of its passage. 
''It is further resolved that a copy of this ordinance shalf 
he forwarded by the Clerk of this Council to The Chesapeake 
& Ohio R.ai1,vay Company, at Richmond, Va.'' 
\Vitness: That is dated 'llfareh 7t11, 1924. 
l\f r. Spicer: :Nfy objection is tl1at the ordinance is too un-
rertain to be enforcible, and it violates both the Federal and 
Rtate Constitutions, and it is an attempt to delegate legis-
lative power to a court and jury. The particular language 
that. we object to is that it sl1al1 he unla,vful for 
page 2:3 ~ H to operate its trains, etc., without providing suit-
able sig·na.ls at all such crossings. The words, 
'' suitahle signals", are objected to. It is a penal statute, 
11unislwhle hy a fine of five dollars the first day m1d ten dol-
lars eaeh cla·y thereafter. My point is that it fails to set 
out any standard by whi(·h the railroad c-ompany or anybody 
ehw k11ows what is required to lJe done; that it leaves the 
matter entirely to be decided hy the jury each time that a 
violation, or nlleged Yiolation, comes up. \Ve contend that: 
the ringing of tl1e hell or hlowing of tllC w·histle is just· as 
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much a signal as anything stationary. We assume that that 
is the violation that these gentlemen especially rely upon, 
. that there should have been something stationary at this 
crossing. 
The Court: \Vhic-h of these ordinances antedated the 
other1 
Witness: The ordinance first read. 
The Court: That was in effect when this other was passed··r 
\Vitness: Yes, sir. 
page 24 ~ The Court: Do you gentlemen desire to say 
anything 1 
Mr. ~fay: Your Honor, although this ordinance has a 
eriminal feature in it, we are not attempting to enforc.e any 
criminal feature which the ordinance may carry. vVe are 
limiting it merely as an act of negligence. \V e think that. to 
provide suitable sig·nals is sufficient there. It probably was 
wTitten for the convenience of. the raihvay company to erect 
'vha tever kind of signal tlley had, either a bell or lights.· 
'Jlhe Court: The court thinks the objection is well taken. 
1\fr. Sinnott: To which action the defendant excepts. 
1\{r. l\fay: That ordinance 'vas in force in tl~e Town of 
l\Iineral at the time of this accident, was it? 
vVitness: Yes, sir. 
1\Ir .. Leake: You 'mever have undertaken to enforce the 
penal provisions of that against the C. & 0., have you? 
\Yitness: No, sir. 
l\Ir. May: \Vas there, at the tin1e of this accident, any 
kind of signals erected at that crossing? 
page 25 ~ \Vitness: No, sir. 
Mr. Leake: You mean no visible signals, sta-
tionary signals 1 
Witness: No, sir, there was not. 
Note: The jpry returned to the court room, and the exami-
nation of the ·witness was resumed. · 
By 1\tir. May: 
Q~ 1\fr. l(eller, in approaching the railroad track from the 
southward, can yon estimate how near yon ]~ave to get to 
the track before you could see a train a hundred yards down 
there, a train coming from the east 1 
A. I would say yon would have to get witl1in prol)ahly five 
or ten feet of the sidewalk. 
Q. I-Icnv far is the nearest rail of this side track to tl1e 
nearest rail of the main track that the train was on, approxi-
nlately? . 
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A. l don't know the distance; probably three and n hnlf 
or four feet, something like that. · 
CROSS EXA~IINATION. 
By Mr. Leake: 
· Q. The side track there you are referring to is south of the 
main line, is it? 
page 26 ~ . A. Yes, sir. 
Q. There is another track north of the main 
line? 
A. Yes, sir-three tracks. 
Q. You say you could see from five to ten feet south of the 
side track which is south of the main track? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, in regard to the ordinance as to the speed, doesn't 
that ordinance sa)r no engine ·or other vehicle shall run at a. , 
speed greater than fifteen miles an hour? In other wordF;, 
aren't automobiles included in that? 
The Court: That is n matter of construction? 
By Mr. Leake: 
Q. Is the rodd, ''vehicle", in there? "' 
A. Yes, sir, "engine, car or other vehicle". 
"\Vi._tness stood aside. 
page 27 ~ :MISS' J\fARY CIIAPLIN, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being first duly 
sworn, testified as fo1lows: 
EXA1IINATION IN CHIEF. 
By Mr. 1vlay: 
Q. 1\t[iss CJ~aplin, ·will you state your residenee and oceu-
pation, please l 
A. I am a teaeher in the ~1ineral schools. 
Q. Do yon rerall the night of the collision between a f'ar 
being driven by J\Irs. J\Iapes and a train of the C. & 0. Rail-
road? 
A. Yes. 
Q. vVhat tiJne, approxin1ately, of the night was that? 
. A. About 8 :30 I think 
Q. \Vhere were yon at the time of the collision~ 
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A. I was on the sidewalk about fifty feet, I should think, 
from the railroad. 
Q. To tl1e north or to the south? 
A. To the east-on the same side the depot is on. 
Q. \Ve will say now that the railroad from Riclunoud to 
Charlottesville runs east and west, east towards Richmond 
and west towards Charlottesville. The south side of the track 
is on the side upon which Mr. Tur!ler 's drug store is, and 
the north side is the side your father's store is. 
A. I was on the north side. 
page 28 ~ Q. Did you have an open vie'v to the collision'?_ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Prior to tl1e collision did you hear any bell ring or 
whistle blow? 
A. No, I didn't notice anv. 
Q. "\Viii you describe as l~est you can to the jury just what 
yon saw? . 
A .. \Vhcn I first saw the car it was on tl1e crossing and the 
train was just a short distance from it; and, just as the car 
seemed to be across the track, I saw the light s'verve, Eo I 
ran down to it and when I got to the car that was empty and 
· 1\1rs. ~fa pes and the boy 'vere lying against the sidewalk 
rig·ht 11ear the track. 
Q. \'7here was the automobile at tJ1at time, do you recall? 
A. Yes, sir, that 'vas near the sidewalk, about fifteen feet 
from the track. 
Q. \Vere there any lights on the station at that time? 
A. T don 't know. 
Q. \Vas the automobile running fast or slow~ 
A. It seemed to he going rather slow. 
Q. Will you state whether the car w·as in low or whether 
it was in high at that time? 
A. No, I could not. 
page 29 ~ Q. If that train had hlow11 nine times coming up 
to that crossing, could you have heard it? 
1\fr. Leake: \Ve object. 
l\fr. lVIay: I withdraw the question. 
Q. ·You don't have any trouble hearing·, at . all, do you! 
A. vY ell, I don't notice the train especially since I have 
l)een aeeustomed to riding in them all my life. 
Q. Who else do you know of that saw this collision? 
A. 1\I v sisfer and two small children. 
Q. Do you kno'v any one else f 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. When you got down there do you recall seeing any one 
at tlw station at the time you got do"'\\Tfi there~ 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know where tl1e train stopped, or where the rear 
coach was, when the train stopped 1 
A. Yes, the last coach was on the crossing. 
Q. Do you know how many coaches there were on the h·aiu t 
A. No. 
Q. Was it a. long train or short train f 
A. I don't l\no,v. · 
Q. You mean the last coach was on the crossing 'vhere the 
man was injured, where the accident took place~ 
page 30 ~ A. Yes. It was a little bit further down. It 
·went all the way across the railroad crossing~ 
Q. Did you see Mr. "i\feyer on the ground there¥ 
A. No. 
Q. So far as you know, he was not even hurt? 
A. No. I didn't know anything about that until later. 
Q. How do you account for your not seeing ~.fr. 1\'Ieyer? · 
A. I saw ~Irs. Mapes. I didn't know he "-:as in the car until 
after I found that he was dead. 
CROSS EXA].fiNATION. 
By 1vir. Leake ~ 
Q. You were walking doi1Jl the street with some one else! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. "\Vho was the other person? 
A. My sister. 
Q. \Vere you ali talking at tl1e time 'vl1ile ·walking along ·y 
A. ·Yes, sir. · 
Q. Yon 'vere not paying particular attention to the train 
or anything- or listening to the bell t 
A. No. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 31 ~ ·n.fiSS "l\[ARG AR.ET CHAPLIN, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being first duly 
. sworn, testified as follows: · 
EXA1fiN.A.TION IN CHIEF. 
By ~Ir. !fay: 
Q. Miss Chaplin. will you state wl1ere your residence is1 
A. A.t l\finera1, Va. 
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Q. What is your occupation~ 
A. I am going to school. 
Q. Do you recall the night that there was a collision be· 
tween a car of ~frs. ~fapes and a C. & 0. Railway train 
there? 
A. Yes, sir. I don't remember the date, but I remember 
the accident. \ 
Q. Was there anything to obscure your view from where 
you 'vere to where the wreck took place? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Tell us where you were 1 
\Vitness: \Yell, do you mean how many feet were we from 
the track~ 
~Ir. ~lay: I mean in reference to where the crossing was, 
wl10ther you were north or south. Take your father's store 
as located on the north of the track. 
A. vVe were approaching the track. 
page 32 } Q. From which direction? 
A. Frmn the north I should say. 
Q. N<;>w, l1ow far do you thi11k you were from the place 
where the collision took place 1 · 
A. \V ell, when the train l1it the ear, I suppose 've 'vere 
about fifty feet. That is my estin1ate; I may be wrong. 
Q. Prior to that time did you hear any l1ell ring or any 
'vhistle hlo"T on the train? 
i\.. No, sir. \Ve "~ere very mueh interested in our conver-
sation. I am used to trains and hardlv ever hear them. 
Q. But you didn't hear any blow or·· ring1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Now, where was the last coaeh of that train in reference 
to the crossing? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. \\Then it stopped? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Do yon remember where the car was (the automobile) 
after tho collision~ 
A. Well, it was about-! don't know l1ow manv feet it was 
from the track. · 
Q. \'\7as it at the station or away from the station or where 
was it in reference to tl1e station? 
page :~a ~ A. It w·as hy the side·walk along the station. 
Q. Did you e-ver see :Jfr. l\Ieyer on the ground. 
there at alB 
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A. I saw him. It was such a crowd around I couldn't see 
him very well. 
Q. Yon know as a matter of fac.t he 'vas killed in that 
accident? 
A. Yes, sir, I know it. 
Q. Did you notice whether the automobile was coming up 
there slow or fast? 
A. W11en it crossed the crossing, when I noticed it in front 
of the train, it seemed to be going very slow, rather slow. 
Q. Could you tell whether it was in low or 'high gear at that 
time? 
A. No, sir: 
Witness stood aside. 
page 34 ~ IRVING LUCK, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being first duly 
sworn, testified as follows : 
EXA:NIINATION IN CI-IIEF. 
By ~Ir. ~fay: 
Q. J\{r. Luck, you are J\Ir. Irving Luck? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is your residence and oceupation? 
A. Live at Mineral ancl go to school. 
Q. Were yon summoned by the railroad company also in 
this ease·¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Are you related to either the firmnan or engineer who 
operated tl1is train? 
A. The :fireman is my uncle hy marriage. 
Q. Now, do you recall the ro1Iision bebvcen a car driven 
by 1\{rs. 1\Iapes up there and the C. & 0. train 1 
A. Yes; sir. 
Q. vVhat time of night wa~ that? 
A. Well, it was between eight and nine. 
Q. Where were yon at that time~ 
A. I was fixing to turn the cornei· of 1\ir. Chap-
page 35 ~ lin's store. . 
Q. Is that to the north or to the south of the 
railroad track? 
A. To tl1e east. 
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Q. Now, say that the track runs east and west, east towards 
Richmond and west towards Charlottesville, and that ~Ir. 
Chaplin's store is on the north side of the track, 'vhere were 
you in reference to· the railroad Y 
A. I \\ras north of the railroad. 
Q. ~want you to tell the jury just what you saw. 
A. Well, when the train hit it, I looked around, I heard a 
11oise and looked around. I 'vent over the crossing to Noell's 
store and told them about it and then came down there and 
saw Mrs. ~!apes lying down; sl1e \\rasn 't dead. 1\fr. ~{eyer 
was lying there ·next to the railroad and l1e 'vas dead. · 
Q. Prior to the time that you heard the crash had you 
l1eard any whistle blow· or bell ring~ 
A. I don't remember, it has been so long. 
Q. You don't remember hearing any~ 
A. No, sir. . 
Q. Now, 'vhen you looked around and saw that train, what 
-would you estimate its speed at 1 
A. Well, the train had stopped when I looked around. 
Q. The train had stopped~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had you seen the train as it approached the 
page 36 ~ crossing? . 
A. I sa·w it coming around the curve 11ext to the 
planing mill. · 
Q. lTow far is that from the depot? 
A. I guess it is nearly half a mile. 
Q. IR it within the corporate limits of the to·wn? 
A. I think so. 
Q. \Vhat \\ras its ,rate of speed then? 
A. W el1, I couldn't tell. It was coming towards me and 
too far off to tell the speed of it. 
l\[ r. May: Your Honor, I desire, for the purpose of re-
frel';hing- the memory of the witnesR to show him a statement 
signed by him some time after this accident happened, and to 
ask, if, upon having· his .memory refreshed, he can testify as 
to the rate of that train at that time. 
1\Ir. Leake: If he 'vants to contradict the witness, ho ha.s 
to go in accordance 'vith the statute. 
1\Ir. ~fay: I have no desire to contradict the witness. 
The Court: I think the witness can ans,ver the <iuestion.. 
1\fr. Leake: He has to contradict him by the statute. 
The Court : He says he wants to refresh his memo1·y. 
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By 1\Ir. 1\Iay: 
Q. If I showed you a statement you signed, would you 
recognize it? 
page 37 ~ The Court: Show him ti1at statement and ask 
him if he recognizes that. 
Mr. Leake (Examining statement): That is no contradic-
tion. · 
Note: Statement handed to ''ritness. 
By Mr. ~fay: 
Q. Do you recogni~e that statement as one you made some 
time ago t 
A. You asked me did it seem to he going twenty-five or 
thirty miles. I told you no, but I couldn't s'vear whether it 
was going fiye or wl1etl1er it was going thirty. 
Q. Now·, I am going to sho·w yon tlw original statement-
1\fr. Leake: If he is contradicting him, we object unless 
he proceeds in accordance with tl1e statute. If he wants to 
impeach his witness, he can do it by the statute. 
1\fr. l\f.ay: That is a typewritten copy. . 
The Court: l-Ie can sho'v him the statement and ask hint 
whether he recollects it. 
By 1\tir. 1\fay: 
Q. Is that your signature to that? (Handing witness an· 
other paper.) 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 38 ~ Q. '\Yhat did you state in thnt paper was the 
rate of speed of the train? 
A. I think I told you I couldn't swear whether it was going 
five or twenty-five or thirty. 
Q. Does it refresh your mind after reading that state-
ment? 
A. I said I conldn 't s·wear it was running five or twenty-
five. I told you that; I remember telling you that. 
Q. You read that statement before you signed it, clidn 't 
you? 
Witness: This is tllC same one as I signed 1 
1\fr. 1\fay: Yes, sir.· 
The Court: Read that and refresh your memory. 
Note: '\Vitness reads over statement. 
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By the Court : 
Q. After reading that statement, have you any different 
statement to make as to what were the real facts stated? 
A. No, sir, I don't think it was running twenty or thirty. 
I think I told you I couldn't s·wear ·what the speed was. Didn't 
l tell you that~ ' 
7\-Ir. l\{ay: There is what you told me. I wrote it down. 
\Vitness: I might have told you that. You asked me could 
I swear it was running thirty or something like that. I told 
you no, I couldn't swear whether it ·was running 
page 39 ~ five or twenty-five; that I wasn't looking at it. 
rrhe only time I saw the train moving was when it 
'vas coming around the curve. 
CROSS EXA1\1INATION. 
Bv 1\fr. Leake: 
··Q. Who wrote that statement 1 Did 1\lr. i\Iay write it or 
you? 
A. 1\{r. 1\:Iay. 
· By 1\fr. Sinnott: 
Q. Did you sig·n it 1 
.A. Yes, sir. 
\Vitness stood aside. 
page 40 ~ CI-IAR-LES A. JOHNSON, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being first duly 
sworn, testified as follows: . 
EXAl\UN.A.TION IN CifiEF. 
By ~Ir. 1\Jay: 
Q. l\fr. ,Johnson, what. is your age and occt1pation? 
A. l\:fy age is thirty-one -years old; salesman for Capital 
Auto Co. 
Q. \Vhere is your residence 1 
.A.. l\Iineral. 
Q. Do you reeall the night tlwt there was a eollision he-
tw·een a train of the railroad eompany nnd a ear owned hy 
l\frs. l\f apes? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ""~'here \"iere you at tl10 time the collision occurred 1 
A. I was standing on tlie street of ~Iincral. 
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Q. Were you in a position to observe the speed of that 
train when it came w·ithin a few feet of the railroad cross-
ing? 
A. Well, tlie only position that I ca~1 say I sa-w it was about 
fifty yards before it got to the station. I was standing on 
the street on the opposite side of the railroad. 
·Q. What would you estimate as its minimum speed,. 
A. Well, I should say that it was running at least t~enty 
or hventv-five miles an hour. -
page 41 ~ Q. Do ·you know where the last coach of the 
train was? · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where was it after it stopped? 
A. It was standing right on the crossing, the rear coach 
of the train. 
Q. Do yon kno'v how long the train was? 
·A. I should say it was around six eoaehes long. I don't 
know the exact amount of coacl1es it was pulling, but I know 
it was right smart of a train, because I helped earry Mrs. 
l\{apes on a stretcher to the baggage car. 
Q. Do you kno'Y of your own knowledge whether Mr. Meyer 
was killed there~ 
A. Yes, sir. "\Yell, I couldn't say either because I didn't· 
see the wreck. 
Q. 'Vas he dead when you got over there? 
A. Yes, sir. 
CROSS EXA1\1INATION. 
By ~Ir. Leake: 
Q. Where did yon say yon were when you observed the 
train? 
A. I 'vas standing on the street of 1Ylineral. 
Q. What street? -
A. Well, I reckon it is the main street they call it. 
Q. Is that the street that the Jefferson Ilighway runs on Y 
A. Yes, sir. · 
page 42 ~ Q. Yon w·ere on that? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Whereabouts on that were von in reference to the sta-
tion; were you w"est or east? ·· 
A. I couldri 't see the station where I was, but T could see 
the train just before it got to the station. There was a 
building there that caused me not to see the wreck; that cut 
my view off from tl1e wreck. I could have seen the wreck 
if it hadn't been for that building. 
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Q. Yon didn't see the accident itself 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q: You say you could see the train. Row far east could 
you see it? 
A. Well, I would say a bout fifty yards down the track. 
Q. And how far west before this obstruction ·was in the 
'vay? In other words, how much space was in there for you 
to see to the track? 
A. Something like fifty yards. \Vhere I was standing you 
could see mighty near parallel with the railroad as the train 
pulled up. _ 
Q. In other words, it was fifty yards space t 
· A. Yes, sir, something like that. 
page 43 } Q. Ho"r far is this higlnvay, what they call the 
main street of Mineral, from the station North ·y 
"\Vitness: What do you mean? How far is the hig1nvay 
·where I was standing? 
Q. The highway doesn't go across the railroad, does it? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. It runs parallel with the railroad~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. llo·w far is the highway from the railroad 1 
A. Well, the closest point I would say is around twenty 
yards. 
Q. How far is it from the crossing at the station to the 
l1ighway¥ 
A. I -suppose about around t"\venty yards, something like 
that; no further than that I don't think. 
RE-DIRECT EXA~IINATION. 
BY ~Ir. 1\fay : 
·Q. V\That ·is it that obscured your view from where yon 
'vere of seeing the station or seeing the wreck? 
A. It was a three-story brick b · ng. Niineralliardware 
]{ept my Yiew from the 'vrec 
page 44 ~ LIN,VOOD BAKER., 
~- witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being first duly 
sworn, testified as follows: 
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EXAMIKATION IN CI-IIEF. 
By )\!fr. ~fay: 
Q. Linwood, were yon with 1\.frs. l\Iapes and l\fr. l\:feyer 
the night that their automobile was in collision ·with a C. & 0~ 
Railway trainf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was your occupation at that tin1e1 ""\Vhat did you 
do? \\1J1at kind of w-ork did you do at that time~ 
A. I washed dishes and helped wait on the store. 
Q. \Vhose store~ 
A. l\fr. 1\Iapes '. 
Q. Did you have occasion to see l\1r. George Edgar )\!!eyer 
at your store the same day this collision took place 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How did he happen to come there? 
A. He was a drummer. I think he came there to sell stuff,. 
you know. · 
· Q. \Vhat kind of stu-ff; groceries or dry goods or what~ 
A. I don't knqw. ""\Vhat was he selling~ Do you knowf 
l\fr. )\!fay: I don't know what he was selling. 
Witness: I don't either. 
page 45 ~ Q. \Vhat was the condition of l\{r. l\Ieyer's au-· 
tomobile "rhen l1e got there? I mean 'vas it in 
repair; did he want to have it fixed 1 
A. He wanted to have it fixed I think. 
Q. Now, did l\{r. lfapes find out he could get the car fixed 
that da.y? 
1\.. I don't know whether he did or not. 
Q. Didl\frs. l\Iapes take Mr. l\feyer home, or start with hiin 
to the l\iineral IIotel? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do yon ln1ow how :;he happened to do that 1 
A. Yes, sir. He asked lVfr. J\1apes to take him down to the 
l\Hneral I-Iotel. 1\fr. ~I apes said, "Sure n, as an accommoda-
tion, you know. She turned around to 1\Ir. 1\<Iapes and said, 
'' 1\-Ir. 1\iapes, could I take l\Ir. l\feyer down to the hotelf'' 
He said, ''Sure'', and then she got in the car. · 
Q. \Vhose car did she usc, !Ir. 1\'lapes' car or l\rfr. ~foyer's 
car¥ 
A. I don't know whose ra r it "\Yas. It was a colored man's 
car, and he put it there for sale. 
Q. It was not the one l\.fr. l\Ieyer came there in f 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. Which way did you go when you left Mr. Mapes' place? 
A. \V e came right straight down the road to-
page 46 ~ wards 1Iineral. 
Q. When you reached the first street in the city 
of ~Iineral, which way did you go then 1 
A. We turned short to the left. 
Q. And First street, does that cross the railroad tracks 
there~ 
A. Yes,JJir. 
Q. Now, "Nir. Baker, I want you to tell the jury as best you 
can what happened after you turned into First street there 
at 1\fineral and started across the track? 
A. After we turned into the first street to cross the tracks, 
've went on up to the track; I don't know whether she stopped 
or not, but I know she cut the car in second gear, changed 
gears in the car (I don't know whether in second or first) 
and she started across the track, and when 've got mighty 
near up on top the track, say, up on top the track, I sa'v a 
big light rig·ht beside me just about as far as from here to 
that thing over there (indicating), and I dicln 't know whether 
it was an automobile or train; and that is all I remember. 
Q. What kept you from seeing the train before you. got 
on the track~ · 
A. It was a lot of houses and things dow·n there, and also 
'rurner 's junk place. 
Q. Was the station lit up that night~ 
..... ~. Yes, sir. 
page 47 ~ Q. In order to see the headlight of the engine 
you would have to Ree it between the front. lights 
of your car· and the station of the railroad company, woulcln 't 
youf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was all that space between you and the station of the 
railroad company illuminated or 'vas it clark in between there?. 
'Vas it light over the station~ 
A. Yes, sir, from the auto to the station was lit up; it was 
lit real light. · 
Q. Did you notice j\fr. 1\fcycr was killed there that night? 
A. No, sir, I did not. 
Q. You stated, didn't you, that you don't kno'v whether y'ou 
came to a full stop or slowed down 1 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In any event you slowed down to a minimum speed, 
didn't you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
~-~-- ---------
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CROSS EXA~IINATION. 
·s.y Mr. Leake: 
Q. This 'vas on open car, wasn't a closed car? · 
A. No, sir, it was not a closed car; it was open but not 
closed. 
By Mr. May: . 
Q. What seat 'vere you in in the all.tomobile? • 
A. Front seat. 
page 48 ~ Q. What seat was 1\1r. 1feyer on~ 
A. He was on the rear seat. 
Q. 1\f rs. Mapes was driving the car f 
A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Leake: 
Q. Had you been to l\fineral before 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
· Q. You were familiar with ~Iineral, you knew all about 
Mineral? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. You knew where the station was and the railroad and 
all that? 
A. Yes, sir. 
l\fr. Sinnott: "Te object to that line of testimony. 
By Mr. Leake: 
Q. Did 1\f.rs. 1\Ia pes know·-
1\fr. 1\fay: We object. 
The Court: On what ground? 
1\{r. 1\{ ~y: I don't see -where it is material, whether 1\frs .. 
• 1\falJeS lme"r the to,\"11 of Mineral or not. He hasn't testi-
fied whether he kne'v whether Mrs. 1\fapes had. ever been 
down to the city or not. 
· The Court: ·I thought he asked whether he knew it. Did 
you ask whether he ln1ew it? 
page 49 ~ 1\fr. Leake: I asked whether he knew it and 
·whether 1\'Irs. 1\tiapes knew it. 
The Court: I think the objection to that should be sus-
tained. 
By 1vf r. Leake: 
Q. Had you been there '\vith Nlrs. lVIa.pes any time before 7 
C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Helen May Meyer, Adm 'x, etc. 77 
Mr. May: Ee object to -that question. 
The Court: Objection overruled. . 
J\IIr. Leake: Had you been to J\IIineral with !virs. Mape::r 
any time before~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Been there more than once before that with Mrs.. 
Mapes? 
A. I don't Irno·w whether I had been there more than once 
or not; I just ·can't remember. 
Q. Had you been across this same crossing· there before' 
Had Mrs. ~fapes been with you before when you crossed that 
crossing? 
A. I don't know 'vhether she had or not. 
Q. "Where 'vas Mr. 1\iapes' establishment; where was the 
garage? He kept a garage? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is its name? 
A. Square Deal Garage. 
page 50 } Q. Isn't that between 1\Hneral and Louisa~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How far is it from !fiiieral to that garage? 
A. Five and a quarter miles. · 
Q. From 1\fineral? Isn't Louisa only five miles from 
l\fineral? 
A. Oh! It is four miles and a quarter. 
Q. I want to ask you if yon didn't make this statement to 
Dr. H. vV. Porter? You kno'v Dr. Porter, don't you? 
A. I don't know him personally, but I know him when I 
see him. · 
1\fr. 1\Iay: Let's see the statement. "(Examining state-
ment.) 
Bv Mr. Leake: 
· Q. I want to ask you-
~Ir. May: Just a minute. I don't know that these gen-
tlemen l1ave Dr. Porter here. He hasn't answered to call 
this morning. · · 
1\fr. Le~ke: That will not stop us from asking tl1at ques-
tion. There is no reason why we can't ask him the question 
on cross examination. 
The Court: I think you can ask him the question. 
l-1 
("I 
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Q. (Continued) I want to ask if you did not make this state-
ment to Dr. Porter-Did you see Dr. Potter that night~ 
A. I don't remember seeing him that night. 
Q. Did yon see him anywhere after the accident~? 
page 51 ~ A. I have seen him since. . 
. / Q. W11ere did you see him the first time you saw 
after the accident r 
I don't remember where I saw him after the accident~ 
At that time dicln 't you state to him, "I 'vas on the 
front seat of the automobile with :nirs. ~{apes''-
Mr. ~Iay: I don't tl1ink he has identified that conve1·sation 
at all. 
The Court: If he doesn't point out. the time and place 
and circumstances; he 'vouldn 't be allowed to contradict him. 
By ltfr. Leake: 
Q. Wasn't this statement made in Charlottesville in the 
hospital there to Dr. Porter to the following effect-dicb1 't 
you make this statement-
The Court: Do you understand what time he is referring 
to? 
Witness: Sir. 
Tl1e Court: Do you understand the occasion lir. Leake is 
referring to 11ow? l-Ie asked you about a statement made 
by you. to Dr. Porter at a certain time. Do you understand 
what time he is referring tof 
.A. No, sir, I don't remember seeing Dr. Porter that night. 
I don't remember hb"r many times I I1ave seen him since, and 
I don't remember tnaking any statement to Dr. Porter at alL 
page 52 ~ By Mr. Leake : 
Q. Didn't you make this statement in the hos-
pital at Charlottesville: "I was on the front seat of auto-
mobile "rith Mrs. ~fapes. She was running very fast, and just 
as neared the track saw the engine. 1\f.rs. 1\tfapes couldn't 
stop the car. I applied the emergency brakes with all my 
strength, but the speed was too fast to stop the car. Engine 
struck right rear wheel." Did you make that statement to 
Dr. Porter in Charlottesville at the hospital? · 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you make it to him ,,rhile going there on the train 1? 
A. I .don't remember what I was doing. 
Q. Did you make it to him at any time~ Did vou makP 
that staten1ent to him at any time? 
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A. No, sir; I am pretty sure I haven't made it to him. If I 
did I don't remember. · 
Q. Do you deny making that statement at any time¥ • 
A. No, sir, I don't deny it but I don't remember making 
any such statement. 
Q. You know J\1r. Dunn here, don't you, this gentleman 
here~ 
A. No, sir, I don't know him. 
Q. IIave you ever seen him before~ 
A. I tl1ink I have but I wouldn't be sure. 
page 53 ~ Q. Did you ever make any statement to him that 
you remember 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I am going to ask yon if yon did not make this state-
ment to him on April 18th, 1925, at the }[artha Jefferson Hos-
pital at Charlottesville: ''I am fourteen years old, birthday 
l\fay 8th, residence Louisa, ·va., and I live with J\ir. C. A. 
J\fapes. On April 15th, 1925, I was in Oakland auto being 
driven by ~Irs. l\fapes. I was on front seat with her and we 
w·ere taking· l\fr. ~Ieyers to the hotel at l\1ineral, he was 
on back seat. \Ye left our garage few minutes past eight. 
It is about four and three-quarter miles from garage to 
l\iineral. Headlight on auto burning, and as ''re approached 
raihvay crossing, speed between five and ten miles an hour, 
I do not remember whether or not auto stopped before going 
on c.rossing·, but auto had slowed down after we turned off 
cement road towards crossing. Before that we had been run-
ning between ten and fieteen miles an hour. I did not look 
to see if train was coming, did not hear the train and did 
not see it until auto got on track and engine then was about 
fifteen feet from auto. I could have seen the train coming 
for some distance down the track before auto got on track if I 
had looked, and could have seen train coming for 
page 54 ~ at least three hundred yards. Engine on auto ran 
about medium and 've could have seen and heard 
the train if we had stopped and looked. I do not know 
whether or not trail1 hlew for crossing or engin~ hell ringing. 
I did not hear them." Did yon make that statement to 1\Ir. 
Dunn? 
A. I don't remember whether I made that statement or 
not. It seems like I remember something about it, hut I 
ean 't rememlJer. 
Q. Do you deny that statement as being eorrect no,v, a 
correct statement? Do you deny that as being a correct 
statement now? 
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A. No, sir, I don.'t deny it bec8;use I can't remember it. 
Q. Do you deny that as being a correct statement of the 
fact~Y 
A. No, sir, I do not. 
RE-DIR.ECT EXA~IINATION. 
By Mr. Ma.y: 
Q. Can you read and "rrite f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Ho'v old are you f 
A. I 'vill be-T_jet's see-I will be seventeeu·years old next 
birthday. 
page 55 ~ Q. Did you ever go to school? 
A. Went a little bit, yes, sir. 
Q. Who ·wrote that statement out that Mr. Leake just read 
to you? Did you write it Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you write it down on paper? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did Mr. Dunn "rrite it down on paperY 
A. I don't remember whether he wrote it do,vn or not. 
Q. :Nfr. Baker, you don't have any claim against the rail~ 
road company at this time, do you 1 
Mr. Leake: We object. 
Witness: v\"l1at do you mean 1 
Mr. 1\tfay: Your Honor, I think we better take the jury out 
for a second. We might get. into some trouble here. 
Note: The jury were sent from the court room. 
~ir. ~fay: We simply desire to ltave the 'vitness state 
that he has no claim against the railroad company at thi~ 
time. and whatever difference he may have had I understand 
has been adjusted. I just want to show that the witness has 
no pecuniary interest. 
The Court: You w·ant his answer in the record? 
page 56 ~ ~fr. l\fay: Yes, sir. 
The Court: Better get that while the jury is 
out. 
1\fr. lVIay: I am going to ask him whether he has any in~ 
terest in this case. 
The Court: I will permit that question. 
Note : The jury returned to the court room. 
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By ~Ir. May: 
Q. 1\ir. Baker, do you have any interest in this caseY In 
o.ther words, are you going to receive any benefit, yourself, 
regardless of ·whether 1\{rs. 1vfeyer recovers or not? Do you 
have any money interest in this case, the one we are trying 
now? 
A. No, sir. 
RE-CROSS EXAJ\;IINATION. 
By ]Jfr. Leake: 
Q. I want to ask if you did not mak~ this statement to 
Dr. Porter after the accident, after you got hack from the 
hospital about five days, at 1\Irs. 1\-[apes' house: "I was on 
the front seat of automobile with Mrs. ~Iapes. She was 
running very fast and just as neared track saw the engine. 
M~rs. l\1:apes could not stop the car. I applied 
1)age 57 } emergency brake with all my strength but speed 
was too fast to stop the car.'' 
A. No, sir, I didn't make that statement. 
Q. Do you deny making that sta_tement at ~Irs. Mapes' 
house? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You know what I mean by deny~ You don't say that 
you never made it~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You just don't remember it 1 
A. No, sir. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 58 } .J. N. AJ\:IBLER, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being first duly 
sw·orn, testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF. 
Bv 1\fr. Sinnott: 
·Q. What is your professionf 
A. Civil engineer. 
Q. How long have you been. engaged in that profession? 
A. About thirty years. 
Q. I will ask you if at my request some time during last 
summer you went to ]Jfineral, Virginia, and made a map, or 
sketch, aftet you had taken measurements of a certain rail--
l'oad crossing and the approach to it Y 
82 In the Supreme Court of .Appeals of Virginia. 
· A. Yes, I made a correct survey of the situation, Im-
mediately around the alleged place. 
Q. Where the accident is said to have occurred? 
A. Yes, sir, and platted it very carefully and checked the 
platting. 
Q. And drew that according to scale? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I will ask you what this represents along here on this 
sketch~ (Indicating.·) 
page 59 }- A. TI1a t is the railroad track. 
The Court: Does he identify it as the map I1e m.ade? 
Witness : Yes, s"ir. 
Note: :nra p filed and marked "Ex. A1nbler # 1 ". 
By Mr. Sinnott: 
Q. This is the railroad track~­
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. This is the depot? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. A.nd this is what f. 
A. 1.\Ierchants' establishments. 
Q. This over here? 
.A. That is the hotel. 
Q. "TJ1at do these represent there f 
A. Stores and brick lJuildings. 
Q. On what street are they¥ 
A. :!\fain street of 1\fineral; they call it ~Iineral Avenue. 
Q. What is this buildh1g tlwre Y 
A. Thn t is a. section foreman's building·. 
Q. And this here? · 
A. That is the pump house. 
page 60 ~ Q. And this¥ 
A. V\T a ter tanl\:. 
Q. And this? 
A. Sand house. 
Q. And this along here ? 
A. That is an old trestle where they used to unload coal. 
It is dismantled now. · 
Q. \Vhat. is this np here? 
A. Tl1at is an embankment f 
Q. I will ask you tl1e heights of these various buildings, 
beginning- with the section honRe there 1 
A. I w·ill have to read that off the plan. I don't remember 
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them. The height of the section house, the comb of the build-
ing is 16 feet above the rail. 
Q. And the pump house 1 
A. The comb is 14 feet above the rail. 
Q. Water tank~ 
_A. The top of it is 25 feet above the rail. 
Q. Sand house~ 
A. Fifteen feet. 
Q. And trestle' 
A. About 11 feet, 7 inches a hove the rail. 
Q. Do you know about the embankment 1 
page 61 r A. That begins the same height and about 600 
feet it slopes out to the level of the rail. 
Q. The embankment runs about 600 feet from .the end 
of the trestle? 
A. Yes, sir, from four to six hundred feet. It is a long dis-
tance. -
Q. Beginning at the end of the trestle the same height of 
the trestle ana··'gradually going down for four or six hun-
dred feet? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. vVhat is this here·~ (Indicating.) 
A. Those two are piles of old iron or junk. 
Q. vVere they hig·h or low? 
A. About as high as your head. 
Q. I will ask you how the grade is as you approach this 
railroad crossing' 
A. It is up grade from the street, possibly as much as 
three per cent up grade. 
Q. State whether or 11ot a person either driving or walking 
up this street here from the south approaching the railroad 
crossing can get a view of the railroad tracks or engine 
coming down there, and, if not, why not? 
A. \V ell, the buildings and trestle and embankment and 
these towers and so on obstruct it almost entirely. 
page 62 r l-Ie might get a fleeting glimpse, at certain com-
binations, of a train approaching if he was walk-
ing and had time to look around. If he was driving and 
didn't have very much time, it would be more difficult to see 
through. He would sec a fleeting glin1pse beyond possibly 
through there; I don't think so. 
Q. \Vould he catch it at an angle if he did~ 
A. Yes, sir, very brief angle. 
Q. Before a person can get a view of that track, a clear 
view of that track, how close approximately must he be t(] 
the track? 
_, 
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- A. About right here. (Indicating.) 
Q. Will you indicate with an X mark and give us in dis· 
tanceY 
A. He would have to be about in here, driving on the right 
hand side of the road, possibly 100 feet from the main line 
track, and the locomotive would have to be here (indicating), 
which would be, say, 120 feet. 
Q. A hundred and twenty feet east of the crossing? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Ho\v would he catch that glimpse? _ 
A. Between buildings at this angle, just a fleeting glimpse. 
If he 'vas moving rapidly, as an automobile is apt to run, 
l1e would have such a fleeting glimpse that it would be very 
hard to see. 
Q. In other words, for the operator of an auto-
page 63 ~ mobile, or a. pedestrian, to see it the engine would 
have to be at a particular point? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where is that point? 
A. About 120 feet. 
Q. Will you mark it with the letter "B"? 
A. Yes, sir. It would l)e about right here. (Indicating.) 
Q. It would have to be there? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When an automobile gets any nearer the point you have 
marked X t<?wards the tracks, can they get a vie'v up the 
track? 
A. I don't think so. 
Q. Whyt 
A. Because they are obstructed by these buildings; you 
cut that fleeting glimpse and you are obstructed entirely 
until you get right on the track before you can see any-
ill~ . 
Q. Yon would have to be right near the track before you 
could see the engine? 
A. Would have to be about forty feet from it before you 
could see, and at that time 'vould be about eighty feet from 
it. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By ~Ir. Leake: 
Q. About forty from what do you mean? 
A. From the main track. 
pa~e 64 ~ Q. ~fain track or side track? 
A. ~{a.in track. It is this view I am talking 
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:about right here. (Indicating.) . If he was there he could 
see that train there. If he was back here he could see the 
train.closer to the track. If he was nearer, nearly up to 
the track, he could see back here. 
Q. The closer he comes to the track the further down the 
track he can see 1 
A. Certainly. 
Q. Do you know how far he could see from a point, say, ten 
feet from the side track? 
A. That would be about right here. (Indicating.) From 
there. He could see a great distance down if he turned his 
l1ead at right angles. 
Q. How far down could he see ~ 
A. He could sec down to here. (Indicating.) 
Q. How far would that be? 
A. Well (twenty feet to the inch, and that is about 20 
inches), 400 feet, something like that. That is, if he was 
right here. (Indicating.) 
By ]\{r: Spicer: _ 
Q. Doesn't that track extend down straight for a distance 
'Of, say,· 500 yards? 
A. Quite a distance, way beyond the 'limits of 
})age 65 ~ this drawing. 
Q. That is not a very great grade¥ 
A. No, sir, about three per cent. 
Q. What does that mean? 
A .. Three feet rise in every hundred feet distance.. 
Mr. Leake: y..,r e expect to put these photographs in evi-
dence (indicating), and I 'vant to ask 1\Ir . .Ambler some ques-
tions about them. 
Bv 1\Ir. Leake: 
· Q. This represents the scene and this is the ·south side of 
the track. Now, that house there you refer to as being the 
section foreman's house, is that the house? (Indicating.) 
- A. Yes, sir. That was taken with the instrument sitting 
about ten feet, I suppose, from the sidewalk. 
1\tfr. Leake: Twenty-one feet south of the sonth rail. 
vVitness: rrhat corresponds with what I said. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. The height you gave of this building is what~ 
A. I ·said the comb above the rail. 
------------ ------·--------------------------------
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By :Wir. Leake: 
Q. This corresponds practically with what you said f 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 66 ~ By 1\ir. Sinnott: 
Q. Are those buildings there used in connection 
with the railroad 1 
A. Y cs, sir, all of them, those along .tlte railroad track .. 
Witness stood aside . 
. page 67. ~ l\1RS. I-IELEN MAY l\1EYER, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being first duly 
sworn, testified as follows: 
EXAMINATiON IN 01-IIEF. 
By ~fr. Sinnott: 
Q. \Vhat was yonr husband's na.m~? 
A. George Edgar 1\ieyer. 
Q. Is he living or dead? 
A. Dead. 
Q. :ij.o\,r long has he been dead 1 
A. April 15th, 1925. 
Q. Do you know what caused his death f 
A. Accident at Mineral. 
Q. Whaf was the age of your husband at the time he 'vas 
killed 1 
A. Thirty-nine. 
Q. For whom did l1e work? 
A. Fiarris Grocery Company. 
Q. In 'vhat capacity? 
A. He was a traveling salesman. 
Q. What were his average earnings per month~ 
A. A.bout $200, an average. 
Q. Was his health good. ''That was the condition of his 
healthY 
A. Fairly good. 
page 68 ~ Q. How many children have you? 
A. Four. 
Q. How old are they? 
A. Four, ten, twelve and tl1irteen. 
Q. Is this one of the little children here? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. "There are the other three¥ 
A.. They are in the ~Iasonic Home. 
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Q. !irs. 1\feyer, I will ask you if you are named as the 
plaintiff in this suit 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. "Wl1o brought this suit for you' 
J!. !faryland Casualty Company. 
Q. In your name? 
A. Yes, sir. 
vVitness stood aside. 
Plaintiff rests. 
page 69 ~ W. A. GIESENDORFFER, 
a witness on behalf of the defendant, being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows: 
EXAnfiNATION IN CHIEF. 
By 1Ir. Spicer : 
Q. vV ere you engineer on the engine that was on train 
#41 that struck the automobile on the First street crossing 
at Mineral on April 14th, 1925' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you recall that occasion? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You remember that~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you tell the jury how fast you were going at that 
time? 
A. According to my best knowledge and judgment, I was 
not going over between 12 and 14 or 15 miles an hour. I had 
nothing on there to tell by.; I had to judge by my own eye. 
Q. You say you were going at what? 
A. I wasn't going- over thirteen or fifteen miles an hour. 
Q. Do you rem em her whether you were on time or not? 
A. I was ahead of time. 
Q. A little ahead of time? 
A. T clidn 't pass the station ahead of time. 
page 70 ~ Q. I8 that a schedule stop at :Mineral? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Yon were not planning to stop there that night~ 
A. No, sir. . 
Q. Where were you sitting as your engine approached the 
crossing' 
A. Up on the hox. 
Q. On the seat box? 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. On which side of the engine T 
A. Right side. 
Q. Regular engineer's seat~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you remember whether or not the whistle was 
blown? 
A. Yes, sir, I blew it. 
Q. On approaching lVIineral? 
A. I blew for Mineral, I blew for the first crossing and 
also blew for the second. 
Q. You say you ble'v for lVIineral. ·Is that for the station f 
A. Station whistle blow. 
Q. How many blasts 1 
A. That is one long blast. 
Q. And the blow for the crossing? 
page 71 ~ A. Two longs and two shorts. 
Q. Is that the crossing on which the accident 
occurred? 
A. The crossing before we got to it, at the mill. 
Q. Some distance east of the crossing at which the accident 
occurred? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You blew two longs and two shorts for that crossing? 
A· Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you blow for the crossing on 'vhich the accident 
occurred? 
A. Yes, sir, I blew for the second erossing soon after I 
passed the first crossing. 
Q. About how far off were you from the second crossing 
when you started blowing 1 
A. Say, "rithin a bout ten or fifteen yards when I stopped 
blowing, west. 
Q. How far were you when you started f 
A. Soon after I passed the first crossing. 
Q. Do you know about how far that is? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Would you say anything like a quarter of a mile? 
A. I don't suppose it was over 25 or 30 yards after passing 
the first crossing. 
page 72 ~ Q. I am trying to get at the distance you 'were 
from the second crossing when you started to 
blowf . . 
A. l don 1t think I was over twenty-five or thirty yards 
after I passed the first crossing before I blew for the second 
one. 
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Q. I am trying to get at the distance it was from the second 
crossing? 
A. I eouldn 't give you the distance. 
Q. Do you know how far the two crossings are from each 
other? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Was it the place that you ordinarily blow~ Did you 
blow at. th.e place yon ordinarily should blow? 
A. Blew at the same place I always blow. 
Q. Did you blow regular crossing signals for the crossing 7 
Did you state what? 
A. Two longs and two shorts. 
Q. I-Iow far off were you when you stopped blowing for 
the second crossing, how far from the second crossing? 
A. Fifteen or twenty yards.· 
Q. Do you ·kno'v whether the bell 'vas ringing on the engine 
or not! 
A. I started the bell before I got to Pendleton: 
Q. Where is that? 
A. About a mile east of :Mineral. 
page 73 ~ Q. How did yon start to working it; with your 
hand? . 
A. No, sir. It 'vorks by pulling open a valve. 
Q. You open a valve~ 
A~ Yes, sir. 
Q. Did the hell start to ringing then? 
A. Started. ringi11g before I got to Pendleton. 
Q. Did it continue to ring? · 
A. Continued to ring until after I stopped and got up and 
shut it off. 
Q. After the accident occurred? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you remember when it stopped? 
A. Stopped as soon as I sl1ut the air off. 
Q. You cut the air off? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was the first that yon knew of the presence of this 
automobile? 
A. The first I kne,•t when I sa'v it come over by the engine. 
Q. I-Iow far away was the .engine at that time from the 
crossing, approximately-from ·tl1e automobile-from the 
crossing? 
A. When I struck the a~tomobile it was right on the eros·s-
ing. 
Q. How far away was it when you saw it? 
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A. I never sa'v it until after I hit it and knocked 
page 74 ~ it off, or pushed it off. 
Q. You mean to say you sa'v it at about the same 
time that you struck it 7 · 
A. At the same time I struck it. 
Q. Were you looking ahead~ . 
A. Yes, sir, I was looking right ahead. 
Q. Did the automobile come from your side of the track? 
A. No, sir, came from the fireman's side. 
Q. Was there anything to obstruet your view1 
A. Nothing· but the engine. I could see the crossing when 
I got probably an engine length from it. 
Q. Qouldn 't see it within that distance? 
A. No, sir. . 
Q. Were you looking ahead before y.qu got within that 
distance1 
A. Yes, sir, I "ras looking ahead all the way around through 
there. 
Q. And didn't see it? 
A. No. 
Q. Was there any one else in tl1e cah? 
A. Nobody but. me and the fireman. 
Q. \Vas there any outcry of any kind made? Did the fire-
man say anything about it? 
A. I-Ie holloed, "Look out", and about the time he holloed 
1 struck the automobile. 
page 75 ~ Q. What did you do when he holloed? 
A. As soon as he holloed I slammed the brakes 
on in .emergency. 
Q. About how ~ar did you go before the train stopped¥ 
A. I never measured the distance. Somebody said 46,S 
feet, or something. 
Q. Yon stopped as soon as you could ? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you make w·hat you as an engineer regard as a 
reasonable stop? 
A. I consider it a good stop considering the circumstances 
of the thing. Of course, I had been using my air all the way 
around through there, and just as I tunwd ·the brakes loose 
for this crossing the fireman l1olloed about at the same time. 
1Iy pressure was about fifteen pounds lighter; the conse-
quence was couldn't make the same stop with 95 pounds of 
air as 'vith 110. · 
Q. What had you been using the air for; for what pur-
pose? · 
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A. For the other two crossings, around through the yard. 
Q. Y.ou mean you increased speed or were coming down? 
A. Reducing speed. 
CROSS" EXA~fiNATION. 
By Mr. Sinnott: 
Q. I believe you stated that the :first you knew of the pres-
ence of the automobile on the track was at -the time you struck 
it1 
page 76 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know. what part of the automobile 
was struck? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You, I believe, were sitting on the right hand side of 
the engine? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ·You heard the fireman hollo and you looked out and saw 
the automobile just the instant you struck it¥ 
A. The firen1an holloed, "Look out!" I was looking out, 
so was he, and the time he holloed I hit the automobile. Time 
he holloed it, I put the brakes into emergency. 
Q. What part of the track was the automobile on 1 Was 
it on the right rail or had it gotten over the right rail? 
A .. I couldn't tell you that. 
Q. It. had to be on the right rail for you to see it, didn't 
it? 
A. It had to be on the main line for me to see it. 
Q. Did it have to be as far as the right rail? 
A. If the automobile had been half way over, I could have 
seen it :rpyself, but I don't think it got half over. 
Q. In other worcls, you could see around the front of the 
engine with an automobile in front of you 'vheu it is half 
way over the tracks? 
A. I dicln 't say I could see around the front of the engine. 
I said when he holloecl, "Look out!" the automo-
page 77 ~ bile came over. 
Q. You saw it come over where? 
A. On my side of the engine. 
Q. On the right rail1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In other words, the first time you saw it was when it 
was· on the right rail f 
.A. After I l1it it; never saw it until I struck it. 
Q. Never saw it until the instant you struck it7 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. Then it was on the right rail f 
A. Coming over, 
Q. Coming over the right rail f 
A. I reckon so. 
Q. Did you hurt anybody there when you stn1ck it? 
A. I didn't think it was anybody hurt because the auto-
mobile wasn't turned over; but after r stopped I got down 
and looked around the engine and I found a hat on the front 
of the engine. I went on lJack and carried the hat, and after 
I seen what had happened tl1en I came on back to the engine. 
Q. But the engine did actually &trike the automobile? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you carried the injured people on the train to 
Charlottesville? 
A. I think so. We got a doctor at ~Iineral or 
page 78 ~ Louisa. 
Q. 1\fr. ~Ieyer was killed in that accident, 
wasn't he' 
A. I think that is his name. 
Q. Immediately whe;n you saw that automobile and heard 
the fireman's outcry, what did you do¥ 
A. I didn't see the automobile until after the fireman 
holloed. 
Q. When you· heard the fireman hollo, what did you do 7 
A. Slammed the brakes on in emergency. 
Q. How many coach~s "rere on that train~ 
A. Six. 
Q. Did that include the baggage coach~ 
A. Included all. 
Q. There ·were six coaches. \Vhat kind of coaches were 
theyY 
A. And baggage car. I don't remember now whether we 
had an express car or not, but the baggage car and two 
coaches and two sleepers and a. private car as well as I re-
member. I think we had a private car on that night. 
Q. Yon don't kno'v 'vhether au express car was on there 
or notY 
A. I don't think it was an express car; I don't remember. 
Q. What is the length of a sleeper, approximately? 
A. I don't know; I never have known the .length. 
Q. Would you say as much as seventy-five feet Y 
A. I don't kno,v. I think ~Ir. Dunn might could 
· page 79 ~ tell you. 
Q. After the collision did you get out and come 
back? 
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A. I got out and walked around the engine to see what 
damage "ras done; then went back. 
Q. Where was your engine in reference to the street cross-
ing when it stopped.; how far was it? 
A. About 460 feet. 
Q. Do you kno·w where the rear coach was f 
A. Standing just on the crossing. 
Q. Which coach 'vas that1 .. 
. A. The rear car, private car. 
Q. Was that a private car? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. IIo'v is that grade there right at that crossing and ap- . 
:proaching it? Is there any grade there' 
A. Little down grade going west. 
Q. About l1ow much would you say f 
A. It is not very much. 
tJ. Practically the tracks are level, isn't it? 
A. Not exactly level, not exactly what you might call down 
grade but just a· little bit. 
-Q. In what distance can you stop a train going 12 to 13 
'Or 15 miles an hour on a track of that kind? · 
A. Well, if I had my pressure charged up, I imagine I. 
could stop a train there, if I had to stop, lmowing I had to 
·stop and go into emergency, in an engine and three car 
l~ngths. 
page 80 ~ Q. You kne'v you had to stop there on that oc-
casion, didn't you f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Why not? 
Witness : How did I know? 
Q. Didn't you strike the automobile? 
.A. I didn't try to stop until I struck it. If I had known 
I was going to strike it, I would have stopped before. 
Q. From the time you received notice you 'vere going to 
stop it, or wanted to stop it, "rithin what distance can you 
stop a train carrying' six coaches, an engine and tender on 
a track of that kind~ -
A. With the same circumstances I couldn't stop it any 
quicker. 
Q. Than ho·w much? 
A. If I had the pressure all charged up to 110 I might 
have stopped sooner. 
Q. But you couldn't stop any quieker than that t 
A. Not with 90 or 95 pounds of air. 
--------. ---~ 
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Q. "'\Vha t is the length of an engine 7 
A. I don't know that either. 
Q. What is the length of the tender¥ 
A. I couldn't tell you. 
Q. Do you know about the length 7 
A. No, sir. 
page 81 ~ Q. After you saw this automobile on the track 
and received a warning cry from the fireman, your 
train "rent its whole length, didn't it~ 
A. Mighty near ; didn't lack much of it. . 
Q. You say that you clicln 't see the automobile until just 
at the time that you struck it. \-Vhy couldn't you see it~ 
A. I conldn 't see through the engine. 
Q. In other 'vords, you couldn't see on the other side' 
A. I couldn't see over it. 
Q. And all you could do was to see them on the right hand 
side? 
A. That is all I can see, on my side. 
Q. Do you know the physical condition, m.· situation, along 
there, about ho'v the buildings are built, along the· track¥ 
Witness: What do yon meanT 
Q. I show you here a map, or a drawing, of that crossing 
at Mineral and the buildings adjacent to it. This is north, 
and tl1ere is the h.otel at ::Mineral. Here is the railway sta-
tion. You recognize the station tbere ¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I 'viii ask you if there are not buildings built all along 
the track on the south side of the railway as you come into 
Mineral? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What buildings arc those? 
page 82 ~ A. I don't knos, ·ris-some frame buildings. 
Q. Built right close to the track, aren't they t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. There is a trestle up here, isn't it, as you come up¥ 
A. I never sa'v a trestle. · 
Q. How ahont that long embankment~ 
A. There is no trestle along that road as I know of. 
Q. How long have you been running on there? 
A. Forty-eight years, say. 
Q. You know tl1e place wl1ere they unload coal ~ars up 
there? 
A. That is a coal bin. 
Q. It is a kind of trestle, isn't it~ 
i 
I 
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A. It is a kind of little trestle to go up on the coal bin. That 
is on the outside of the side track. 
Q. When you are coming down the main line, state 'vhether 
or not those buildings along the track would obstruct your 
view of pedestrians or vehicles coming north¥ 
A. No, sir, I can see them time I get around there. Tt is 
a straight line there. 
Q. You can do it time you get where? 
A. Time I get around the curve there. 
Q. How far is the curve from the station there¥ 
page 83 ~ A. Good long ways, down beside the mill where 
those houses are. 
Q. About how would you say is it beyond the end of tbnt 
embanlrmen t? 
A. As soon as you come around this little curve-You 
didn ~t seem to have all on here. As soon as you come around 
this curve there are houses over here. You can see down 
to the crossing then. 
Q. IIouses over 'vhere f 
A. On the right hand side of the track. 
Q. Houses are on the left hand side, a.ren 't they~ 
A. There are houses both sides. 
Q. These railroad houses are the ones on the left hand side 
of the track, aren't they? 
A . .i\Ton't no railroad people live along there that I kno'v 
of. 
Q. Isn't there a section man's house there~ 
A. Not that I kno'v of. 
Q. And pump house! 
A. Pump house is at the crossing. 
Q. It is east of the crossing' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Isu 't it just hef ore you get· to this crossing here 1 
A. There ·is a water tank there. 
Q. Isn't there a pump there? 
A.. That is down below there. 
page 84 ~ Q. Isn't there a section house there? 
A. There is a tool house and coal bin. 
Q. Isn't there a sand house there? 
. .l~ .. Never saw it. 
Q. When you are coming down the main line, you will not 
say there is nothing to obstruct your view of a pedestrian 
coming north approaching that roadway? 
A. ·when I get around there a certain distance. 
Q. Tell us about how far tl1at curve is you are talking about 
from the crossing f 
--------------------
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A. I couldn't tell you. 
Q. Give us some idea? 
A. I don't like to give an idea. 
Q. Was it a block away? 
A. 1\Ir. Dunn could tell you that. He has a map of the 
track. 
Q. Would you figure it would be a block away? 
A. I don't know; I wouldn't like to say. 
Q. You have some: idea of- the- distanee? 
A. I haven't any idea how many feet it is more than you 
have. · · 
Q. Would it be as far as from here across to that buildingf 
A. In a straight line as far as 'that building I suppose. 
Q. About ho'v far would you say that is! 
· A. I don't know. 
page 85 ~ Q. Is it 150 feet 1 
A.· I wouldn't suppose so. 
Q. Were you looking out this way or looking on the right 
hand side? 
A. Looking right straig·ht down the right hand side. 
· Q. If anybody had been coming a bout here . ( inqica ting) 1 
yoll couldn't have seen them? · 
A. If they had come out and stopped on the track I would 
have seen them. I couldn't see theni behind the houses. They 
didn't cmne out on the track into mv view. 
Q. As they approach in twenty~five or thirty feet you 
couldn't see them? People coming from the south towards 
the trae~ north, getting within twenty-five or thirty feet1 
could you see them~ . _ 
A. I did not. Perhaps the fireman could see them in that 
distance. 
Q. 'Vhy not? 
A. On account of the 'vafer tank. 
R.E-DIREC'r EXA~IINATION. 
By 1\fr. 8picer: 
Q. 'Vas your headligl1t burning¥ 
· A. Yes, sir, burning good. 
Q. You said just now that you could have stopped in a 
shorter distance, I believe, if you had had your full charge 
of air? 
page 86 ~ A. Yes, sir, and kne-\v I had to stop. 
Q. Yon say you had used :UP most of your air? 
A. Yes, sir, I had been using air all around the yard limits. 
Q. In slowing upY 
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A. Yes, sir, and keeping from passing there ahead of time. 
Q. That explains why you didn't stop in a shorter time 
than you did? 
A. I suppose it did. If I had known the automobile was 
coming there I might have stopped and let him gone on. 
Q. You stopped as soon as you could? 
A. I stopped as quick as I could according to my judg-
ment. 
Q.' What train was that; 
A. Number 41. Q. Passenger train ~ · 
A. Yes, sir, through train. 
'Q. Wl1at time did it leave. Richmond at that timet 
A. Left there at. 7 o'clock then. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
·By ~fr. Sinnott: 
Q. When did_ you say you started ringing the bell? 
A. I started ringing the bell a quarter of a mile to the 
east of Pendleton. 
page 87 }- Q. That is about a mile from ~Iineral? 
A. ·Yes, sir. There is a road crossing there. 
Q. When did you sound the 'vhistle ~ 
A. Sounded the whistle for Pendleton about half a mile 
east of Pendleton for that road crossing and started the bell. 
I blew for the road crossing at Pendleton station and blew 
for the station, and after I passed t]:lere and I got to the 
whistling post between Pendleton and Mineral I blew for 
the station. 
Q. How far is the whistling post from the crossing where 
this accident happened f 
A. About a quarter of a mile, the whistling post, that is, 
for the station. 
Q. You ble'v the whistle there? 
.l\.. I blew for the station there, and then probably after I 
got probably twenty-five or thirty yards I blew for the road 
c.rossing, the first road crossing. 
Q. You mean you got t"renty-:five or thirty yards from the 
·whistling post f . 
A. From t!1e station ·whistling post. You have a whistling 
post for the station and one for the road crossing. 
Q. Wllere is the one for the road crossing1 
A. That is between the first whistling post and the first 
road crossing. · 
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page 88 ~ Q. After yon left the whistling post did you 
blow the 'vhistle again Y 
A. I blew it twice between the whistling post and before l 
passed Mineral. 
Q. Did you ring the bell any more f 
A. Bell was ringing from a quarter of a mile east of Pen-
dleton until I stopped at ~Iineral. 
Q. When 'vas the last time that you ble'v the whistle before 
you got to the crossing where the accident happened~ 
A. I ble'v the whistle for the station. 
Q. flow far is that away~ 
A. About half a mile. 
Q. Didn't blo'v it any more 1 
A. I said I blew for the first road crossing after that and 
then after I ran over the first road crossing I ble\v for the 
second road crossing. 
Q. I ask you how far were you from the station 'vhen you 
blew the whistle the last time'~ 
A. I was not more than about fifteen or twenty yards, ble'v 
for the road crossing then. 
Q. About fifteen or twenty yards¥ 
A. Yes, sir. I was blowing for the road crossing 
page 89 ~ then. · . 
Q. Did you blow the whistle from the time you 
were six hundred yards from that station up to the time you 
were three hundred yards away from it 1 
A. The \Vhistle post isn't six hundred yards. No, sir. I 
blew it fifteen seconds, according to law. 
Q. Did yo-u blow it from the time you were 600 yards away 
until yau got about 300 yards away~ 
A. I blew for two road crossings. 
Q. Can you give us the distance 1 
A. No, sir. I blew for both road crossings according to 
law at the whistle post fifteen seconds each tim 
'Vitness stood aside. 
Note : At 2 :00 P. ~L a recess was taken 
page 90 ~ J. II. ROBERTS, 
a ·witness on behalf of the defendant, being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows: 
EXAl\IINATION IN CHIEF. 
By JYir. Spicer: 
Q. Were you firing on train #41 on April 15th, 1925, pas-
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senger train, at the time of the accident at the crossing at 
l\1:ineral? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you remember the occasion 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How 1ong have you been in the railroad service' 
A. Thirteen years-a little over thirteen years. 
Q. What is your rating? 
Witness: \Vhat do you mean~ My rate? 
l\ir. Spicer : Yes. 
A. As engineer. 
Q. You were firing at that time 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You were qualified to operate an engine at that time1 
A. Yes, sir. ( 
Q. Ho'v long have you been qualified 1 , 
... ~. Since December 16th, 1918. 
page 91 ~ Q. vVha t side of the engine were you sitting on? 
·.A. Sitting on the left side. 
Q. Whereabouts 7 
A. On the seat of the fireman in the cab. 
Q. Will you state just what you know about the accident 1 
A. I was sitting on the left side, looking out. I noti~ed 
this car coming up to the crossing 'vhen we were approach-
ing close to it and the car was approaching close to it. I found 
he wasn't going to make any effort to stop and I holloed to 
the engineer to hold her. lie immediately threw the brakes 
in to emergency. 
Q. How far away was the car? 
A. I would judge a bout hventy-five feet from the crossing 
at the time I saw him-about bventy-five or thirty feet, some-
thing like that. 
Q. How far was the engine, 'vould you say? 
A. We were a bout the same distance. · 
Q. About the same distance? · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you remember any signals being blown in approach-
ing there~ 
page 92 ~ A. Yes, sir, station signal was blown. 
Q. How far off was that blown? 
A. Half a mile from the station. 
Q. Is that where the whistle post is? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Any other signals blown? 
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A. T'vo road crossings between the 'vhistle post and this 
crossing at the station. 
Q. What signal was blown for that Y 
A. Two long and two short for each crossing. 
Q. Was there a separate signal blown for thi~ crossingf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q~ Two longs and two shorts f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q~ Mr. Roberts, can you say about how far you were away 
from this crossing at the time the cross.ing whistle was 
blown for the second crossing? 
. A. I would say about hvo hundred and twenty-five or 
fifty yards when· the whistle was started blowing. 
Q. Do you know about how far you were at the time it 
stopped blowing the last time? 
A. When it stopped blowing I don't think it was over fifty 
or seventy-five feet from the crossing. 
Q. Does it take some· time to complete that 
page 93 ~ whistle blowing? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know ho'v long 1 
A. It is two long blows and thirtee.n seconds elapse be-
tween the blo'"~{S and it takes a right good while. 
Q. Then you blow two short 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you remember anything about the bell on the engine ~1 
A. The bel1 was ringing, yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know ·when it started to ring and 'vhen it stoppeil 
ringing? 
A. \V e have automatic bell ringers, or air bell ringers, 
operated by air. It is right many crossings. It commenced 
at Pendleton and continued until we passed .Mineral until we 
stopped. 
Q. Do you know of your own knowledge· it did that? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do yon remember when it stopped ringing? 
A. The engineer shut it off after he stopped the engine. 
Q . .A,fter passing the crossing? 
· A. Yes, sir. 
Q. There is a passing track on your left on approaching 
this crossing·, is it not y· 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Coming west this way, coming down. the main track,. 
there is a passing track here? (Indicating.) 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q.. Do you recall whether or not there were 
page 94 ~ any cars on that track? 
A. No, sir, no cars on there. 
Q. Was there anything on the track to obstruct your view~ 
A. No, sir. -
Q. Mr. Roberts, what was your position? ·You say you 
were sitting on the seat box coming towards the station. 
Which way were yon facing1 
A. I was facing the way the engine was going. 
Q. Facing ahead, the way the engine was going! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Could you have seen this automobile any sooner than 
you did by taking any other position? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What did you do wl1en you realized that the car was 
co min~ and wasn't going to stop? 
A. Holloed to the engineer to hold it, and, if I remember, 
I said "An automobile!" That is the- words that passed 
between me and the engineer at the time. lie put the brakes 
l~ight in emerg·ency. 
Q. Was that done right instantly' 
A. Instantly. 
Q. Do you lmow what kind of stop he made t 
A. We considered it a good stop that he made. 
page 95 ~ He only ran an engine length and about five or 
six cars I think. The rear car stopped on the 
crossing. 
Q. Do you kno'v at what rate of speed the engine was 
going through ~iineral T 
A. He was running between twelve and fifteen miles an 
hour. 
Q. Yon don't think he ·was running over fifteen~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Had you slo,ved up any in coming into lYiineral f 
A. Yes, sir, we had slowed up considerably. We were a 
little ahead of time when we approached Mineral. We were 
1dlling time through 1\fineral. We were due there at 8:31; 
· we were right on the second. We were a little ahead of time 
if we hacln 't. 
Q. Would that have any effect on the distance in which 
you could stop the engine after you saw the automobile 1 
A. Y·es, sir, because he had released the brake with the in-
tention of going on if ev:erything had been clear. Of course, 
he didn't have full train line pressure. 
Q. Why was that f 
~ \ .. 
------- ------
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A. Because he had reduced it in making his applications. 
Q. He had used it f 
A. Yes, sir, in slowing up through Minerai. 
Q. Was that a regular schedule passenger train Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Due at ~fineral at what time 1 
A. 8:31. 
page 96 ~ Q. Do you kno'v 'vhat part of the automobile 
was struck? 
A. As well as I remember, it was the rear wheel.; top of his 
fender was mashed. The rear wheel was the only thing I 
saw injured to amount to anything. 
Q. Was the automobile turned over? 
A. No, sir, it was only slued around. 
Q. It remained in an upright position? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you recall w·hether or not your headlight was burn-. 
ing~ 
A. Headlight was burning, yes, sir. 
Q. Do you ln1ow what kind of night it was, clear night or 
raining¥ 
A. If I am not mistaken it was clear. 
Q. Did you get out of the cab after this a·ccident f 
A. Yes, sir, after we stopped. 
Q. Did you go back to the crossing? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see ·any of the people that were in the auto-
mobileY 
A. I sa'v the lady and a big crowd around ~fr. Meyer. I 
didn't get very close to him. I saw the lady, had her sitting 
up when I got there. 
Q. Did you notice any odor of whiskey aroui1d 'vhere Nlr. 
~'I eyer was? 
A. Yes, sir, I notice the odor of whiskey around there. 
Q. Near where he 'vas? 
page 97 ~ ·A. Yes, sir, around near 'vhere he was. 
Q. Did you see any¥ 
A. I didn't see any whiskey. 
~{r. ~Iay: Your Honor, I would like to move that the 
whiskey part of the testimony be stricken out because it is 
not connected with Mr. ~£eyer in any way except he smelt the 
odor of whiskey in that vicinity. . 
The Court: I think the jury can have that. 
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CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By 1vfr. May: 
Q. Did you get close to ~Irs. Mapes~ 
A. I suppose I got in six or seven feet of her. 
Q. Was there any odor of 'vhiskey in her direction 7 
A. I smelt 'vhiskey around the car, and she was about five 
or six feet of the car. 
Q. Is that a regular stop~ 
A. No, sir, no stop at all. 
Q. Where is the end of the line that that train goes 7 
A. I don't know. It goes to Cincinnati, I suppose. 
Q. Do you know whether the whistle of your train blew 
between the times it was 600 yards away from the crossing 
and 300 yards away from the crossingJ 
page 98 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
· Q. How many times was it sounded in that dis-
tance? 
A. It was sounded 250 yards of the crossing, the crossing 
signal, two longs and two shorts. 
Q. Now, did you see ~Ir. Meyer on the oor anywhere? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. "\Vhat position was he in on the cart 
A. He 'vas standing on the running board facing the engine. 
~-<When did h.c first get out on the running board? 
A. I didn't see him when he got out on the running board, 
but he was in a kind of inclined position, leaning back like 
this against the back part of the automobile on the fender, 
or on the running· board I should say. 
Q. You say you were going between twelve and fifteen 
miles an hour ~ 
A. 1res, sir .. 
Q. Are you certain you were going no slower than twelve 
miles an hour? 
A. "\Veil, I would say, according to my judgment, we were 
running between 1.2 and 15 miles an hour. 
Q. Could you say definitely that you were not going over 
f5 miles an hour? 
page 99 ~ A. I am sure we ·were not going over fifteen 
miles an hour. 
Q. How is that train stopped? Is air the only thing you 
can put on it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The emergency brake is worked on the principle of 
air? 
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.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is there any way you can slow your train down other 
than by putting fhe brakes on Y 
A. Of course, you can slow your train down by easing off 
your throttle. 
Q. That is, to cut the steam down? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Isn't that the usual way that you: slacken the speed o.f 
your train wnen you are not going to make a stop y 
A. No, sir. We have to use brakes most of the times when 
we are not going to make a stop in order to keep the speed 
where we want it. - -
Q. On this particular occasion, although you were not going 
to stop, you used the air- instead of the throttle? 
A. Of course, the throttle was all shut off; that 'vas shut 
off on approaching and had used the afr to cut the speed down 
to get to the speed limit. 
Q. What is the speed limit? 
A. Fifteen miles an hour. 
page 100 ~ Q. You are· related to Irving Luck, and 1\:Ir. 
Luck who was summoned and testified in this 
case? 
A. No, sir. I am not related. · 
Q. Either by blood or marriage? 
A. By marriage he is my brother-in-law. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
· Q. After you saw the car come upon tl1e track, was there 
any opportunity on the part of the engineer to stop the 
engine in time ·to avoid the collision Y 
A. No, sir. 
By_Mr. J\{ay: 
Q. Why couldn't you see this car before it got 25 feet f 
A. Because the car wasn't there. 
Q. Was there anything on that corner to obstruct your· 
vision? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. How far could you see south on First street when you 
were 25 feet away from the crossing, that is, the street that 
crosses the track? 
A. I don't know; I couldn't say exactly. 
Q. Do you kno'v where that cement road is there? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Could you see the cement road from where you were·? 
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A. Not 25 f~et east of the crossing, I don't 
page 101 ~ think. 
Q. Isn't it a matter of fact the reason you 
couldn't see before getting 25 feet of the crossing that these 
stores obstructed your vision~ 
A. Possibly might have been the store would have ob-
structed the vision of car coming to. the crossing; I don't know 
about that. I didn't see the car until in 25 feet of it. 
Q. What I want to know is, when you first saw the car had 
it just come from behind the buildings~ 
A. I don't know where· it came from.· 
Q. Ho'v fast was that car· running' 
A. He didn't seem to be running so fast. I would· say he 
was running not over fifteen miles an hour; twelve or fifteen . 
miles an hour; I wouldn't say for sure; it is mighty hard to judge speed. ~ · · 
Q. Could you tell· from the way that car was running 
·whether the gears were changed while you saw it? 
A. No, sir, I couldn't tell that. 
Q. It never slacked until it got to the crossing? 
A. No, sir. · 
Witness stood aside. 
page 102 ~ W. H. LACY, . . 
a· witness on ·behalf· of the defendant, being first 
duly sworn, testified as .follows: 
EXA~IINATION IN CHIEF. 
By 1\ir. Spicer: 
Q. Mr. Lacy, are you passenger conductor in the employ 
<Of the C. 8i 0. Railway? 
A. Yes, sir: , 
Q. How long have you been a passenger conductor? 
A. About twenty years. 
Q. How long have you been running in the territory be-
tween Richmond and Charlottesville? · 
A. About eight years. 
Q. Were you conductor on train #41 on the night of April 
15th, 1925, the night that there was an accident at the First 
street crossing at Mineral? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you recall that occasion? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Mr. Lacy, just tell the jury what you know about that 
accident? What was the first that you knew of it Y 
.A. The first I knew of it was after it had happened. 
Q. Where were you at the time? 
page 103 ~ A. I ·was in the passenger coach, the first pas-
senger coach of the train. When they stopped, 
I got -out and went back. 
Q. Did you feel the brakes go on 1 
A. Felt the brakes go into emergency, yes, sir, and the 
thing came to a stop at once. • 
Q. Do you know how fast the train was running in ap-
proaching that crossing through town¥ 
A. Between 12 and 15 miles an hour. 
Q. Do y_9u know of any signals that ·were given in ap-
proaching 1\iineral ¥ 
A. Station whistle and hYo road crossing 'vhistles. 
Q. Do you remember their being blo\vn? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know ho\v far that station whistle post is? 
A. No, I don't know the exact distance, no, sir. 
Q. Do you kno\v approximately f 
A. Oh, I suppose it is behveen half a mile and three quar-
ters; about" half a mile, I should say. 
Q. The regul!l.r·whistle was blo·wn for the station? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You recollect the' crossing whistle for each of the two 
crossings Y • 
... ~. Afterwards, yes, sir. 
page 104 ~ Q. Do you know whether or not there were any 
cars on that passing track on the left hand side ? 
A. There 'vas none on the west end of it. I ·don't kno\v 
about the east end of it. ) 
Q~ None occupying the crossing? 
A. No, sir, none·in sight on tl1e west end of it. 
Q. How many cars did you have on that train 1 
A. Had six cars. 
Q. Did you see the occupants of the automobile afte1; the 
accident had occurred~ 
A. I walked around it. I never made a real close inspec-
tion. 
Q. Did you go up to the people who were in the car¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see 1Ir. 1\feyerf 
A. Yes, sir. He was tl1e first one I got to. 
Q. How close clicl you get to him? 
A. I had my hand on him to see if he was alive. 
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Q. vVas the automobile turned over~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What position was that in? 
A. That was sitting up in its regular position. It was 
leaning the least bit on account of spokes being broken in one 
wheel. ' · 
page 105 ~ Q. Which way was it facing1 
A. It was facing towards the hotel, what I 
should call north. We go by the railroad running east and 
'vest and the street running north and south. 
Q. Did you notice any odor of whiskey around Mr. Meyer~ 
A. I didn't see any. I smelt some whiskey but I didn't 
see any. I don'l know where it was at. 
Q. \Vas it very pronounced? Are you certain about the 
odor of whiskey 1 
it. 
A .. Oh, yes, sir. The baggage man called my attention to 
Q. You could smell it, yourself~ 
A. Yes, sir.· 
Q. That was near where he 'vas? 
A. I couldn't tell. I was walking and stirring aro1md. I 
could smell it in walking in different places there. I did not 
notice just where it was at. 
Q. Do you recall whether or not. the train was on time Y 
A. Yes, sir. \Ve were running slower than usual on ac-
account of killing time in order not to pass the station ahead 
of time. 
CROS'S EXA.lVIINATION. 
By Mr. May: 
Q. How close did you get to 1\tlr. J\lleyer? 
A. I came right up to him, had my hand on 
page 106 ~ him. 
Q. Did you bend over beside him? 
A. Yes, sir, I had to bend over to put my hand on him. 
Q. Your head then was just a matter of a foot from his 
mouth? 
A. No, sir, it was further off than that. 
Q. How far? 
A. Possibly two or three feet. 
Q. If an odor of liquor had been pronounced on the body 
of 1\fr. 1\ieyer you would have been able to have told just where 
that odor came from, wouldn't you ? 
A. Well, if a bottle of liquor was broken on the ground, 
or in this room, I don't know as I can tell exactly where it 
comes from. I couldn't say it came from him or not. 
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Q. Do you know whether the liquor "that you smelt was 
from the .breath of that man or from somethinp: that had 
been broken? · 
A. He had no breath in him, not at that time. 
Q. ·Yon don't know whether yon smelt it from a man or 
not? 
A. I can't say how it got there. 
Q. ·Have you ever served as engineer? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You say the train stopped at once. Just what do you 
mean by the train stopped at once? 
A. As quick as possible. 
Q. As quick as possible? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 107 ~ Q. Yon are certain you were running no slower 
than twelve miles an hour~ 
A. I say about that. I don't think we were running much 
over that. 
Q. Are you positive you were not running over :fifteen 1 
A. I am positive we were not running fifteen. 
Q. It was dark outside, was it f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You could see no objects on the outside at that timef 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Just how do you figure out how fast the train was run-
ning? Can yon by standing in a coach tell how fast your 
train is rum1ing? 
A. Well, if you know where you are at and you can look 
at your watch and tell the time it takes about how far it 
takes to go. 
Q. If it was dark and you saw no objects how did you lrno'v 
where you were at? 
A. I can tell from whistles and tell from frogs in the track 
as you run over them, and the fuss you make, that the ·wheels 
make when they run over a switch. 
"'\Vi tness stood aside. 
page 108 ~ W. J. COFFEY, 
a witness on behalf of the defendant, being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows : 
EXAl\ITNATION IN CHIEF. 
By Mr. Spicer: . 
Q. Mr. Coffey, what is your occupation t 
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A. Baggagemaster. . 
Q. Were you baggagemaster on C. & 0. train #41, the pas-
senger train whicli was involved in an accident at Mineral 
on A pril15t11, 1925 Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
·Q. Do you remember tha.t occasion? 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where were you at the time of the collision? . 
.A. I was in the colored smoker. 
Q. What was the first that you knew of itY 
.A. When t4e brakes were applied in emergency. 
Q. Emergency brakes Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you get out Y 
A. Got out as soon as it stopped. 
·Q. Did you see any of the occupants of the automobile? 
.A. I did. 
-page 109 } Q. Did you converse 'vith them 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you smell any odor of whiskey around in that 
vicinity? . 
A. I smelt something that smelt like it; I wouldn't swear 
it was whiskey. 
Q. You wouldn't swear it was whiskey1 
A. No, s!r. 
Q. Is it your opinion it was 'vhiskey? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was the automobile turned overT 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you know how fast the train was running' 
A. Well, it 'vas running, I 'judge, between twelve and fif-
teen miles an hour. 
· Q. Do yon know whether the whistle was blown? 
A. It was. 
Q. Was the whistle blown for that crossing? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was it blown any other time~ 
A. :Blown for the crossing below that. 
Q. Was it blown for anything else~ 
A. Blown for the station. 
Q. Do you know whether the engine bell was ringing or · 
notY 
A. It was. 
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page 110 ~ CROSS EXA~IINATION. 
By Mr. May: 
Q~ Do you kno·w when the engineer lets air off? Can you 
tell from 'vhere y;ou are 1 
A. Sometimes I can and sometimes I can't. If you are not 
paying any attention to it, you wouldn't notice it. 
Q. You were paying attention to that bell ringing, weren't 
youT . 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You paid attention to the sound of the whistle? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you hear the engineer let off any air between Pen-
dleton and Mineral? 
A. I felt it when it w·as released. 
Q. You felt the air when it was released? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. This whiskey that you smelt was that in th_e possession 
df l\{r. ~Ieyer? 
A. I don't know where it was. 
Q. Was it in the possession of l\1:rs. Mapes? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Do you know whether it was on your engineer or fire-
man? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. You 'vere in the baggage coach at this time? 
A. I was in the colored smoker. 
page 111 ~ Q. It was dark, 'vas it? 
A. It was night. 
Q. Do you remember whether you were noticing any ob-
jects on the outside? · 
A. I didn't notice. 
Q. You were not noticing f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. If it 'yas dark outside and you didn't have any objects 
to fix how fast you were going away from any object how 
can you tell whether you were going hvelve or fifteen miles 
an hour or how fast you were going~ . 
A. That is easy enough to tell. Lights were in the houses 
on the side of the track. You could notice those and tell ho'v 
fast you were running- in the neighborhood. 
Q. Didn't you just say you hadn't noticed anything opt 
there? 
A. On the side of the track I did not. This was away from 
the side of the track. 
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A. ·Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. Do you know who the brakeman was 1 
A. C. W. Mahone. 
Q. Is he living nowY 
A. No, sir. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 112 } . A. L. DE1\iENTI, 
a witness on behalf of the defendant, being first 
duly sworn, testi~ed as follows: 
EXA:NIINATION IN CHIEF. 
By l\{r. Spicer: . 
Q. ~fr. Dementi, what is your occupation~ 
A. Photographer. . 
Q. Did you take some photographs for the C. & 0. R-ailway 
Company of the scene pointed out to you as the scene of an 
accident at 1\fineral, Va.? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I will ask you if you took these two pictures Y (Indi-
cating.) 
A. Yes, sir. 
Note: Photographs filed and marked "Ex. Dementi # 1" 
and ''Ex. Dementi #2''. 
Q. This picture here, marked #1, says 21 feet south of the 
south rail looking east and man 1,006 feet. Is that right 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. \Vhere was he 1 In the track 1 
A. Yes, sir, he 'vas on the inside of the track. 
Q. 1\fain line track 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. #2 taken 21 feet south of the south rail 
page 113 } looking east, man 610 feet. Is that correct! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that man in the center of the track? 
A. Yes, sir, rig-ht here. It was taken on a very cloudy day. 
Q. This one marked #3, taken 98 feet south of the south 
rail, looking north, did you take that? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Note: Photograph filed and marked ·''Ex. Dementi #3''. 
Q. What was the condition of the weather when these 
photographs were taken T 
A. Right cloudy.. They were made about 12 o'clock in the 
day on an unusually cloudy day. 
Juror: Which rail was he referring to ? 
Witness: It is the main line. It is a siding there but I 
always figured on the main line-track of the main line. 
By Mr. Spicer: . 
Q. Middle tracx in the picture¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 11~ ~ H. P. SCHWARTZ, 
a witness on behalf of the defendant, being first 
duly sworn, testified as follo,vs: 
EXAJ\!IINATION IN CHIEF. 
By :.M:r. Spicer= 
Q. What is your occupation Y 
A. Hotel proprietor. 
Q. Where? 
A. Mineral. 
Q. Where is your hotel in reference to the crossing known 
as First street crossing? 
A. We are right at the First street crossing, right opposite 
the C. & 0. station, grounds com~ out to First street, on the 
railway right of way. 
Q. I-Iere is a map of the location. Your hotel is located 
there? (Indicating.) 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you·recall the night on which this accident occurred f 
A. I do. 
Q. In which 1\fr. Meyer was struck? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where were you at the time? 
A. I was at the hotel in the back. 
Q. Will you indicate where that was 1 
page 115 ~ A. I was here on the back porch. 
eral? 
Q. Did you hear the train approaching Min-
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was the first you lmew of it coming~ 
A. The nrst I heard was the whistle for the station and 
then I heard the whistle for both crossings. 
Q. What is the station that they blow for the station and 
for the crossings f 
A. It is a long for the station, and I think hvo longs and 
two shorts for the crossings. 
Q. You heard it blow for both crossings? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was that prior to the time it had reached the First 
street crossing? 
A. Yes, sir. Then I heard, of course, the brakes. 
Q. Could you tell anything about the speed of the train? 
. A. Well, no, not as to the distance, but it appeared to me 
that night that the train was not making as fast time as it 
does at times. As to the speed, I don't know about that. I 
recall quite plainly that it came to me it was not running 
quite as fast as usual. 
Q. How did the impression reach you that it "\vas not run-
ning as fast as usual? Did you see it~ 
page 116} A. Because I reckon it was not making quite 
as much speed as I can tell from the noise. I 
notice it of course some nights when it comes by and I don't 
}{now about it, but that night I recall for some reason about 
it coming to my mind from some reason that the train was 
uot running quite as fast as usual. 
Q. · That is before it reached the crossing? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you hear the bell ring? 
A. Yes, sir, I heard the bell ring. 
Q. What did you do1 You said you heard the train stop. 
A. I started around the hotel to see and that is when a 
gentleman came running and told me it had struck an auto-
mobile. I went after a bucket for water and ~ent down to 
·the wreck. 
Q. About how long after the \vreck occurred did you get 
there? 
A. I don't expect it was over two. minutes at the outside-
two or three. 
Q. Do. you know whether the headlight was burning on the 
eng·ine? 
A. Yes, sir. I could see the brightness of it. I could not 
see the train where I 'vas at but I could see the brightness 
of the light. It puts it all over the front of the property 
there .. 
---------- ---~----
114 In the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
Q. Had Mr. lVIeyer ever stayed at your hotel Y 
A. Yes, sir, Mr. Meyer stayed with us two nights every two 
weeks regularly. 
page 117 ~ Q. How long had he been coming there? 
A .. r expect two years and a half. 
Q. When he came into your hotel would he come across the 
railroad tracks at Mineral? . 
A. Yes, sir. One time he "rould make from here up and 
stop with us o:n Tuesday night, but this week he had car 
trouble and didn't get to our place on Tuesday night, but 
c~me in at noon on vVednesday and asked about his mail, said 
"I will be here to-night". 
Q. That was the day of'the accident? 
·A. Yes, sir. 
CROSS' EXA~ili~ATION. 
By ~Ir. Sinnott: 
Q. I believe you stated you operated a hotel? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where were you standing when the accident happened f 
A. I was in the oack of the hotel back from the railroad. 
Q. It is in front of the hotel 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where 'vere you? 
A. I 'vas in here. (Indicating.) 
Q. You couldn't see the train Y 
A. No, sir. 
page 118 ~ Q. This accident l1appened when 1 
A. This accident must have happened about 
8 :31 on the 15th of April. 
Q. Did you go down there where it was ~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see lVIr. lVIeyer? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was he dead? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. J\IIr. Schwartz, that train doesn't stop at :M:ineral, does 
itY · 
A. No, sir. 
Q. That is a through train, goes on through town? 
A. -Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know anything about in "That distance it takes 
to stop a train Y 
. A. I do not. 
Q. Don't know anything about it? 
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A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you know how far this train went that night 1 
A. This train ran a little more than its length. 
Q. A little more than its length 1 
A. Yes, sir. I should say the distance of across the street 
or partially across the street. 
page 119 ~ Q. ]\fore than its length 1 
A. Just its length. 
Q. Do you happen to kno\v what the length is~ 
A. No, I do not. I don't know, only from hearsay. I 
noticed ho'v many coaches it carried that night and prac-
tically the length of it, but otherwise I wouldn't have known. 
Q. How many did it carry that night¥ 
A. Six. 
Q. "'\Vhat coaches were on there' 
A. I couldn't tell you. 
Q. You don't kno'v whether any sleepers were on? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. There are some electric lights on the station, aren't 
they? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Here is the station over here. (Indicating on map.} 
Now, where are those lights on the depot! 
A. I think the light burnt here if I am not mistaken. 
They have changed it. now. 
Q. Was there more than one light? 
A. I couldn't answer that. 
Q. Was it pretty bright from that light around that sta-
tion' 
A. I wasn't there when the train came in, but it usually 
is, yes, sir. 
page 120 ~ Q. The glare of the headlight there 'vould not 
have been so bright you couldn't distinguish it~ 
A. The lights on the station were not very ntight anyway 
at that time. 'They only have a Delco plant. 
Q. You didn't notice the lights that night to notice whether 
they "~ere particularly bright~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. 1-Io,v long· have you lived at Mineral~ 
A. I have been there nearly six years. 
Q. You are familiar with the location along there? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. What buildings are there on the south side of the track 
just as you approach that crossing? 
A. "'\Vell, I think it is used for a tool house of the C. & 0. 
and do you mean adjacent? 
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Mr. Sinnott : Yes, sir. 
A. (Continued) And the pump house. 
Q. There is a section or 'tool house, isn't it? 
A. No, sir. They use it no doubt for just castaway. _The 
section house you may say is beyond the depot. 
Q. What is the first house up from that crossing? 
A. I think it is used for just the necessary things. 
Q. There is a pump house next to that Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 121 ~ Q. Next to that is the water tank, isn't it f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Next to that is another house known as the sand house? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Then there is beyond the trestle the coal dump up there 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Beyond that there is an embankment, isn't it~ 
A. I think that embanl{ment is made by running up on that 
·coal dump. 
Q. That runs some distance up the track, doesn't itf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Persons coming out here towards that crossing from 
the south can have a good clear view. of the track up there 
or do those buildings obstruct the view? 
A. If one is acquainted with the situation they can see the 
train from here (indicating), over there and a little in there, 
provided the train is in there. 
Q. If it happens to be there at the time. he gets up here 
somewhere? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Isn't it much higher up here than it is down there? 
A. It is higher, but, if you are acquainted with the situation 
and know that a train is coming and you were looking, you 
can see that train coming. . 
Q. Can you see it over top the trestle? 
page 122 ~ A. Yes, sir, you can see it. Not back here too 
far, understand, but when it gets up here you can 
_begin to see the smokestack and top of the engine. 
Q. See the smokestack and top of the engine? 
A. Yes, sir. I have noticed a number of times since. 
Q. Day time or night Y 
A. Either one. This night train makes quite a light and it 
is quite plain to see. 
Q. When one is approaching these tracks there and the 
train gets in behind these buildings here, can you get a vie'v 
of it when the building is between yon! 
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A. No, you can't get a view there. As I say, if you hap-
IJen to be in here you can get a view between these two for 
/a little while. 
Q. If you happen to strike it at a particular time! 
A. Yes, sir, and, if you were up here a ~ittle, you could, but 
you have to get here to see. 
Q. As they got over First street and got past this hard-
ware store, until you get to the end of that hardware store, 
you can't see anything up that way at all, and, when you · 
get further over here behind the section house and that row 
of obstructions, you can't see up the track at all~ 
.A. No. 
page 123' ~ Q. I believe you stated you never saw the train 
before it stopped 7 
A. No, I didn't see it. Where I was at I couldn't see-
·when I get way down here trees are in my way and I can't 
see. 
Q. When you went down there did you see the automo-
bile? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where was that? 
A. The automobile 'vas standing in the street across clear 
of the track and turned in abou·t this position (indicating) 
towards tl1e hoteL 
By Mr. Spicer! 
· Q. Which way? 
A. Just this way. (Indicating.) The rear wheels as near 
this depot grounds as the front wheels, showing it was stand-
ing in this position: I looked especially because I looked 
the auto over and looked how it was standing. ·It was facing 
.almost exactly the hotel ; the. rear wheels near the curh and 
these were a'vay. (Indicating.) 
By :rvrr. Sinnott: 
Q. Where was l\ir. Meyer's body? 
A. Over here beside the main track. ~Irs. Mapes was 
right here against the curbing and ~Ir. 1\~Ieyer was here be~ 
side the. side track and the main track, about a couple of feet 
of the main track. 
page 124 ~ Q. 'Vhich side of the main track 'vas Meyer 
on? 
A. On the north side. 
Q. Where were his injuries? 
A. He was injured all over. 
Q. Was the automobile damaged anyf 
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A. Yes, right much. I didn't see how much but one wheel 
was smashed and some other things torn up; and then I later 
talked to Mr. Mapes and he said that it was damaged con-
siderably. 1 don't know whether this is permissible or not. 
He knew more than I did about it. 
Q. Where did they take ~ir. 1\feyer's body¥ 
A. Took it to l_\lfr. s·avory's, the undertaker's. 
Q. Up in Mineral? 
A. Yes, sir. .I· helped to take it. 
. / 
VRE-DIRECT EXAMINATION_ 
By Mr. Spicer: . 
Q. After reaching a point even with n.l1e north side of the 
second house on the road here, is there anything to obstruct 
the view whatever of a train approaching from the east? 
A. Not when you come up back here it isn't anything at all,. 
when you clear that house wherever that point is; of course,. 
the nearer the track yp_u get the further you can see. 
Q. HOw far can you see as soon as you clear 
page 125 } that house f · 
A. As I looked at that, I would say, ·without 
measuring, oh, four hundred feet, or three hundred and fifty 
or four hundred feet. 
Q. After you reached the side track there how far could 
you see then 1 
A. You could see all the way. 
Q. How far is the track straight in that direction 1 
A. You can see a little below the second crossing. It makes 
a curve as it comes across the third crossing, and you can 
see it soon after between the third and second crossing. 
Q. Ho'v far is the track straight there, approximafelyY 
A. It must be about a mile, close to it. 
Q. You say the headlight.of that night train makes a bright 
light? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is it a kind of flood light? 
A. Yes, sir, it makes quite a light. 
RE-CROSS EXA1\1INATION. 
By Mr. Sinnott: 
Q. I believe you said you lived in ~iineral for some years 1 
A. Six years. 
Q. Do you know where the city limits are, how far they 
are from this crossing? . 
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A. Near to it. 
page 126 ~ Q. About how far are they from the crossing 
over the place where this man was killed Y 
A. Well, you see, we go way up here beyond the third cross-
ing. 
Q. About how far away¥ 
A.· Half' a mile if it is where I think it is. I think I am 
right. 
RE-RE-DIRECT EXlliiNATION. 
By ~Ir. Spicer: 
Q. Do you know whether ~Irs. Mapes had been across that 
First street crossing fief ore~ 
A. I do not; I don't know. 
Q. Do you know 'vhere she lived 7 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where did they live? 
A. They lived about four miles from ~Iineral, or they did 
then, two miles from Louisa ·on the Jefferson Highway. 
Q. Do they operate a garage Y 
A. ·Yes, sir. 
Q. Did they at that time Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Sinnott: 
Q. Is Mrs. M:~rpes living or dead now~ 
A. Dead. 
page 12·7 ~ By Mr. ~fay: 
Q. How long after this wreck did she die Y 
A. This was in April, and I think that Mrs. Mapes died in 
June or July. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 128 ~ L. G. PER-KINS', 
a witness on behalf of the defendant, being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows: 
EXA~1INATION IN CHIEF. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. What is your occupation' 
A. Postmaster, 1\Eneral. 
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A. Yes, sir. · .. 
Q. Do you remember the occasion on which ·an automobile, 
in which Mr. Meyer was a passenger, was struck by a C. & 0.· 
train? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where were you when this accident happened? 
A. I was standing on the potch of W. C. Chaplin, a short 
distance north of-the depot. 
Q. Chaplin's store? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that the poin.t 1 (Indicating on map.) . 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You were standing where? 
A. Standing right in here on the porch. 
. Q. Had you seen the train coming, Mr. Per- -
page 129 ~ kins? 
A. Yes, sir. Just a few minutes prior to this 
accident I had walked down to the depot and heard the train 
while I was there. 
Q. While you were at the depot? . . 
A. Yes, sir. I also saw the headlight when it came around 
the curve. I walked back to the porch. 
Q. Did you hear any whistle blow? 
A. Yes, sir, I heard the whistle very distinctly. 
Q. Did you hear it blow once or more than once? 
A. I don't remember about the number of times. I heard 
it and knew it was coming because the tr~in rumbled. I 
stepped up on the porch.- I turned facing the railroad to 
see the train pass. That is the time I saw the car, the first 
time I sa'v the car. 
Q. Where was the car in respect to the train 'vhen you 
saw itY · 
A. The automobile was pulling up on the side track. There 
are three tracks there. On the south side track when I saw it. 
Q. How far off was the. automobile from the train? 
A. I should say the train was possibly twenty-five or thirty 
yards, not that far hardly. I am not much of an estimator 
-of distance. 
Q. Hardly that distance~ 
A. No, sir, I don't think so. 
Q. Did you see whether or not the· automobile stopped~ 
A. The automobile didn't stop. 
page 130 ~ Q. Which way was it coming? 
fi.. It was coming north. 
Q. Did it come straight north? 
A. No, sir. It cut nearly across the track, then it seemed 
I 
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to lean a little east, the front end seemed to be pJilling east. 
Q. The dir·ection in which the train was coming from 7 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. They ·were heading towards the train Y 
A.. Yes, sir, just a slight turn to the east. 
Q. Did you smell any odor of whiskey around where the 
car wast 
A.. Yes, sir, I smelt an odor that I took to be whiskey when 
I first got to the place of the accident. 
Q. Are you capable of recognizing the odor of whiskey7 
A. I think so. 
CROSS EXAMIL~ATION. 
By 1\fr. May: 
Q. Did you detect the whiskey on 1\frs. 1\Iapes, Mr. Meyer, 
the fireman or engineer? 
A. Well, I smelt the odor of 'vhiskey; I couldn't tell where 
it was; it was in the vicinity of the accident. 
Q. There were a good many people around there in a very 
-short while, weren't they! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How many 'vould you say were there inside 
page 131 } of five minutes? . 
A. Well, I think I was the second person to get 
there. I 'vent for a doctor. When I returned it was quite a 
crowd, I don't kno,v, possibly fifty or more. A good many 
people had gotten off the train and others had come up. 
Q. You say when you first looked back there and saw the 
car it was then pulling up on the side track to the south? 
A. ·Yes, sir. · · 
Q. Yon know that the car did not stop from the side track 
to the main track? 
A. No, sir, didn't stop. 
Q. That is only a very short distance, isn't itY 
A. Yes, sir, very short distance. 
Q. Probably a couple of feet or so' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How far 'vould you say it is from the southermost rail 
Qf the side track to the southermost rail of the main track~ 
A. Well, not over ten or twelve feet I sliouldn 't think. 
Q. How fast would you estimate that that train was run-
~g through there? 
A. Well, the train didn't appear to me to be running at 
very fast speed, I didn't think. 
------- -~-----~~ 
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Q. What is your estimate of the mileage that it was run-
ning~ 
A. Well, I shouldn't think it was running over fifteen miles 
I don't think. 
page 132 ~ Q. You couldn't swear ·whether it was run-
ning over fifteen miles 0/ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you think it was n1nning any less than fifteen 1 
A. I really don't know. I think possibly around twelve or 
fifteen miles, judging from. having ridden in an automobile 
with a speedometer. I had no \vay of telling exactly ho\v 
fast it was going. · 
Q. Do you think it would take an .engineer five hundred 
feet to stop an engine going at the rate of fifteen miles an 
hour¥ 
A. \Veil, I don't know a thing about the operation of an 
engine. 
Q. l{ow fast do you generally walk an hour, ]\fr. Perkins? 
A. Well, not over five miles. Yon have to step along to do 
that. 
Q. Don't you think that train was . going three times as 
fast as you generally ·walk-~ 
A. Well, it might be. I hav.e no way of knowing ho\v fast 
it was running. 
. Q. Your best estimate is exactly fifteen miles an hour, or 
approximately fifteen miles an hour? Did you say from 12 
to 15 miles a.n hour? 
A. I said I didn't think over fifteen. 
Q. You didn't say anything about twelve? 
page 133 ~ A. No, sir, I don't think I mentioned twelve. 
I Q. Now, \vhen you first saw this car it was 
about ten feet south of the south rail of the main track? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Then, the train was some twenty-five yards to the east 
of the crossing f 
A. Something in that neighborhood. 
Q. N O\V, while the car went ten feet, the train had gone 
approximately seventy-five feet, isn't that true 1 
A. According to the way you dignre it. 
Q. Then, the train was running seYen and a half times as 
fast as the automobile? 1Vouldn 't that follo,v? Doesn't that 
follow? Was the automobile running fast or slow?' 
A. It struck me as running as slo\v as any I ever saw to .be 
hardly moving; it was hardly moYlng. I took particular 
notice of that, realizing the fact that it \Vas likely to be 
struck by the train. 
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W1t\ness stood aside. 
page 134 } F. F. JOHNSON, . 
a witness on behalf of the defendant being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF. 
By Mr. Leake: 
Q. Mr. Johnson, where do you live? 
A. Mineral. 
Q. What is your age? 
A. I will be hventy-one in December. 
Q. Were you in Mineral on the night of the accident at 
the crossing there on April 15th, 1925? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where 'ver~ you at that timet 
A. I was at home in bed at the time of the accident. 
Q. Did you hear of the accident? 
A. Mr. Turner came to my house and called my father and 
that woke me and I got up and ran up to the depot. 
Q. You went up to the depot? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. H·ow soon did you go after he called Y 
A. Just as soon as I could get my clothes on. 
Q. That was after the accident f 
.A. Yes, sir. 
. Q. How soon was that after the accident took 
page 135 ~ place that you got down there, do you know? 
A. No, I don't kno'v exactly. The train had 
left.. I heard him call the flagman ·before I got there; he had 
gone. 
Q. Did you go down to where the wreck was? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did you find ~ 
A. Well, the first thing that I saw was the car, and then 
the next thing I saw was Mr. Meyer. 
Q. Where was the car? 
A. The car was on the left hand side, knocked ·around a 
little bit. · 
Q. Where was 1\'Ir. Meyer in reference to the car? 
A. He was lying about twenty-five feet I ·would say 
(twenty or twenty-five feet) from the car, up the track. 
Q. Did you find anything else there? 
A. Yes, sir. I walked around and a short while afterwards 
(about ten minutes) I found a bottle. 
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Q. What sort of bottle was it? 
A. Coca-cola bottle. 
Q. Did it have anything in it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was it? 
A. Liquor. 
Q. You could tell it 'vas liquor? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 136 ~ Q. How much whiskey was in it 1 Was it 
whiskey¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How much was in it Y 
A. It was a small drink. 
Q. What was the condition of the bottle and where did you 
find it? Tell the jury where you found the bottle. 
A. It was on the side of the railroad going down the rail. 
They put this gravel slanting like that (indicating), and the 
mouth of this bottle had l1een broken off, and it looked like 
it had been rolled in the dirt; . dampness had dampened the 
gravel and it had stuck to the bottle and it had rolled on 
the side of the gravel like that, and the broken part was 
up here like this. In the bottom of this bottle was where 
the liquor was. 
Q. Ho'v far was that bottle from ~ir. ~Ieyer? 
A. About ten feet as near as I ca.n come to it. 
Q. Did you smell the odor of liquor around there~ 
A. No, 1 couldn't smell the odor of liquor much. 
Q. It was liquor in this bottle~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did you do with the bottle? 
A. I threw it over to one side, over on the side of the rail-
road. · 
Q. Did you go close to Mr. Meyer? 
A. Yes, sir . 
. page 137 ~ CROSS" EXAniiNATION. 
By Mr. 1'Iay: 
Q. Was that liquor as near the railroad track as it was 
the automobile? 
A. It was right on the railroad, right near the railroad; 
it was not that far from the rail (indicating about 2 ft.) 
'vhere that slants down. 
Q. Do you know whether it came from the Baker boy or 
from Mrs. Mapes or from 1\IIr. 1\ieyer? 
A. No, I wouldn't say who it came from. 
Q. Did you hear the train when it went by your house? 
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.A. No, sir. 
Q. Your house is right on the track between Mineral and 
Pendleton, isn't it, just a few feet from the track? 
A. It is about five l1undred feet from the track. You were 
up there a short while ago; you know where it is. 
Q. Were you awake at the time the train went by1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You had gone to sleep? 
A. Gone to sleep. I wasn't exactly asleep ; I was kind 
of dozing a little bit. 
Q. Do you remember hearing the train whistle? 
A. I heard him call the flagman. That is the only thing 
I recollect. I don't kno'v 'vhy I took notice of it, 
page 138 } but I just heard him call the flagman, just ''Toot, -
Toot'' · 
Q. That is all you heard from Pendleton to Mineral? 
A. That is all I heard. I was asleep, kind of dozing off. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 139 } DR. I-I. W. PORTER, 
a withess on behalf of the defendant, being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF. 
By 1\:fr. Leake: 
Q. Doctor, what is your business? 
A. I am a practicing physician, sir. 
Q. Are you physician for the C. & 0. Railway at Louisa 7 
A. I am local surgeon. 
Q. You are also engaged in private practice? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you called to see Linwood Baker and others for · 
an accident that occurred at Mineral on April 15th, 1925' 
A. Yes, sir, I was called that night. 
Q. Where were you? 
A. I was at Louisa at the time and was notified of the 
accident and went down to the train and got on board the 
train. 
Q. You got on the train at Louisa ? 
A. Yes, sir, and accompanied the injured to the Charlottes-
ville hospital. 
Q. Was Linwod Baker on there~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
126 In the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.. ·. 
Q. Did Linwood Baker make any statement to 
page 140 } you either at Charlottesville or on the train as 
to how the accident happened! 
A. Yes, sir. After I had seen Mrs. ~Iapes and the other 
injured person, I 'vas told tha.t there was a boy in the rear 
of one of the Pullmans that had been injured. I went back 
to see him and found him asleep (the berth was made up),. 
resting very comfortably, so I woke him, and while I was 
examining him and dressing his wounds, which were not 
serious, I naturally asked him something about the accident,. 
and he told me that he was in the automobile with Mrs. 
Mapes and l\{r. Meyer, was sitting on the front ·seat; they 
were running~ pr.etty rapid rate of speed; as they approached 
· the tracks at Mineral he saw the train coming,. and he said he 
holloed, "Look out!" and grabbed. the emergency brake with 
both hands and applied it 'vith all his strength; just about 
that time the engine struck the autom<Jbile and he didn't re-
member anything more. · 
Q. Did he make that statement anY'vhere else? 
A. ·Yes, sir, substantially that. He returned from the hos-
pitat in about four or five days and I took him .in charge 
again and dressed his injuries, and he r~peated the same state-
ment. 
Q. Where was he? 
A. He was at the home of Mr. l\{apes just ·a mile east of 
Louisa. . 
Q. That was after he returned from the hospital 1 
A. Yes, sir, after he returned from the hospital. 
page 141} CROSS EXAMINATION. 
B.y Mr. Sinnott : 
Q. Did you ever reduce that statement to writing that he 
made you? . 
A. Only in part in my report to the company. 
Q. When did you do that? 
A. That was the next day or a day or two after,vards. 
Q. You say he made that statement to you on his. way to 
Charlottesville T . 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And then later he made it to you: again? 
A. Yes, sir, he repeated that or substantially that. 
Q. What was the occasion of his repeating it~ 
A. Like most boys he was very talkative at first about it. 
Q. ·You asked him about it Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
._ I 
I 
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Q. Did you ask him about it the second time! 
A. I recall asking him why didn't he have time to jump. 
He said no, the car was running !30 fast he didn't;. he saw 
the train coming, just holloed, ''.Look out 1'' and grabbed the 
brake. 
Q. The car was running so fast he didn't have time to 
jump? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was the condition of the boy when you saw him 
on the train going to Charlottesville 7 
"· page 142 ~ A. He was asleep when I first sa'v him. 
Q. When you waked him up was he suffering 
with injuries~ . · 
A. No, he didn't seem to be suffering any. He had a 
painful cut or bruise on his left arm, not a very severe one. 
While dressing him I talked with him. 
Q. You got all the information you could out of him 7 
A. Yes, sir, I asked him about it. I hadn't heard anything 
about the accident at all. 
Q. When did you say you reduced this to writing? 
A. That was a day or two after the accident, possibly the 
next day or the day afterwards. 
Q. That is your recollection of what occurred? 
A. That is my recollection. 
Q. Of 'vhat he told you 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You then took the boy in charge ~ 
A. Yes, sir, after he returned to Louisa I dressed the 
arm. 
Q. About how many times did you see him after that? 
A. I don't recall exactly. Some several times-as long 
as necessary-possibly four or five. · 
Q. Why were you reporting to the railroad company on 
a private patient or in reference to a private 
page 143 } patient? 
A. I made those reported, before the boy re-
turned to Louisa, as surgeon of the company; we are re-
quired to do that. 
Q. Yon saw him on behalf of the railroad company when 
you took him over there, did you? 
A. Yes, sir. I was notified by the agent at Louisa of 
some accident. I responded to the call as qutck as possible. 
Q. "\Vhile acting as surgeon of the railroad company did 
you get a statement from him? 
A. I got the state:rnent that night going to Charlottesville. 
-----------:--- ------------------------
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Witness stood aside. 
page 144 ~ D. R. LUCI{, 
a witnes on behalf of the defendant, being first 
duly sw<;>rn, testified as follows: 
EXAl\1INATION IN CHIEF. 
.By lVIr. Leake: 
Q. Mr. Luck, where.do you livef 
A. 1'Iineral. 
Q. What is your business? 
A. Run a car for hire. 
Q. Were you at Mineral on the night of the 15th of April, 
1925, at the time of this accident at this crossing? 
'A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where were you f 
A. I was in Mr. Noell's store. 
Q. Was that on the north side of the track or south side T 
A. It is on the north the way you all call it here. 
Q. Considering Richmond east and Charlottesville west, 
it was on the north ~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you go down to the accident? 
A. After it happened, yes, sir. 
Q. What did you find there? 
A. V\Then I got down there the car 'vas stand-
page 145 ~ ing kind of fac.lng me a little cross,vays like that~ 
(Indicating.) I went down and it was a lady lying 
out on the side-1\frs. ·l\1apes. I saw a bunch of people up 
beside the train, walked up there and found l\1r. l\ieyer was 
killed. 
Q. Did you detect the odor of whiskey there f 
A. Well, I smelt something around there smelt like 'vhiskey~ 
I didn't see any whiskey; I don't kno·w where it was. 
Q. Did you hear the train blow for the crossing~ 
A. Yes, sir, I heard it blow several times; I don't know 
whether blowing for the crossing or what for, but I heard 
it blow. several times. 
Q. You knew 1\i"rs. ~!apes, did you Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you ever see her at l\IIiueral f 
A. Often. 
Q. Often? 







C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Helen :hJiay Meyer, Adm'x., etc. 129 
Q. Did she live in that neighborhood or had she lived in 
that neighborhood? 
A. She lived between Mineral and Louisa, which is about 
four miles; she lived up there at the time of the accident. 
She had lived at Pendleton I think, about a mile this side of 
}Iineral. 
page 146 ~ Q. Do you know 'vhethP-r Mrs. Mapes had any 
child in school there or not 01 
A. Yes, sir. I don't know how long but maybe two or 
three years she used to bring her daughter there to school. 
\ Q. At Mineral? 
A. Yes, sir. She had to cross the track to get to school. 
Q. Would have to cross the railroad track to get to school? 
A. Yes, sir. She brought her down in the morning and 
came back for her in the afternoon. 
CROSS" EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. May: 
Q. You are brother-in-law to 1\tir. Roberts, the fireman on 
the engine? 
A. We married sisters. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 147} JAliES C. PAYNE, . 
a witness on behalf of the defendant, being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows: 
EXA~fiNA.TION IN CI-IIEF. 
By Mr. Leake: 
Q. Mr. Payne, where do you live? 
A. I live at Pendleton now. 
Q. What is your business? 
A. Fireman. 
·Q. Fireman for whom? 
A. For Walton's planing mill. 
Q. He runs a planing mill at" Pendleton? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You are not employed by the C. & 0. Railway? 
. A. No, sir. 
Q. N o,v, Mr. Payne, where 'vere you on the night of the 
15th of April, 1925, at the time that this accident happened 
-at :Mineral? · 
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A. I was right approaching close behind the car that Mrs. 
Mapes was driving. · 
Q. What were you doing? Where 'vere you~ 
.A. I was coming up from towards Pendleton. 
Q. Were you walking? 
.A. In an automobile. 
Q. You were behind the car run by J\1:rs. ~£apes? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 148 ~ Q. Tell the jury in your own way what you 
saw? 
.A. I saw the car moving towards the railroad track. I / 
didn't· see it when the train struck it. I pulled over and 
stopped my machine, and I heard the grinding of the brakes. 
Q. You were coming from Pendleton towards Mineral f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Coming up the ~Jefferson Highway f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see Mrs. Mapes when she turned off the high-
way1 
A. No, sir, I never noticed her. 
Q. When did you notice that car? 
A. After I turned the corner going towards the railroad. 
Q. Did the car stop before it got to the track Y 
A. The car was moving when I saw it, and didn't stop 
any after I saw it. . 
Q. Here is a map that has been introduced. (Indicating.) 
This is the south side of the railroad, and this is the north 
side. This is the highway along here, and this is. First street 
going up to the depot. You were coming along here. When 
you turned in on this street yon saw this lady. About where 
'vas she when you saw her ? . 
A. About twenty-five or thirty feet of the crossing 'vhen 
I saw the car. It might have been a little further. 
Q. Where were you? 
page 149 ~ A. I turned this corner here and got straight 
and my lights 'vere shining across the track. 
Q. Yon turned to go up First street, too? 
A. To cross the railroad to go home. 
Q. Where was your home? 
A. I lived on the road right straight across the railroad 
track. . 
Q. You stopped f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. VVliere did you stopf 
A. I stopped between the north corner of the ha;rdwarP 
store and the railroad. 
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Q. Did you hear the train 7 
A_. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you hear any whistle blown! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What whistle blew? 
A. Heard the station whistle, one long blast. 
Q. Did it blow for the crossing? 
A. Yes, sir, blew for the crossing, t'vo long and two short 
whistles-blew for the crossing and depot. 
Q. Blew for that crossing two longs and two shorts and 
then blew for the depot f 
page 150 } A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you heard all those t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Yon were behind the car! 
A .. Yes, sir. · 
Q. ·Where were you 'vhen you first heard this train blow 
for the station? 
A. On the highway. 
Q. Where were you when it blew for the first crossing? 
A. Still on the highway. 
Q. 'Vhere were you when it blew for the second crossing? 
A. About making the bu~1 at the hard,vare when he com-
menced his whistle, two longs and two shorts. 
Q. Was the bell being rung? 
A. I never noticed whether the b.ell was ringing or not. 
Q. Could you hear the train coming? 
A. Yes, sir. 
'Q. If the occupants of that car had looked and listened 
could they have seen the train in time to have st.opped? 
Mr. May: I object. 
The Court: What is your. objection, Mr. 1\Iay~ 
1\Ir. May: I don't see how he can speak for the other 
parties. It is merely a conclusion that he is reaching from 
his own opinion of it. · 
The Court: He has located the other parties 
page 151 } and the position they 'vere. in and the train at 
the time, hasn't he? 
1fr. M~y: But he wasn't a.t the position of the other 
car. It may have been probably there was a passage be-
tween the houses where he could hear the engine and ~ear 
the bell. He wasn't at the same position that this operator 
of the Mapes car was in. 
The Court: Have you ever put yourself at the point that 
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the Mapes ·car was in to see whether you could see-the~_train 
thenf 
Witness-: .I don ''t -know as I ever put myself in the sam~ 
p_osition, but, I noticed you can see the train a good wavs 
down the track. · , - . 
The Court: Objection is sustained.· 
By Mr. Leake: _ 
Q. How far could you see the train down the track? 
Mr. May: Could he see? 
Mr. Leake: How far could any one see it the night of 
this accident. 
Witness: In a safe placeY 
Witness : In a safe place 1 
1\fr. Leake : Yes, sir. 
A. About 300 yards. 
page 152 ~ By Mr. Le~l\e: 
Q. Do you know how fast Mrs. !{apes was 
goingY 
A. No, sir. The car was moving slow. 
Q. Do you know 'vhat was the speed of the train? 
A. No, I do not. The train was moving along slow, seemed 
to be well under control. 
Q. Was there a headlight on the- engine Y 
· A." "t_es, sir. , . 
Q. Di.d the train stop quickly or not after the accident 1 
A. The train stopped quickly as I call it, about a train 
Iengtli. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. May: 
Q. You said yon didn't recall hearing the bell ring? 
-A. No, sir. 
Q. W onld you say the car was running as· much as fifteen 
miles an hour? Of course, we kno'v that is mostly an ap-
proximation on-your part. · ·. -
Witness:-- The automobile. 
!Ir. May: Yes, sir. 
. . 
A. I couldn ~t say. I don't think it was .. · 
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_ Q.- Would you say the train 'vas· running tha.t. 
page 153 ~ fast, Mr. Payne? 
·'. A. I reckon maybe the train was running may-
be fourteen or fifteen miles. 
Q. Wasn't it just as apt to be running sixteen~ 
A. Fourteen or fifteen. 
Q. Do you think it was just as apt to be running sixteen as 
fourteen or fifteen? · · 
A. No, sir. 1 
Q. You can't conceive of bringing that train through ~Iin­
eral at a great rate of speed than fifteen miles an hour, can 
you? · 
· A. I don't know. 1 .. I don't think it was making over fifteen 
that night-fourteen or fifteen. 
Q. You didn't see this wreck? 
A. I dicln 't see the train when it hit the car. 
Q. You told Mr. Leake that a person could see the train 
for three hundred yards. Where did you mean the party 
would have to stand to be in a car in order to see down the 
track three hundred yards? 
· A. Some six or eight feet from the siding. 
Q. Before you got six or eight feet you couldn't see that 
far, could you~ 
A. No, sir, couldn't see quite that far . 
.. Q. The closed you got to the track the more you could see 
to the east? · 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 154 ~ Q. As you approached that track until you got 
about six feet of it, as a matter. of fact you · 
couldn't see through there at all, could you f · 
A. Yes, sir, you can see do"rn there before you get in six 
or eight feet. · 
Q. How near the south rail of the siding do you think you 
'vould have to get before you can see down the track, say, 
three hundred yards? 
A. To see down there three hundred yards you would 
have to g-et six or eight feet of the siding to see three hun-
dred yards. · · 
Q. Ho"r far is the section house from the siding? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Isn't it a fact, J\.Ir. Payne, that you have to get even 
with the corner of this house (indicating) before you can 
see down there to the east t Do you recall this house here·! 
A. Yes, sir. That is the section house. 
Q. It is a fact, isn't it, that you- have to get up to the cor_. 
ner of that before you have any view at all? 
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A. The corner of that comes out here, you see (indicating) 
a right good ways. from the siding. 
A. I don't dispute tha.t. (six or eight feet) but you have 
to get there before you can view down f}?.e track. 
A. Yon have to get past the house. 
Q. In other words, when you are between here . 
page 155 ~ on the Jefferson Highway, there is no place where 
you could view through there to the train f 
A. I haven't noticed. 
Q. You wouldn't deny that, would you~ 
A. I haven't noti~ed it. Q. As a matter of fact, you have to come out further than 
the edge of the house here to see down the track any further 
than this water tank, don't you Y That obscures the vision 
and comes out further than the tool house¥ 
A. By the main line being over this far you can see three 
hundred yards all right, I am pretty sure. 
Q. ·You would have to come out further than the edge of this 
house in order to see by that water tank, don't you f 
A. No, sir, I don't think so. 
Q. As a matter of fact, you can't say whether Mrs. Mapes 
stopped her car or whether she merely reduced her speed 
between the Jefferson Highway and the railroad tracks 1 
A. No, sir, I couldn't say whether she stopped or not. The 
car was moving when I sa'v it .. 
Q. In fact, she had gotten nearly to the side track when 
you came around the curve f 
A. When my light flashed on her car she was ·within twenty 
or thirty feet. 
page 156 ~ Q. That is just when you turned the corner! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So, if she stopped further than twenty-five feet from 
the rail, you wouldn't have ln1own it, would you~ 
A. ·No, sir. 
Q. But you do kno'v that her car was running very slowlyf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the train was runniJlg faster than her carY 
A. I don't think so.· 
Q. Didn't you state the train went a little faster than 
the carY 
A. No, sir. The train maybe was making fourteen or fifteen 
miles an hour. . 
Q. You didn't think the car was going that fast, did you Y 
A. The car might have been making that or might not; I 
wouldn't sav. I was behind the car and it was hard for me 
to t~ll how ":fast it was going. 
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RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Leake: 
Q. I understand you to state six or eight feet from this 
side track this way, south, you could see the train three or 
four hundred yards? 
page 157 ~ A. Yes, sir, about three hundred yards. 
Q. You stopped your car on account of hear-
ing the train coming? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Stopped your car right there? (Indicating.) 
A. Between the hardware and the railroad. 
Witness stood aside. 
Note: It is admitted that the train in question consisted 
of six cars and engine and tender, each of the cars having 
a length of seventy-one feet, and the engine and tender hav-
ing a length of sixty feet. 
page 158 ~ W. A. GEISENDORFFER, 
. a witness on behalf of the defendant, being re-
called for further cross examination, testified as follows: 
CROSS EXAMINATION (Continued). 
By Mr. Sinnott: 
Q. What kind of engine was this you ~ere driving that 
night? 
Witness: What do you mean Y 
l1:r .. Sinnott: "That size? 
A. F-15 engine, three drivers on a side. 
Q. I!ow long had you operated that engine~ 
A. About five years. · 
Q. About how far was it from the corporate limits down 
to this place where this accident happened¥ 
A. I don't exactly understand what yol.t are trying to get 
at. I told you all I kno'v about it. 
Q. You know w·here the corporate limits are, don~t you? 
A. No, sir. Somewhere down there about the mill. 
Q. I-I ow do you know when to reduce your speed? 
A. Through the yard limits. 
Q. You don't do it at the corporate limits Y 
· A. I started where I always start. 
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Q. You don't know where the corporate limits are, do you Y 
A. I never saw the board. 
Mr. Leake: We object to this. 
The Court: He can show by this witness he 
page 159 ~ didn't know where the corporate limits were when 
he said he had to blow for it. Objection over-
ruled. 
By Mr. Sinnott: 
Q. You say you don't know where the corporate limits 
~ .,. 
are. 
A. I suppo~e theY.. have got boards up in the city limits. 
I reckon tha.t is what they go by. That is what we run by. 
Q. They have boards up there for both? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How far is that from the place where the accident oc-
curred? 
A. I don't kno,v. 
Q. About how far? 
A. I can't say because I don't like to guess. 
Q. Do you think it is half a mile¥ 
A. Something like that. 
Q. About half a mile~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I believe you stated on the stand this morning that you 
could stop an engine in the distance of what? What was 
the distance you could stop in going at fifteen miles an hour? 
Mr. Leake: We object. 
The Court: He has been over that. 
page 160 ~ By Mr. May: 
Q. This description you gave of that engine, 
will that fully describe the engine to another engineer! 
A. Sure. · 
Q. F-15 and three drivers on a side? 
A. Yes, sir. /"-
Witness stood aside. . _ 
Defendant rests. 
page 161 ~ M. D. ANDERSON, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, in rebuttal, 
being ~rst d~ly sworn, testified as follows: 
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EXA1viiNATION IN CHIEF. 
By J\iir. Sinnott: 
Q. l\1r. Anderson, in what business are you engaged? 
A. I am membership secretary of the Railroad Y. M. C. 
A. and mechanical air brake instructor. 
Q. Are you familiar with the brakes on engines and loco-
motives generally? 
A. I am familiar with installing them .. 
Q. Are you enough familiar to know anything about opera-
tion? 
A. I know how they operate. 
Q. How long have you been engaged in that business? 
A. I' have been following air brake work for a.bour ever 
since 1889. 
Q. 1890? 
A. That will be all right, yes, sir. 
Q. Now, taking an engine known as F-15 with three drives 
on the side and going on a practically level track with a 
slight dip in it, with six coaches on it, 'vithin what distance 
could an engineer stop with the emergency, going at the rate 
of thirteen to fifteen miles an hour ~ 
page 162 ~ Mr. Spicer: I don't know whether the witness 
has qualified himself and I don't think he has 
qualified him by the question. He has not showp. any ex-
perience in operating trains or engines. 
The Court: I think you are right about that, Mr. Spicer, 
He is shown to be au expert in construction, but not in 
operation. 
By 1\{r. Sinnott : · 
Q. Are you familiar with the working of brakes on engines Y 
A. Yes, sir. · 
By the Court : 
Q. Are you familiar with the type of train, with six 
coaches-
A. I will tell you right straight up and down. A gentle-
man was over to my house to-day at one o'clock (I don't 
know. who he was) and asked me the question-
The Court: Just answer the question. 
The Witness: It is impossible for me to tell you how quick 
a ·train ought to be stopped, 
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By Mr. Sinnott: 
Q. Do you instruct firemen and engineers in the work-
ings of these brakes? 
A~ I told you that I was mechanical air brake instructor. 
· Mechanical air brake instructor is not an instruc-
page 163 ~ tor in handling a train. I don't know anything 
about the distance a train ought to be stopped, 
because it is impossible for me to tell you; I don't lmow. 
Q. Do you know in what distance these brakes that you 
give instructions on will stop a train 1 · 
The Court: The witness said he didn't know. 
A. I told you I don't know. I can't testify if that train 
. would run a mile or ten miles or ten feet. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 164 ~ MISS 1\'fARY CHAPLIN, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being re-
called in rebuttal, further testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION IN CIDEF. 
By Mr. May: 
Q. Did_you have occasion to have the head of Mrs. Mapes 
in your lap·Y 
A. I held her head. I 'vas stooping on the ground. 
Q. That was as soon as the collision took place? 
A. As soon as I got to her. 
Q. Did you smell any odor of liquor upon Mrs. Mapes Y 
A. No. 
Q. Did you have occasion to examine Mr. Meyer Y 
A. No.· 
Witness stood aside. 
page 165 ~ C. A. JOHNSON, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being re-
called in rebuttal, further testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF. 
By Mr. ~Iay: 
Q. I believe you stated you were the second one to reac'~ 
the scene of the accident Y 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you have occasion to get close to ~Ir. ~Ieyer? 
A. I didn't have any occasion. to get close to him but I 
did get close to him. 
Q. How close did you get to him? 
A. Well, something .like I was standing up here and his 
body was lying down there. (Indicating.) 
Q. Did you ·smell any liquor on him~ 
A. No, sir. . 
Q. Did you hear any one make any comnient apout liquor 
being on him 1 · 
A. No, sir. 
Witness stood aside. 
Note: At 5:15 P. l\L court adjourned until to-morrow, 
S'ept. 24th, 1926, at 10 A. M. 
page 166 ~ SECOND DAY. 
September 24th, 1926. 
T. J. FAGAN, 
.a witness on behalf of the plaintiff in rebuttal, being :first 
duly sworn, testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF. 
By ~Ir. Sinnott: 
Q. You are Mr. Tom Fagan? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where do you live~ 
A. 2;917 E. Broad. . 
Q·. In what business are you now engaged? 
A. Policeman, Richmond Police Department 
Q. City police? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I will ask you if you have ever operated locomotives, 
and, if so, for ·how long a period of time? 
A. Nine years for the Atlantic Coast Line 7 
Q. Are you familiar with the operation of various types 
of locomotives? 
A. I was. 
Q. Are you no'v familiar with them? 
A. I haven't been on one for quite a while. 
page 167 ~ Q. When you operated them were you familiar 
with them? 
--- -~-~~~-~--------
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Fagan, ·I will ask you-
1\{r. Leake: Ask him when he last operated one. When 
did .you last operate an engine 1 
Witness: Around about 1914. 
By the Court : 
Q. Are you familiar 'vith engine, type F-15, three drives 
on a side? Was that the style or type of engine used when 
you were operating f 
A. Well, Judge, they changed the different class, or types, 
of engines as far as names was concerned. They were im-
proving the whole time I was on the road; they improved 
from time to time, you see, and just' what improvements they 
made in ten years that I am not able to say because I haven't 
been on them since that time, but I am familiar with the 
operation of engines with the conditions engines 'vere in at 
the time I was operating them. 
Q. In 1914? 
A. Yes, sir, up to 1914. 
Q. Are you able to say whether you are familiar with the 
operation of engine, tyiJe F-15, three drives on a side, in 
1925? 
page 168 ~ .A.. Well, that depends altogether, Judge, on 
the improvements that have been made on· them. 
I understand there have been quite a few made. If the old 
equipment still stands, I am familiar with them, but, if new 
equipment has been put on from time to time, I wouldn't 
be so very familiar with that. 
By Mr. Sinnott: 
Q. Are you generally familiar with the operation of en-
gines? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. ::May: Wouldn't it be part of the rebuttal testimony 
of the defendant to show that there have been changes since 
1914? 
The Court: This witness has said that; he said there 
have been anumber of appliances put on. Unless he has 
operated under those appliances, it seems to the court the 
testimony is not admissible. 
Mr. Sinnott: He qualified himself as being familiar with 
the general operation of locomotives. 
The Court: In 1914. 
Mr. Sinnott: lie is familiar generally with the operation 
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of locomotives. He mi~ht be an electrical engineer and 
qualify as an expert and not follow his calling for fifteen 
years, but still he is qualified. 
· . The Court: He says numerous appliances have 
· page 169 ~ been put on. If you want to ask the witness any 
further questions as to his qualifications as an ex-
pert, but so far t11e court thinks he is not qualified. 
By ~Ir. Sinnott: 
Q. Do you lmow of any appliances that have been put on 
engines since 1914 that would refer to the length of time 
to stop an engine then or did when you last operated one 1 
A. No, sir. 
By the Oourt: 
Q. Can you say that there have been any or haven't been 
any? 
A. Haven't been any to my knowledge. 
Q. I-Iave you kept posted on that? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You haven't kept posted f 
A. No, sir. 
1\:lr. Sinnott: If he can testify as to how an engine could 
he stopped then, and, if there have been other appliances 
added since that time which would change the situation, that 
would be competent evidence on behalf of the defendant 
anct 'voulcln 't prevent this man testifying as to 
page 170 ~ the distance 'vithin which an engine ~ould be 
stopped. 
lVIr. Leake: He is speaking of engines in 1914. 
The Court: If the witness were posted as to what the 
appliances have 'been, it might be different. 
Mr. Sinnott: He says he doesn't know that any have been 
made. 
The Court: I-Iis testimony is negative; he doesn't know. 
:Mr. Sinnott: If the' defendant should show by evidence 
that there have been other appliances which have changed 
the situation, that would be taken into consideration in weigh-
ing his testimony, but certainly the fact that he has not kept 
posted on those appliances would not prevent his testifying 
as to 'vithin what distance an engine could be stopped ac-
cording· to his opinion. . J: The Court: You introduce an expert and the burden is 
~upon you to show his qualifications. 
-------------
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Witness stood aside. 
page 171 ~ PAUL COPLEY, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, in rebuttal, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF. 
By Mr. Sinnott: 
Q. Air. Copley, in what business are you engaged f 
A. I am engineer. 
- Q. Locomotive engineer¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What railroad¥ 
A. R. F. & P. 
Q. Now engaged in operating locomotives f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you been so engaged Y 
A. I have been promoted nine years, been on the road 
fifteen. 
Q~ Are you familiar with the operation of locomotives 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I will ask you, Mr. Copley, this: Traveling on a track 
where there is no grade but a slight dip, a loepmotive pulling 
a train of six coaches-
Mr. Spicer: I don't want to interrupt counsel's question, 
but I don't think he has laid the foundation yet to qu~lify 
the witness for the question he is seeking to ask him. I 
should think he should bring out whether or not 
page 172 ~ the witness has had particular experience with 
the type of engines, in the kind of service, yard 
service, freight service or pa~senger service. 
By the Court : 
Q. What kind of engines have you been driving? 
A. I have been driving the Pacific type, three drivers. 
Q. Type F-15Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Drive on a passenger train Y 
A. I never had a regular passenger job. I did a little 
extra passenger work. I never stood for a passenger job. 
Q. Done some passenger work? 
A. ·Yes, sir, very little. 
Q. What is your usual work? What is the nature of the 
usual train yoi:t drive on Y / 
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A. I have been working extra ever since I have been pro-
moted. I did have a freight job about two months this year, 
but they cut that off. I am on the extra list now. 
By Mr. Sinnott: 
. Q. You have operated a passenger train with that type of 
engine? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 173 ~ By the Court : 
Q. Operate them enough to acquaint you with 
the stopping of trains' 
A. Yes, sir. 
·By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. In the time that you have been engineer have you been 
principally engaged in yard service or what! · 
A. I have been in yard service and been firing a passenger 
train and been running freight, hostling and most everything 
that came to hand. 
Q. What have you been doing most of that time' You 
said you had been engineer nine years. 
A. I have been running extra run freight train and yards. 
Q. Mostly freight and yard? · 
A. ·Yes, sir. 
Q. Mostly in yard service 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. About what proportion of your time would be taken up 
with yard service? 
A. About six months in the year I am on the yard. In 
the extra list you get yard work and road work, too. 
Q. Fire a passenger train any' 
A. Running. 
page 17 4 ~ Q. How many passenger runs have you made 7 
A. I never made any only emergency runs on 
passenger train. The only _passengel train I ever ran was 
from Potomac Yards to Washington. I caught that on an 
emergency trip. 
Q. How far is that? 
A. About eight miles. 
Q. That is tbe only time you have run a passenger train? 
A. Yes, sir. I .have handled a passenger train around the 
station in making up passenger trains, around Broad street 
s~ation up here. 
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The Court: I am going to admit the testimony. The de-
gree of expertness is a question that the jury may decide; 
they may weigh his testimony. 
~Ir. Spicer: We just note an exception. 
By Mr. Sinnott: .... 
Q. I believe you stated you are familiar with the F-15 
three drive engine. I will ask you, on a track where there 
is no grade but a slight dip, an engine of that type pulling 
six passenger coaches and traveling at the rate of speed of 
15 miles an hour, in what distance could it be stopped? 
Mr. Leake: We object to the question as not containing 
all the facts of the case. 
The Court: What facts has he omitted? 
Mr. Leake: It doesn't give the location of the 
page 175 ~ curve or indicate the amount of pressure on. 
Q. (Continued) With ninety pounds of air, within what dis-
tance could it be stopped V 
]rfr. Leake: We save the point. 
A. Should stop in about a car and a half length. 
Q. Would it have any difficulty in doing that going at the 
rate of fifteen miles an hour? 
A. No, sir, I don't think it would. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. You say you operated a passenger train once~ 
A. From Potomac Yard. to Washington. 
Q. Eight miles? o 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ·You base your opinion upon the result of that trip? 
A. Yes, ~ir. 
By the Court: 
Q. I would like to ask you this, if you ever -fired on a pas-
senger train? 
A. I fired a passenger engine for ten years regularly. 
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page 176 ~ RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Sinnott: 
Q. In your experience as fireman did you .learn a good 
deal about stopping locomotives t 
A. Yes, sir. We made some mighty good stops while 
I was firing. 
Q. Did you have experience then in stopping engines? 
A. Well~ not on the main road. I never had any experience 
stopping 'vhen I was firing. 
Q. You 'vere on there when the engine would be stopped¥ 
A. Yes, sir, when they would be stopped. 
(, 
1\Ir. Spicer: We move to exclude the testimony o:f the 
witness on the ground that he is not properly qualified. 
, The Court: The motion is overruled and exception noted. 
lv[r. Spicer: We would like to note an additional ground 
for the motion to exclude the evidence; that is, as to the 
conditions and the circumstances at the time of the accident. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 176Y2 ~ G~ N. LAWSON, 
a witness on behalf of the defendant, in sur-
rebuttal, being first duly sworn, testified as follo,vs: 
EXA:NIINATION IN CHIEF. 
By Mr. Spicer : 
Q. Mr. Lawson, what is your business? 
A. Road Foreman of Engines, C. & 0. Railway. 
·Q. Are you an engineet? 
A. Yes, sir .. 
Q. Ho'v long have you been a locomotive engineer? 
A. Since 1911. 
Q. Have you ever operated a passenger train T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long did you operate passenger trains~ 
A. Well, ever since 1918, off and on, never was regularly 
assigned to a passenger train. 
Q. Have you had occasion to make frequent trips over 
the main line of the C. & 0. Railway¥· 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What are yout duties now as Road Foreman of Engines Y 
A. Supervising the work of engi.neers and firemen and in-
. structing -them in their duties. 
/~ 
l 
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page 177 ~ Q. Do you consider yourself capable of judging 
the distance within which engines might be 
stopped under given conditions t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Lawson, in case of an engine pu1ling a passenger 
train of sic cars, on a particularly level grade, engine type · 
F-15 with three drivers, going at the rate of speed of fifteen 
miles an hour, having reduced air pressure from 110 to 90 
pounds, within what distance would you say that engine 
· could be stopped? · 
( Mr. May: Just a minute. This evidence was put in on 
direct testimony by the railroad and they have gone and 
put it on now as rebuttal evidence. 
The Court: What have you to say 1:1bout that? Why 
didn't you put this on before Y 
Mr. Spicer: There was no occasion for it. No expert 
evidence has been introduced on this point at all. 
The Court : Yon asked your engineer. 
Mr. Spicer: We asked him the time within which he stopped 
and if that was reasonable. 
The Court : I don't think yoU: can go into this testimony 
now. Objection is sustained. 
Mr. Leake: You will not let us go into that for the pur-
pose of contradicting 7 We would like to have the jury ex-
cused so as to show what his answer would be. 
page 178 ~ Note : The jury were sent from the court room 
and the question was repeated to the witness. 
A. Well, I would say in the neighborhood of four or five 
hundred feet. · 
By Mr. Leake: 
Q. That would be more than a car length and a half? 
What is the length of a car? 
A. A car is about eighty feet, or eighty-four feet. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 179 ~ J. W. CLOWES, 
.a witness. on behalf of the defendant, in sur-
rebuttal, being first duly sworn, testified (without the pres-
ence of the· jury) as follows: 
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EXA.MINATION IN CHIEF. 
By }.fr. Spicer: 
Q. Mr. Clowes, what is your occupation 1 
A. I am a locomotive engineer on the C. & 0. Railway. 
Q. Ho\v long have you been a locomotive engineer? 
A. Forty years. 
Q. IIave you been engaged in passenger service? 
A. About eight years. 
Q. Operate a passenger engine for that length of time? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Recently? 
A. Yes, sir, at the present time. 
Q. Do you consider yourself capable of judging the dis-
tance within which a passenger engine of type F-15, with 
three drivers on eaeh side, is capable of being stopped under 
different conditions~ 
A. I think so, sir. 
page 180 ~ Q. In case of a locomotive of that type, pulling 
a train of six passenger coaches, at a rate of speed 
of fifteen miles an hour, on a practically level grade, having 
reduced the air pressure from 110 to 90 pounds, within what 
distance would you asy that engine could be stopped? 
A. I \Vonld say approximately between 400 and 450 feet, 
something in that neighborhood. 
'Vitness stood aside. 
( Note: Plaintiff, by counsel, objected to tl1e foregoing tes-
-.;' timony of the witness, ,J, 1V. Clowes, going to the jury, which 
) objection the court sustained, to which ruling of the court l defendant, hy counsel, excepted. 
Testimony closed. 
page 181 ~ And this being all the evidence- in the case, 
t11e jury, having been instructed by the Court and 
haYing heard the argun1ents of counsel, retired to consider 
of their verdict, and later returned into the Court with the 
verdict wl1ich is set out in the orders of Court herein. 
And thereupon the defendant, by counsel, moved the Court 
. //to set aside the verdict of the jury and to enter up judgment 
v for the defendant or in the alternative to award the defen- · 
dant a ne\\r trial upon the following grounds: 
1. \T erdict contrary to the law and the evidence and 'Vitb-
out evidence to support it. 
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2. Errors of the Court in the admission and rejection of evi-
dence as heretofore pointed out. 
3. Errors of the Court in the giving certain instructions for 
the plaintiff and in refusing certain: instructions offered by 
the defendant, as heretofore pointe_cl out. 
4. Errors of' the Court in amending on its own motion and 
g-iving certain instructions offered by the plaintiff. 
5. Errors of the Court in giving any instructions au-
thorizing a recovery by the plaintiff. 
6. Plaintiff in anv event is limited in its recovery to the 
amount. for which i't became liable to pay under the award 
uf the Industrial Commission of Virginia. 
7. The damages aw·arded by the jury are excessive. 
But the Court overruled said motion and entered up 5ndg-
ment for the plaintiff on the verdict of the jury, to which 
ruling and action of the Court in overruling the motion to 
set aside the verdict of the .fu,rty and to enter up judgment 
for the defendant or to award it a 11ew trial, anrl its action 
in entering up judgment for the plaintiff on the verdict of 
lhe jury. the defendant, by counsel, excepted upon the grounds 
set forth above, and tenders this its Bill of Exceptions No. 
1, and prays that the same may be signed, sealed 
page 182 ~ and made a part of the record in this case, whi(·h 
is accordingly done on this 12th dav of J annary, 
1927. within the time prescribed by law and alter· dne and 
reasonable notice in writing to counsel for t11e plaintiff~ as 
required· by law. 
FRANK T. S'UTTON, JR., Judge, (Seal) 
page 183 ~ Virginia: 
In the Law & Equity Court of the City of R.ichm_ond, Part 
II. 
Helen l\fay Meyer, Administratrix of George Edg·ar 1\f.cyer, 
deceased, 
v. 
-The Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company. 
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DEFENDANT'S BILL OF EXCEPTIQ}.fS NO.2. 
BE IT R.Ji~lviE1IBERED that on tlwtrial of this case and ; . 
~fter the jury had been selected and S\Vorn and after all the 
·evidence l1ad been introduced before the jury, which evi-
dence is set out in Defendant's Bill of Exceptions No. 1, the 
plaintiff offered tl1e following instructions, numbered 1, 2, 
2-A, 3, 4 and 7: 
PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1. 
The Court instructs the jury that if you 'bcli.t.::ve fron1 a 
·preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was ~.ruilty 
·of negligence charged in the Notice of l\1otion for J udg-
ment, and such negligence was the proximate cause of the 
·injuries and death of George Edgar Meyer, you shall find 
for the plaintiff, unless you further believe that the said 
George Edgar Ivieyer \vas guilty of contributory negligence~ 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2. 
The Court instructs the jury that if the defendant relies 
on the contributory negligence as a defense to this action, 
that the burden of proof of contributory negligence on the 
part of l\leyer is upon the defendant to prove such contribu-
tory negligence by the preponderance of the evi-
page 184 ~ deuce, unless such contributory negligence ap-
pears from the plaintiff's evidence or may be 
fairly inferred from all the circumstances shown in evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2-A. 
'rhe Court instructs the jury that even if you believe from 
the evidence that the driver of the car was guilty of negli-
gence, but which was not the proximate and immediate cause 
of the accident, that such negligence is not charg-eable to 
ltieyer. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3. 
The Court instructs tho jury that if you believe from a 
preponderance of the evidence, the death of George Edgar 
lfeyer ·was caused by the concurrent negligence of both t~1e 
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driver of the car in which he was riding and the defendantr 
and that the negligence on the part of both was a proximate-
cause of ti1e collision, you will find in favor of the plaintiff,. 
unless you further believe said ~feyer was. guilty af contribu-
tory negligence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4. 
The Court instructs the jury tllat if you believe fi·om tnc· 
evidenc.e- that the defendant approached and operated its train 
over the crossing where ~Ieyer was killed at a greater rate 
of speed ti1an 15 miles au hour, tliat such fact alone is evi-
dence of the negligence of the defendant. · 
INSTR-UCTION NO. 7. 
The Court instructs the jury that if you find for tlw plain- , 
tiff, in ascertaining the amount of damages, you should fix 
the same at such sum as you may think fair and just, not irr. 
excess of $10,000.00, with reference to: 
page 185 ~ (1) TJ:le pecuniary loss u,~stainerl by the wife 
and children of the ·deceased, fixing such sums 
as would be equal to the prolJable earnings of the deceased, 
taking into consideration his age, intelligence and health 
during what would have been his life time if he had not 
been killed. 
(2) By adding thereto compensation for the loss of his 
care, attention and society to I1is wife and children. 
(3)' By adding such further sum as you may deem fair and 
just by way of solace and comfort to his ·wife and children 
for the sorrow, suffering and mental anguish occasioned to 
'them by his death. 
Defendants objected and excepted to the giving of any in-
~tructions whatsoever in this case, authorizing a recovery by 
the plaintiff, on the following grounds: 
1. That there 'vas no evidence in this case upon which a 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff can be lawfully rendered; 
2. That the evidence shiws no negligence on the part of 
the defendant; 
( . 
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3. That, if the evidence shqws any such negligence (which 
is denied), the evillence fails to show that it was the proxi-
mate cause of the injury complained of ; 
4. That the evidence shows that the intervening act of the 
driver of the automobile, to-wit, !irs. Mapes, was the sole 
proximate cause of the injury complained of, and 
5. That the evidence shows that plaintiff's decedent was 
guilty of contributory negligence .. 
V,iri addition to the above general objections and ex~eption·s 
to each and all instructions, offered by the plaintiff and given 
by the court, defendant made ·the following objections and ex-
ceptions to said instructions, specifically: 
page 186 ~ .AS' TO PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION #1. 
. l. That this instruction is too abstract, general and in-
definite and allows the jury t.o consider all the charges of 
negligence contained in the plaintiff's notice of motion. 
2. The instruction· should have been limited so as to jus-
trify a -verdict only on specipe grounds on 'vhich there is evi-
dence to base a reeovery, 1f any such there w·ere, which is 
denied. 
3. The instruction condudes with a direction to find for 
the plaintiff and leaves out an essential factor for this direc:. 
tion, to-wit: As to the intervening and independent act of 
the driver of the automobile. 
AS TO PLAINTIF.F'S INSTRUCTION #2. 
This instruction is erroneous in that it hypothetically 
leaves the question of contrihutory negligence to the reliance 
thereupon. by the defendant '\vhen the defendant speci:fic.ally 
filed its grounds of contributory negligence before the trial 
of the case. 
AS TO BLAINT1F'S INSTR.u.c~eiON #2-A. 
rrhis iiistruction lS too general and without evidence to 
support it. 
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AS rpo PI.JAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION #3. 
1. This instruction refers to ''a'' proximate cause when 
it sh-ould have been "the" proximate cause; and the instruc-
tion should have stated that the concurrent negligence re-
fen·ed to should have been the sole proximate cause of the 
collision. 
2. This instruction misleads the jury in that it assumes, or 
may readily be interpreted to assume, that the negligence of 
the driver of the automobile was not the proximate cause of 
the accident. 
.· 
3. This instruction also in effect tells the jury to disregard 
the negligence of the driver of the automobile unless it was 
the proximate cause of the accident although the 
page 187 ~ negligence of 1\'Iayer may have been a coutributii1g 
factor thereto. 
AS TO PLAINTIFF'S INSTR~UCTION #4. 
1. This instruction is erroneous in that it fixes negligence 
upon the defendant if it operated its train in excess of a defi-
nite i·ate of speed. 
2. This instruction is violative of the ptinciple that a par-
ticular rate of speed is not, 1Jer se, negligence. 
3. rrhis instruction makes it negligence to approach a cross-
ing at a greater rate of speed than fifteen miles an hour, con-
trary to the provisions of the ordinance of the town of 1\En-
eral, upon whic·h the instruction is based, as this ordinance 
requires only than an engine shall not be drawn or pro-
pelled "in or across any street" of said town at a. greater 
ra t.e of speed than fifteen miles an hour ; and the ordinance, 
being a penni ordinance, should, of course, be strictly con-
strued. 
4. The instruction is further objectionable in that the evi-
dence sl1o·ws that the speed, at which the train was proceed-
ing, could·not in any event have been the proximate cause of 
the accident. 
AS TO PLAINTIFF'S INSTR.UCTION #7. 
I. This instruction is erroneous in that it mentions the 
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~urn of ten thousand clol1ars without stating that this was the 
:amount claimed in the declaration, and thereby gives judicial 
sanction to the said sum of ten thousand dollars. 
2. The mentioning of this amount in the instruction is 
:further objectionable in that it authorizes a recovery in ex-
cess of the amount of compensation which the plaintiff in-
surance company was liable to pay. 
3. Each of the items of damage mentioned in the instruc-
tion are objected to as the statute states that the jury may 
render a verdict for only such damages as may be "fair and 
just", a11d there is no authority for fixing the 
page 188 ~ damages for the pecuniary loss sustained by the 
wife and children of the deceased based upon -the 
probable earnings of the deceased, taking into consideration 
l1is age, intelligence and health, during what would have been 
his life time if he had not been killed; there is no evidence 
on these questions as to the probable earnings of the de-
ceased or what would have been his prospective life time 
if he had not been killed. 
4. The instruction is erroneous in that it authorizes an 
additional compensation for the losR of care, attention and 
soc·iety to the wife and children of plaintiff's decedent when 
there is no autl1oritv in the statute for such addition and 
there is nothing in tlie evidence to sho'Y any such care, atten-
tion, etc. 
5. The instructi011 is erroneous in allowing the jury to add 
to the above mentioned amounts any such sums as they may 
deem fair and just in the 'vay of solace and comfort to the 
·wife and children of tl1e deceased for the sorrow, suffering 
and mental ang-uish occ•asioned to them by his death, when 
there is no authority in the statute for any .such allowance, 
and, further, there is no evidence in the record to support 
-a verdict thereon. 
But the Court overruled each and every one of said objec-
tions set forth ahovc and gave instructions numbered 1; 2, 
'2-A, 3, 4 an<l 7, to wl1icl1 action of the Court in giving each and 
every one of said instructions and in giving any instructions 
w·hatsoever authorizing a recovery by the plaintiff, the defen· 
dant, by counsel, excepted. 
rrhe defendant offered the following instructions, num~ 
bcred A, B, C, D, E, F and G! 
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DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN. 
INSTR.UCTION A. 
The' Court instnwts the jury that the lJnrden of proof i~1 
this action is unon the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance 
of legal evidence t11at the defendant was guilty of negli-
~gence, proximately causing the death of the plaintiff's de-:.. 
cedent, and unless the jury shall believe that there 
page 189· ~ is such preponderating evidence in this case they 
should :find for the defendant .. 
INSTRUCTION B: 
The Cou;rt insfructs the jury that even tllough they may 
believe from the evidence that the defendant's se-ction house 
located npon its r~g·ht .. of way near .the First Street crossing 
in the Town of Mine.ral, partially obstructed the· view east-
ward of the plaintiff)s decedent. and the driver of the auto-
mobile fn which he was riding- as the automobile approach~d 
said crossing, the pr<~sence of said section l1ons-e on or in the 
vicinity of the defendant's right of way line did not constitute 
negligence upon which the plaintiff can base a recovery~ 
The existence of such obstruction to the view "rould onlv 
have the effect of increasing tl1e degree of caution requireci 
to be exercised by tlle plaintiff's decedent, and the driyei;' 
of the automobile, and the defendant's employees operating 
its train approaehing said crossi.ug. 
INSTRUCTION C. 
-The Court instructs tlw jury that a railroad train is en:.. 
titled to. the right of 'vay in preference to an automobile 
where the two approach a railroad crossing at approximately 
the same time. 
INSTRUCTION D.· 
The· Court instructs ti1e jury .that if tbey believe from ti1c 
evidence that the automobile in which the plaintiff's. decedent . 
was riding "\V'as driven by the driver tl1ereof in approaching 
the crossing in a reckless. and careless manuer and that the 
driver negligently failed to l1eed · the near a.pproa~h of the 
train ; and if the jury further. believp. t\om th~ ev~d~n~e tlu-J.t 
bv the exercise of ordinary care the driver of the au'fomobilc 
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to have avoided the accident, and that the failure 
page 190 ~ on her part to exercise such ca.re was the sole 
proximate cause of the accident then the jury 
should find for the defendant. 
DEFENDA-NT'S INSTRUCTIONS REFUSED. 
INSTRUCTION E. 
The Court instructs the jury that a passenger who sits 
quietly in an automobile while approaching a railroad cross-
ing and allows the driver to take him into a place of danger 
without effectively exercising his senses for his own protec-
tion, or without warning the driver, or making a protest, is 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
INS'TRUCTION F. 
The Court instructs the jury that a railroad track is of 
itself a notice of danger. to a traveler and tl1at a person aJr 
proaching a railroad crossing must not only use his eyes and 
cars, looking and listening in both directions, but must, wl1cn 
about to c.ross the track, look and liRten so as to make these 
acts reasonably effective. If such looking or listening did or 
'v-oulcl warn hin1 of the ncar approach of the train, t:4en it 
is· the duty of s~lCh person approaching a crossing to keep 
off a track until the train has passed. ...~nd if the jury be-
lieve from the evidenee that the plaintiff's decedent in this 
case did not look and listen in both directions as he ap-
proached the crossing of the defendant, or that he did not 
continue to look and listen us~ng reasonable care to make 
f.;uch looking and listening effective in both directions until 
he reached the main track of the defendant, the plaintiff 
was g-uilty of contributor·y negligence, and the jury should find 
for the defendant. 
INSTRUCTION G. 
':Phe Court iw:;tructs the jury that if they believe from the 
evidence that the plaintiff's decedent was himself guilty of 
negligence when the automobile in which he was riding- crossed 
or atten1pted to cross the raihvay tracks, upon 
page 191 ~ tlw occasion of his injury, and such negligence 
effieiently contributed to cause the injuries re- · 
ceived, then the p1aintiff cannot recover in this action even 
i 
156 l11 the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
·- though the jury may believe from the evidence that the de-
fendant was negligent. 
The Court gave instructions A, B, C and D, as offered, but 
refused to give instructions E, F and G, to which action of 
the Court in refusing to give each and every one of said in-
structions E, F and G, or any or either of them, the defen-
dant, by counsel, excepted and tenders this its Bill of Ex-
ceptions numbered 2, and prays that the same may be signed, 
sealed and made a part of the record in this case, which is 
accordingly done on this 12th clay of ,Tannary, 1927, within the 
.time prescribed by law and after clue and reasonable notice 
in writing to counsel for the plaintiff, as required by la"r· 
FRANI< T. SUTTON, ,Jn., Judge, (Seal) 
page 192 ~ Virginia : 
In the Law & Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part 
II. 
DEFENDANT'S BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO.3. 
Helen :1\fav :1\-Ieyer, Administratrix of George Edga~ ]\{eyer, 
deceased, 
v. 
The Chesapeake and Ol1io Railway Company. 
BE IT REl\fEMBER.JDD that on the trial of ~this case and 
after the jury had been selected and sworn and after the 
plaintiff, by counsel, had tendered to the Court a w·it.ness in 
rebuttal. Paul Copley, whose testimony was expressly limited 
by the Court so as to have no further effect than as an im-
peachment and negation of tllC testimony of F. A. Giesen-
dorffer, a witness for the defendant, to the effect that as 
engineer of tlw engine, l1e stopped the train as quickly as he 
could, under the existing circumstances, the following oc-
curred: 
"By J\fr. Sinnott: Q. J\Ir. Copley, in wl1at business are you engaged? 
A. I am engineer. 
Q. Locomotive engineer? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Whicl1 railroad? 
A. R. F. & P. 
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(Q. Now engaged in -operating locomotives? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q.. How long have you been so engaged 1 
A. I have been promoted nine years, been on the road 
fifteen. 
Q. Are you familiar with the operation of loco-
page 193 } motives ~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I will ask you :Nir. Copley this: Traveling on a track 
·where there is no grade ·but a slight dip, a locomotive pulling 
a train of six coaches-
I\£r. Spicer: I don't want to interrupt counsel's question, 
lJnt I don't tl1ink he has laid the foundation yet to qualify 
the 'vitness for the question he is seeking to ask him. I 
should think he should bring out whether or not the witness 
has had particular experience with the type of engines, in 
ihe ldnd
9 
of service, yard service, freight service or passen-
ger serVIce. 
13v the Court: 
·Q. V\That kind of engines have you been driving? 
A. I have been driving the Pacific type, three drivers. 
Q. Type F-151 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Drive on a passenger train 1 
A. I never had a regular passenger job, I did a little extra 
passenger work. I never stood for a passenger job. 
Q. Done some passenger work? 
A. Yes, sir, very little. 
Q. What is your usual 'vorkf \Vhat is the nature of the 
11sual train you drive on? 
A. I have' been working extra ever since I have been pro-
moted. I did have a freight job about two months this year) 
but they cut that off. I am on the extra list now. 
By 1\tir. Sinnott: . 
Q. You have operated a pa_ssenger train with that type of 
engine1 . 
A. Yes, sir. 
By the Court : 
Q. Operate them enough to acquaint you with the stop· 
ping· of traiiis? 
A. Y~s, sir. 
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By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. In the time that you have been engineer have you been 
principally enJl!lged in yard service or what¥ 
A. I have· been in .yard service and been :firing a passenger 
train and been running freight, hostling and most everything. 
that came to. handr· 
page 194 ~ Q. \Vhat have you been doing most of that 
time ? You said you had been engineer nine years~ 
A. I have been running extra run freight train and yards~ 
Q. l\1ostly freight and yards 0l . 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mostly in yard se.rvice t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. About what proportion of your time would be taken 
up with yard service Y 
A. About six months in the year I am on the yard. In the 
extra list you get yard work and road work, too~ 
Q. Fire a passenger train any~ 
A. Running. 
Q. I-I ow many passenger runs have you made f 
A. I never made any only emergency runs on passenger 
train. The only passenger train I ever ran 'vas from Potomac 
Yards to Washington. I caught that on an emergency trip. 
Q. Ho'v far is that? 
A. About eight miles . 
. . Q. That is the only time yon l1ave run a passenger train? 
A. Yes, .sir. I have handled a passenger train around the 
station in making up passenger trains, around Broad Street 
station up here. · 
The Court: I am going to admit that testimony: The 
degree of expertness is a question that the jury may decide ; 
they may "reigh his testimony. 
Mr. Spicer: We just note an exception. 
By Mr. Sinnott: 
Q, I believe yon stated you are familiar ·with the F-15 
three drive engine. I 'vill ask you, on a track where there 
is no grade but a slight dip, an engine of that type pulling-
six passenger eoaehes and traveling at tl1e rate of speed of 
15 miles an hour, in what distance could it he stopped? 
]Hr. Leake: V\T e ohjert to the question as not containing 
all the facts of the case. 
The Court: What facts has he omitted1 
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l\ir. Leake: It doesn't _giYe the location of the curve or 
indicate the amount of pressure on. 
page 195 ~ Q. (Continued) With ninety pounds of air, 
within what distance could it be stopped~ 
l'Ir. Leake: We sa-ve the point. 
A. Should stop in about a car and a half length. 
Q. Would it have any difficulty in doing that going at the 
rate of fifteen miles an hour? 
A. No, sir, I don't think it would. 
CROSS EXAl\IINATION. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. You say you operated a passenger train once t 
A. From Poton1ac Yard to Washington. 
Q. Eight miles 1 
·A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. You base your opinion upon the result of that trip? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Bv the Court : 
~ Q. I would like to ask you this, if you ever fired on a 
passenger train? 
A. I fired a passenger engine for ten years· regularly. 
Bv :Mr. Sinnott: 
. · Q. In your experience as fireman, did you learn a good deal 
about stopping locomotives? 
A. Yes, sir. \V e made some n1ighty good stops while I 
was firing. 
Q. Did you have experience then in stopping engines? 
A .. vVell, not on the main road. I never had any experience 
stopping wl1en I 'vas fi.rii1g. 
Q. You were ~n1 there when the engine would be stopped? 
A. Yes, sir, when they would be stopped. 
1\fr. Spicer: \V c move to exclude the testimony of the wit-
ness on the ground that he is not properly qualified. 
The Court: The motion is ove1·ruled and ex-
page 196 ~ ception noted. · 
r.fr. Spicer: \Ve woi.1ld like to note an addi-
tional ground for the motion to exelude the evidence; that 
is, as io the conditions and the circumstances at the time of 
the accident. 
,.--
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Thereupon the defendant, by counsel, objected to ·the tes-
timony of the witness as shown above, hut the Court overruled 
the said objections and allowed the testimony to go to the 
jury, to which action of the Court the defendant, by conn~ 
sel, excepted, and thereafter, at the conclusion of the testi-
mony of tl1e 'vitness the defendant, by eounsel, moved the 
court to exclude and strike out the testimony of the wit-
ness, which motion the Court overruled, to which action of 
the court, the defendant, by counsel, excepted and tenders 
this its Bill of Exceptions No. 3, and prays that the same 
may be signed, sealed and made a part of the record in this 
case, which is accordingly done on this 12th day of tT anuary, 
1927, within the time prescribed by law and after due and 
reasonable notice in writing to counsel for the plaintiff, as 
required by law. 
FRANK: T. SUTTON, ,JR., Judge, (Seal) 
page 197 ~ Virginia : 
In the Law & Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part 
II.- . 
DEFENDANT'S BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO.4. 
Helen 1\tfay :.Meyer, Administratrix of George Edgar 1\{eyer, 
deceased, 
v. 
The. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company. 
BE IT RE1\IE1\fBERED that on the trial of this case and 
after the jury had been selected and sworn and after the tes-
timony of tl~e witness, Paul Copley, had been allowed to go to 
the jury over the objections of the defendant, as set out in 
Defendant's Bill of Exceptions Number 3, tlw defendant, by 
counsel, tendered to the Court a witness, G. N. Lawson, and 
the following occurred: 
By 1\.{r. Spicer: 
Q. ~fr. Lawson, what is your business 1 
A. R.oad Foreman of Engine, C. & 0. Railway. 
Q. Are you an engineer? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you been a locomotive engineerT 
A. Since 1911. 
Q. Have you ever operated a passenger train~ 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long did you operate passenger trains1 
A. Well, ever since 1918, off a11d on, never was regularly 
:assigned to a passenger train. 
Q. Have you had occasion to make frequent trips over the 
main line of the C. & 0. Railway. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What are your duties no1v as Road Foreman of Engines 1 
·A. Supervising the work of engineers and fire-
page 198 ~ men and instructing them in their duties. 
Q. Do you consider yourself capable of judg-
ing the distance Within which engines might be stopped under 
given conditions? 
· A. Yes, sir. . . 
Q. Mr. Lawson, in case of an engine pulling a passenger 
train of six cars, on a practically level grade, engine type 
F-15 with three drivers, going at the rate of speed of :fif-
teen miles au hour, having reduced air pressure from 110 
to 90 pounds, "rithin what distance would you say that en-
gine could be stopped f 
:fi1r. ~tfay: Just a minute. This evidence was put in oit 
direct testimony by the railroad and they have gone and 
put it on now as rebuttal evidence. 
The Court: ·vvhat have you to say al)out that1 Why 
didn't you put this on before? . 
l\fr. Spicer: There was no occasion for it. No expert evi-
dence has been introduced on this point at all. 
The Court: You asked your· engineer. . 
l\fr. Spicer: \Ve asked him the time within which he 
stopped and if that was reasonable. 
The Court: I don't think you can go into this testimony 
now. Objection is sustained. 
1\fr. Leake: You will not let us go into that for the p1u• 
pose of contraclictingf We would like to have the jury ex-
cused so as to show what his ans,~;rer would be. 
The jury were· sent from the court room and the question 
was repeated to the witness. 
A. Well, I would sny in the neighborhood of four or five 
hundred feet. 
B:r ~1:r. Leake~ 
·Q. That would be more than a car length and a halft 
What is the length of a car f 
,---
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.A . .A car is about eighty feet, or eighty-four ~eet. '' 
To 'vhich action of tl1e Court in. excluding the.testimony of 
the witness, G. N. Ln,vson, and refusing to allow it to go to 
the jury, the defendant, by counsel, excepted. 
Thereafter, and during the absence of the jury 
page 199 ~ from the court room, the defendant, by counsel,. 
tendered to the Court the witness, J. W. Clowes, 
arid after he had been first duly swo-rn the following occurred: 
"By Mr. Spicer : 
Q. ~fr. Clowes, wl1at is your occupation Y 
A. I am a locomotive engineer on the C. & 0. R,ailway. 
Q. I-Io:w long have you been a. locomotive engineer~ 
A. Fort¥ years. . 
Q. Have you been engaged in passenger service ·f 
A. About eight years. 
Q. Operate a passenger engine for that length of time 1 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. RecentlyY 
A. Yes, sir, at the present time. 
Q. Do you consider yourself capable of judging the dis-
tance vtithin which a pass·enger engine of Type F-15, witb 
three drivers on each side, is capable- of being stopped under 
different oonditions f 
A. I think so, sir.· 
Q. In case of a locomotive of that type, pulling a train 
of six passenger coaches, at a rate of speed of fifteen miles 
an hour, on a practically level grade, having reduced the air 
pressure from 110 to 90 pounds, within what distam.ce 'vould 
you say that engine could be stopped Y 
A- I "Tonld say approximately between 400 and 450 feet, 
something in that neighborhood. 
Plaintiff, by counsel, objected to the foregoing testimony 
of the witness, J. "\'\7• "\!Jowes, going to the jury, which ob-
jection the court sustained, to which ruling- of the court de-
fendant, hy counsel, excepted.'' 
To wl1icl1 action of the Court in excluding the testimony 
of the witness, J. W. Clowes, and refusing· to allow it to 
go to the jury, the defendant, by counsel, likewise exrepted. 
and tenders this its Bill of Exceptions No. 4, and prays that 
the same may be signed, sealed and made a part 
page 200 ~ of t11e rerord in this case, which is according·ly 
done on this 12th day of January, 1927, 'vithin 
I 
·! 
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the time prescribed by law and after due and reasonable 
notice in writing to counsel for the plaintiff, as required 
by law. 
FRANK T. SUTTON, JR., Judge, . (Seal) 
. . 
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In the La'v and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part Two. 
STIPULATION. 
Helen ~fay ~feyer, Administratrix ·of George Edgar Meyer, 
deceased, 
v. 
The Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company. 
·It is agreed between Counsel for the respective parties 
hereto that the following named exhibits introduced in eVi-
dence at the trial of this case need not be copied in the record 
by the Clerk of the Law and Eq11ity Court of the City of 
Richmond, Part Two, but in the event that a 'vrit of error 
or other appellate process be awarded the original exhibits 
themselves shall be used in the appellate court with the same 
force and effect as if set forth at large in the record: 
Exhibit Ambler #1. 
Exhibit Demeute #1. 
· Exhibit Demeute #2. 
Exhibit Demente #3. 
It is further agreed that a reduced size copy of Exhibit 
Ambler No. 1 may he attached to the petition for writ of 
error to he presented in this case, and that in the event a 
writ of error or other appellate process be a'varded, reduced 
size copies of this e;t:hibits may also be attached to copies of 
the briefs to he filed. 
S. L. STl\TNOTT and JOfiN G. ~IAY, Jn., 
Counsel for Helen l\fay ~feyer, Administratrix 
and Maryland Casualty Company, 
LEAKE & SPICER, 
Counsel for The Chesapeake and Ohio Railway 
Company .. 
1-64 l11 the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. · 
page 202 ~ I, Luther Libby, ·Olerk of the Law and Equity 
Court of the City of -Richmond, Part Two, do 
hereby certify that the foregoing is a true transcript of so 
much of .the record in the above entitled action wherein H·elen · · 
May Meyer, Administratrix of tlw estate of George Edgar .. 
l\ieyer, deceased, and l\faryland Csualty. Company," are· plain-
tiffs, a.ild the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, a cor-
_poration, is defendant, as was agr~ed upon· between Coun-
sel f~r said plaintiffs and defendant, should be copied, and 
that the said plaintiffs had due notice of ·the intention of the 
defen-dant to apply for such transcript. 
Witness my hand this 31st day of January, 1927. 
LUTHER LIBBY, Clerk. 
Fee for this Record, $83.50. 
A Copy-Teste: 
H. STEW ART JONES, C. C. 
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